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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: FOCUSING THE

INQUIRY
By CATHY S. KRENDL** and JAMES R.
I.

KRENDL*

THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE VEIL DOCTRINE

A fundamental tenet of Anglo-American law is the concept
that a corporation will ordinarily be treated as a legal entity
separate from its shareholders.' The shareholders can thus confidently commit limited capital to the corporation with the assurance that they will have no personal liability for the corporation's
debts.' This tenet is based on the theory that the corporation is
an artificial entity, separate from the shareholders. 3 Further, it is
* Partner, Cohen, Brame, Smith & Krendl, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1963, Harvard
University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1967, North
Texas State University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School. The authors wish to acknowledge their appreciation to Mr. Arnold Guttenberg, a third-year law student at the University of Denver, who diligently and skillfully performed much of the legal research for this
article.
See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, § 122 at 293 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited
as BALLANTINE]; W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 25 at 100 (rev. vol. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 252 at 501 (2d ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN]; F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, § 1

at 1 (1931) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]. The general rule cited by these authorities is
usually cast in these words of Judge Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905):
If any general rule can be laid down in the present state of authority, it is
that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and
until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
For an English case illustrating the strong policy of recognizing corporateness, see Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., L.R. [1897] A.C. 22, 38, rev'g Broderip v. Salomon, L.R.
[1895] 2 Ch. 323, cited in BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 298-99.
1 Subscribers and shareholders will normally be liable to the corporation or its creditors for the full consideration for which their shares are issued. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 410 (West 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-4-120 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 162 (1974); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.23 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 628 (McKinney 1963); TEx.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 1956).
1 For a discussion of the theories of corporateness (separate artificial entity versus
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based on the economic policy that shareholders should be encouraged to commit limited amounts of capital to an endeavor which
might be too risky for direct individual involvement.' Corporate
limited liability is fundamental to the law of every jurisdiction in
the United States. 5
There is no suggestion in the case law which will be discussed
later in this article of any basic change in this strong legal policy.
There are, however, numerous cases in which the corporate structure is used so improperly that the continued viability of the
corporation is unfair. In such circumstances, the courts will exercise their equitable powers 6 to disregard the corporate entity, to
"pierce the corporate veil," and thereby hold the proper parties
liable for the corporation's actions.'
Obviously, there are other legal remedies8 which would
achieve many of the same ends attained by piercing the corporate
collections of persons), see FLETCHER, supra note 1, at §§ 24-25; HENN, supra note 1, at §
78.
, For a brief review of the history of limited liability in English common law and in
the United States, see Carolan, Disregardingthe CorporateFiction in Florida, 27 U. FLA.
L. REV. 175, 177 n.10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Carolan]. For the general rationale
behind the policy of limited liability, see Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929) [hereinafter cited as
Douglas & Shanks]; Comment, Should Shareholders be Personally Liable for the Torts
of Their Corporations?,76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1190-91 (1967). See also Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d
552 (Conn. 1967) (Cotter, Assoc. J., dissenting).
See note 1 supra. In 1929, Douglas & Shanks confidently proclaimed:
Yet in spite of this apparent recession no one would claim that the availability of limited liability played an insignificant part in the expansion of industry and in the growth of trade and commerce. It has had a potent influence.
Limited liability is now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained
in our economic and legal systems. The social and economic order is arranged
accordingly. Our philosophy accepts it. It is legitimate for a man or group of
men to stake only a part of their fortune on an enterprise. Legislatures, courts
and business usage have made it so.
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 193-94. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247
App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 72 (1936).
a See BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 122 at 326; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 141 at 559;
HENN, supra note 1, § 146 at 250.
' See BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 136 at 292-93; HENN, supra note 1, § 147, 148 at
293; FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 41; PowEL, supra note 1, § 18 at 95; R. STEVENS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 17 at 86 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
STEVENS].

For a succinct description of the noncorporate theories of liability, see Note,
Liability of a Corporationfor Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1122, 112325 (1958).
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veil: Agency,' fraud,' 0 estoppel," contract or quasi-contract theoI Distinguished scholars have wrestled with the difference between an agency theory
and a piercing-the-corporate-veil theory for more than half a century. Although the distinction they make seems clear, some courts seem to confuse the issue. Consequently, each
new article on the subject must reiterate the distinction. In 1925, Professor Ballantine
stated that most of the opinions which disregard the corporate veil can be explained by a
liberal application of ordinary agency rules. See Ballantine, SeparateEntity of Parentand
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAul. L. REv. 12, 15 (1925). Justice Cardozo in 1926 seemed
to agree that agency per se might not always be present in situations where justice requires
piercing the veil. In Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), he
stated:
Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general
rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent.
Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and
justice. Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Cal. Law Review, 12 18, 19, 20. The logical consistency of a juridical conception will
indeed be sacrificed at times, when the sacrifice is essential to the end that
some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. This is so, for
illustration, though agency in any proper sense is lacking, where the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will work a fraud upon
the law. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civil & Commerce
Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 38 S. Ct. 553, 62 L. Ed. 1229; United States v. Reading
Co., 253 U.S. 26, 61, 63, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. 760. At such times unity is
ascribed to parts which, at least for many purposes, retain an independent
life, for the reason that only thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form. We find in the case at hand neither
agency on the one hand, nor, on the other, abuse to be corrected by the
implication of a merger. On the contrary, merger might beget more abuses
than it stifled.
In 1929, Judge Learned Hand made the most sensible distinction: that express agency
would not provide a remedy because the consensual element would be lacking and that
implied agency would be inappropriate because that would mean that the veil would be
pierced in every situation. In Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31
F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929), Judge Hand stated:
One corporation may, however, become an actor in a given transaction, or
in part of a business, or in a whole business, and, when it has, will be legally
responsible. To become so it must take immediate direction of the transaction through its officers, by whom alone it can act at all. [Citations omitted.] At times this is put as though the subsidiary then became an agent of
the parent. That may no doubt be true, but only in quite other situations;
that is, when both intend that relation to arise, for agency is consensual. This
seldom is true, and liability normally must depend upon the parent's direct
intervention in the transaction, ignoring the subsidiary's paraphernalia of
incorporation, directors and officers. The test is therefore rather in the form
than in the substance of the control; in whether it is exercised immediately,
or by means of a board of directors and officers, left to their own initiative
and responsibility in respect of each transaction as it arises. Some such line
must obviously be drawn, if shareholdering alone does not fuse the corporations in every case.
Hand's distinction was adopted and elaborated by POwELL, supra note 1, at 94. This same
analysis is often made by modern commentators. See note 8 supra,at 1124. However, some
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ries such as unjust enrichment, 2 and breach of fidiciary duty 13 are
among such alternative bases for relief. Indeed, it is common in
corporate veil cases for a complaint to state a claim based on one
courts continue to be confused. They use agency as a synonym for instrumentality and
then also use agency in the correct sense. The difference between the two, or indeed the
meaning of agency in a particular opinion, is often not clear. See FLETCHER, supra note 1,
§ 43 at 209-10. For a general survey of the instances where the traditional rules of agency
would be appropriate, see FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 30 at 130.
10 Misrepresentation is often not a helpful remedy in these situations, either because
the misrepresentation is in the nature of an opinion or conclusion, because there is no proof
of detrimental reliance, material misrepresentation, intent, or because of statutes of limitations. See POWELL, supra note 1, at 63. Powell illustrates a kind of misrepresentation
often found in the corporate veil area with these examples: where the officers of the parent
corporation in their reports or correspondence or in their oral statements to the plaintiff
state that the parent is "back of" the subsidiary or that the subsidiary is the same as the
parent or a mere department or division of its business. See notes 111-19 infra and accompanying text.
For examples of the corporate entity being disregarded in the case of fraudulent
transfer in hindrance of corporate creditors, see generally FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 44 at
238-39; HENN, supra note 1, § 146. For an illuminating description of the relationship
between fraudulent transfers and piercing the corporate veil, see Clark, The Duties of the
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1977).
1 Traditional estoppel will often be useless because it requires proof of detrimental
reliance which is usually not present in the typical piercing-the-corporate-veil case. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 at 215 (1975). For a comparison of
traditional estoppel with the kind of estoppel-like conduct present in piercing-the-veil
cases, see FLETCHER, supra note 1, § .47 at 274; POWELL, supra note 1, § 13(e) at 66; Note
supra note 8, at 1125.
"2 But see United States v. Dean Van Lines, 531 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1976), where the
United States brought suit against a Belgian subsidiary's American corporate parent,
seeking an accounting and collection of overcharges allegedly made by the subsidiary. The
Belgian subsidiary had overcharged the United States when acting as its freight forwarder,
and the parent had sold the stock of its subsidiary. The Government alleged that the
parent had realized an inflated price for the shares as a result of the overcharges. The
parent had not liquidated the subsidiary, and, according to the court, there was no showing that the United States could not pursue its claim against the subsidiary. The Government admitted that it could not prove that the former subsidiary was the alter ego or
instrumentality of its parent and that, therefore, it was proceeding on an unjust enrichment theory, not the corporate theory of piercing the veil. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
lower court and held that on these facts-particularly in view of the failure of the Government to show a unity of interest between these two corporations-the government could
not recover.
'1 For a recent discussion of the requirements of the fiduciary duty theory, see generally Comment, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary
Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964). For example, in Zohn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d
36 (3d Cir. 1947), the directors of the corporation were found liable for calling certain stock
of minority shareholders in order to increase the value of stock held by another corporation
which controlled such directors. On slightly different facts, it can be seen that the corporate shareholder might be liable on a piercing-the-veil cause of action for causing the
partially owned subsidiary to take actions in the interest of the parent.
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or more of these theories as well as the piercing-the-corporate-veil
theory.' 4 The corporate veil theory, although similar to certain
other causes of action in some respects, is not congruent with any
of them.
One can imagine, for example, a hypothetical situation
which would represent a composite of a number of recent corporate veil cases.' 5 Assume that a corporation sets up a subsidiary
to engage in some high risk activity related to the parent's business. The corporate formalities between the companies are casually observed: They operate out of the same office with the same
officers and directors, they participate in the same projects with
confused lines of authority between them, and they transfer
money and other assets between them without proper accounting
or consideration. Third parties dealing with the parent and subsidiary are not fully aware of the distinction between the two
companies, and, either through deliberately misleading statements or through a failure to correct the impression given to such
third parties, the related corporations encourage or permit such
confusion. As a result of initial undercapitalization or because the
subsidiary is operated in an unprofitable manner, the parent ends
up with all of the fruits of their combined business activities and
the subsidiary is left insolvent.
Then, a creditor or tort victim of the subsidiary corporation
finds that the subsidiary is judgment proof while the parent
which has grown prosperous on the subsidiary's activities has no
contractual or other obligation to the plaintiff. Seeking redress
against the parent, the plaintiff may allege fraud (on the theory
that the parent represented itself as being liable for the subsidi" See, e.g., Bernardin, Inc. Midland Oil Corp. 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975) (fraudulent transfer possible alternative theory); Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324
F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963) (agency pleaded); Puamier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019
(E.D. Va. 1974) (misrepresentation or estoppel possible theories); Whayne v. Transportation Management Serv., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (agency pleaded); Savage
v. Royal Properties, Inc., 4 Ariz. App. 116, 417 P.2d 925 (1966) (estoppel); Soderberg
Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355 (1974) (court
said judgment could be upheld on the theories of agency and estoppel).
'1 See, e.g., Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp.,
520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975);
Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); Puamier v. Barge
BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Va. 1974); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552
(1967); Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974);
Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355
(1974).
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ary's debts), fraudulent transfers of property (on the theory that
money or assets were improperly transferred from the subsidiary
to the parent), agency (on the theory that the subsidiary acted
at the direction of the parent), breach of fiduciary duty (on the
basis that the directors and officers of the subsidiary wasted its
assets in order to benefit the parent), or any number of other
causes of action. In such a situation, the corporate veil doctrine
may provide a more realistic measure of the essence of the claim,
that is, that the parent, not the subsidiary, is the real party in
interest. More important, it may be easier for the plaintiff to
carry his burden of proof under the corporate veil theory than
under other legal theories.
A plea to pierce the corporate veil may occur in a wide variety of circumstances: against the sole individual shareholder of a
close corporation"6 or against a substantial parent corporation
with one or more subsidiaries;" it may arise against an affiliated
group of corporations with a common shareholder or shareholders; ' the party sought to be held liable may not even be a shareholder, but rather a creditor or optionee. 11The plaintiff may be a
party to a contract with the subsidiary who claims that he relied
on representations that the parent would back the subsidiary, 0
or he may be a tort victim who had no knowledge of the defendant
prior to the incident giving rise to his claim.2 Obviously some22
what different policy considerations are involved in such cases,
"

See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988

(1968).
" See, e.g., Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
" See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carleton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966), 276
N.Y.S.2d 585.
,1See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (creditor); Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash.
App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355 (1974) (optionee).
2 See, e.g., Paumier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Va. 1974).
23 See, e.g., Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963). For
other examples of the vast variety of contexts in which this question arises, see
BALLANTNE, supra note 1, § 121 (tax), §§ 129, 139 (bankruptcy and receivership), 140
(jurisdiction and service of process); FLrcHER, supra note 1, §§ 40, 43, 45.1 (tax); HENN,
supra note 1, §§ 149-153; STEvENs, supra note 7, § 17.
21The creditor elects to extend credit to a corporate entity; the tort victim does not.
On that basis, most commentators suggest that the courts should view such claims from
different perspectives. See BALANrINE, supra note 1, § 137 at 315; HENN, supra note 1, §
146 at 252-54; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 210-11; Carolan, supra note 4, at 194;
Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. REv. 979, 984 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
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and equitable principles are usually
but a common set of rules
23
applied to all of them.
The corporate veil concept therefore serves a useful if ambig2
uous role in the law. Because the remedy is essentially equitable
and because disregarding the corporate entity requires contradicting the strong public policy of limited liability, the courts
reluctantly, inconsistently, and sometimes unclearly determine
how and when to pierce the veil.2 5 This article will discuss the
historical development of the principal applicable rules, consider
in some detail what we will refer to as the "Powell" rule, analyze
a number of recent cases within the structure of what we believe
are the ultimate issues which courts consider in determining
when to pierce the veil, and, finally, suggest some considerations
and procedures which may help corporations weave more impene2
trable veils and assist plaintiffs in piercing the veil.
Hamilton]; Comment, supra note 4, at 1190. See also Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 521 S.W.2d
639, 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); But see notes 121-25 infra and accompanying text.
The policy considerations are different when the defendant is a corporation rather
than an individual. Should the veil of one corporation (a subsidiary, for example) be
pierced to reach the assets of another corporation (the parent), the personal assets of the
shareholders of the parent corporation are still protected by the parent's corporate shield.
In other words, such shareholders have a double layer of insulation not available in
situations where piercing the veil of a closely held corporation would immediately jeopardize all of the personal assets of the shareholders. See text accompanying note 155 infra.
Generally, the principles governing one-man, family, and other close corporations
are applicable to subsidiary and other affiliated corporations. See BALUANriNE, supra note
1, § 136 at 311; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209; HENN, supra note 1, § 148 at 258-59;
STEvENS, supra note 7, at 85. It has, however, been suggested that courts are more willing
to pierce the veil when a corporation rather than an individual is the defendant. See
Hamilton, supra note 22, at 992.
24 See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.2 at 179; HENN, supra note 1, § 94 n.5, § 146 n.2,
§ 148 n.7, § 150 n.16.
25 In 1925, Ballantine, supra note 9, at 15, described this area of law as a "legal
quagmire." In 1926, Justice Cardozo stated in Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84,
155 N.E. 58 (1926), that this subject was enshrouded in "mists of metaphors," a phrase
which Douglas agreed was appropriate in 1929. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at
218. Professor Ballantine in his treatise in 1946, supra note 1, § 136 at 312, stated that
there was still no guidance in the opinions to solve the variety of problems in this area:
"The deciding and differentiating factors in any particular situation are often difficult to
discover in the opinions. The formulae invoked usually give no guidance or basis for
understanding the results reached." Current commentators continue to emphasize the
confusion in this area of law, and the general failure of courts to articulate reasoned
grounds of decision. See Hamilton, supra note 22 and note 8. Courts also decry the
confusion; see, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973).
" This article will deal primarily with corporate cases subject to presumably uniform
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Approaches to Piercing the Corporate Veil

The corporate veil area of law seems peculiarly susceptible
to unhelpful rhetorical devices. Some of the terms which have
been used to discuss or describe a corporation whose veil should
be pierced include "mere adjunct, agent, alias, alter ego, alter,
idem, arm, blind, branch, buffer, cloak, coat, corporate double,
cover, creature, curious reminiscence, delusion, department, dry
shell, dummy, fiction, form, formality, fraud on the law, instrumentality, mouth piece, name, nominal identity, phrase, puppet, screen, sham, simulacrum, snare, stooge, subterfuge, and
tool."2
1.

Early Case Law

A fair starting point for analyzing this rhetoric is to examine
the early case law. Perhaps the earliest important case is United
rules. However, it should be recognized that numerous cases apply specialized rules. See
Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634
(8th Cir. 1975) (corporate veil of fund raising company is pierced to find in personam
jurisdiction over chief executive officer of company resulting from breach of contract);
Bruhn's Freezer Meats of Chicago, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 438 F.2d
1332 (8th Cir. 1971) (corporate veil pierced to find parent corporation liable for evasion of
Packers and Stockyards Act by subsidiary); Griffin & Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 802
(Ct. Cl. 1968) (veil of the subsidiary is pierced to hold the parent liable for federal income
taxes of subsidiary in a two year period in which the subsidiary did not carry on a
substantial business); Hillebrand v. Say-Co., 353 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. I1. 1972) (corporate
veil of parent pierced to allow trustee in bankruptcy to set aside certain voidable transfers
occurring within four months of bankruptcy by the subsidiary); ABC Great States, Inc.
v. Globe Ticket Co., 304 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (corporate veil of parent is pierced
to subject the subsidiary to venue in the jurisdictions where venue was proper on the
parent in antitrust proceeding); In re Farmers Federation Cooperative, Inc., 242 F. Supp.
400 (W.D.N.C. 1965), modified on other grounds, 368 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1966) (in a
bankruptcy proceeding subsidiary given same status as parent); Co-Con, Inc. v. Bureau
of Revenue, 87 N.M. 118, 529 P.2d 1239, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974)
(parent and subsidiary corporation are treated as one corporation for purpose of taxing
gross receipts, based on certain construction equipment without regard to which corporation had the legal title to the equipment); People ex rel. Bolton v. Progressive Gen. Ins.,
44 Ill. 2d 392, 256 N.E.2d 338 (1969) (in insurance company rehabilitation proceeding, sole
shareholder is ordered to "turn over" certain premium trust funds); State Bank of Cerro
Gordo v. Benton, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 317 N.E.2d 578 (1974) (corporation's veil is pierced
to prevent controlling shareholder from avoiding sales tax and transferring property to
himself to avoid paying a creditor's claim); Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 20, 514 P.2d 888 (1973) (corporate veil pierced to find corporation
liable for violation of liquor license law because of previous conduct of corporation's sole
shareholder). Most of these cases will be disregarded in the course of this article because
they involve special considerations which are not applicable to the area generally.
21HENN, supra note 1, § 146 n.2.
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States v. Reading Co. 2 In that case the United States brought
suit under an antitrust statute which provided that it was unlawful for any railroad company to transport in interstate commerce
"any article or commodity that . . . [is] mined or produced by
it, or which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may
have any interest, direct or indirect." The Reading Railroad had
established an elaborate corporate structure whereby a coal company originally organized by Reading became the wholly owned
subsidiary of a holding company which also owned Reading. The
Court looked through this subterfuge to find a violation of the
statute.
The Reading case involved both a strong public policy, as
embodied in a statute, and a cause of action which might have
rested solely on a liberal construction of the statute in question.
However, the Court chose to adopt a broader line of attack by
piercing the corporate veil of the elaborate structure to treat the
coal company, the railroad company, and the holding company
as a single entity.
The most widely cited of the early cases is Berkey v. Third
Avenue Railroad Co." In that case Judge Cardozo refused to
pierce the corporate veil of a street car subsidiary corporation to
find its parent liable for a personal injury to the plaintiff. The
accident in question occurred on a street car belonging to the
- 253 U.S. 26 (1920). This case was cited by the early commentators. See POWELL,
supra note 1, at 7. It is occasionally cited by courts today. See, e.g., Int'l R.R. v. United
Brands, 532 F.2d 231, 248 (2d Cir. 1976); Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315, 1319 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
240 F.2d 643, 650 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1959).
- 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 217 N.Y.S. 156 (1926). In POWELL, supra note 1, at 93, it
is noted that Berkey was a widely discussed case in the late 20's and early 30's. This case
continues to be cited frequently. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.3, n.52, and HENN, supra
note 1, § 94, n.5, § 146, nn.2 & 24, § 148, n.7, § 150, n.16. See also Lehigh Valley Indus.,
Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1975); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973); Estate of Stranahan v.
Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Murray v. Murray Laboratories, 223 Ark.
907, 912-13, 270 S.W.2d 927, 930 (1954); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. Dunn,
230 Ga. 345, 371, 197 S.E.2d 129, 143 (1973), (Hawes, J., dissenting); Carrol v. Caldwell,
12 I1. 2d 487, 497, 147 N.E.2d 69, 74 (1958); Goodwin v. S.A. Healy Co., 383 Mich. 300,
309, 174 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1970); Petition of White Mountain Power Co., 96 N.H. 144, 150,
71 A.2d 496, 502 (1950); Ford v. McCue, 163 Ohio St. 498, 502, 127 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1955);
United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 R.I. 501, 509, 209 A.2d 215, 220 (1965); Bell Oil & Gas
Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. 1968).
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42nd Street, Manhattenville and St. Nicolaus Railroad Company
which was a subsidiary of the Third Avenue Railroad. Facts
which indicated that the 42nd Street Company was not a genuine
separate corporation were that the subsidiary's cars were marked
with the parent's name, the annual report of the parent referred
to the subsidiary as part of the system, the employees of the
companies regarded them as identical, many functions such as
printing and purchasing were handled on centralized basis, the
parent directly paid for certain expenses of the subsidiary, and
the parent had made substantial loans to the subsidiary. 0 On the
other hand, Cardozo emphasized that the subsidiary maintained
its own bank account, paid the wages of its lower level employees
out of such account, had not been organized by the parent, had
substantial assets, negotiated loans from the parent in an arm's
length manner, and separated its operations to some degree from
affiliated lines, for example, by not allowing its motormen and
3
conductors to travel beyond its lines. '
Although Berkey was a civil action for injuries, piercing the
veil of the subsidiary-or treating the parent and subsidiary as
one entity-might have suggested that the corporations had violated a criminal statute which made it illegal for a franchise to
be assigned (in this case from the subsidiary to the parent) without the approval of the proper regulatory commission. In refusing
to pierce the veil, Cardozo placed considerable emphasis on the
32
seriousness of inferring a violation of the criminal statute.
The most interesting and significant part of this case was not
its holding, but this famous, oft-quoted language in which Cardozo struggles to impose some kind of rational order on the metaphors to which the courts had resorted in attempts to propound
rules for disregarding the corporate entity:
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mist of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
the devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. We
say at times that the corporate entity will be ignored when the
3o 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 217 N.Y.S. 156 (1926).
31 Id.

3, Id. at 91, 155 N.E. at 60. But see Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 198-99, who
argue that the subsidiary would not be an instrumentality in the absence of the criminal

statute.
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parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary which
is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well enough
if the picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that
the essential term is to be defined in the act of operation. Dominion
may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general
rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an
agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the test of
honesty and justice. Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Cal. Law. Rev. 12, 18, 19, 20. The logical consistency of a
juridical conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, when the
sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may
be defended or upheld. This is so, for illustration, though agency in
any proper sense is lacking, where the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will work a fraud upon the law. (Citation omitted) At such times, unity is ascribed to parts which, at
least for many purposes, retain an independent life, for the reason
that only thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do
business in a corporate form. We find in the case at hand neither
agency on the one hand, nor, on the other, abuse to be corrected by
the implication of a merger. On the contrary, merger might beget
more abuses than it stifled.n

2.

The Powell Synthesis

In 1931 Frederick J. Powell published a monumental study,
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations,3 4 which attempted to synthesize those cases which had disregarded the corporate entity.
Powell described an "instrumentality" test which he perceived to
be the test for determining whether a subsidiary is in fact so
dominated by its parent that its veil should be pierced to find the
parent liable. Although Powell's test was derived from a study of
the parent-subsidiary relationship and may have been meant to
apply exclusively to that relationship, it has been applied with
equal force to pierce the veil of closely held corporations to hold
35
the individual shareholders liable.
a.
synthesis

Lowendahl: An early application of the Powell

One of the early cases which used the Powell synthesis, although in a slightly modified form, was Lowendahl v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. 36 In Lowendahl two insolvent individuals had, prior
244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
"

See note 1 supra.
See note 7 supra.
247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
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to the entry of the judgment against them in favor of Lowendahl,
transferred substantially all of their assets to a newly-created
corporation in exchange for forty-nine percent of its stock. The
defendant B&O Railroad was the majority shareholder of such
corporation and, when Lowendahl failed to recover against either
of the individual debtors or against the insolvent transferee corporation, he sued B&O on the theory that the corporate veil of
the transferee corporation should be pierced to hold B&O liable.
In refusing to pierce the corporate veil, the court emphasized
that the individual judgment debtors had formed their scheme to
evade creditors long before they approached the defendant and,
therefore, that the B&O Railroad had played no direct role in the
injury to the plaintiff.3 The court also found that the B&O Railroad did not in fact control the subject corporation at the time of
the fradulent transfer, that it paid fair value for its stock and
received no assets from the defunct corporation, and that it was
not shown even to have had any knowledge or warning of the
improper activities of the insolvent individual shareholders.38 Citing Powell generally, the Lowendahl court stated that three elements must be proved to pierce the corporate veil:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit
fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other
positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of
plaintiff's legal rights; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. 9

b.

The impact of the Powell synthesis

It is interesting that the Lowendahl court chose a rule
strongly supportive of corporative limited liability when Lowendahl had such a weak case for relief on the facts. One explanation
might be that the court felt the need to preserve the rules of
limited liability in the depression era. Otherwise, widespread cor"

247 App. Div. at 158, 287 N.Y.S. at 77.
Id. at 160-61, 287 N.Y.S. at 79-80.
Id. at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76.
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porate failures might have encouraged a multiplicity of lawsuits
where hopeful plaintiffs would seek to pierce corporate veils to
find shareholders personally liable.
Derived from Powell's examination of the earlier case, the
Lowendahl case is one of the most frequently cited cases in this
area, 40 and is frequently followed either expressly or implicitly by
other courts. Although the Powell rule is itself solidly grounded
on case law, it represents a composite of factors considered by the
courts. In other words, some courts rely only on one or two of the
Powell factors and do not require all three. Therefore, the Powell
rule is of interest, not only because it is perhaps the most frequently applied and most clearly articulated of the rules in the
corporate veil area, but also because its parts include most of the
other rules in this area.4"
The Powell rule was derived to a large extent from a study
0 See Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1972);
Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 422 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1970);
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1963); Fisser
v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1960); Atlantic Mgmt. Corp. v. American
Cas. Co., 141 F.2d 108, 110 (3rd Cir. 1944); Johnson v. Warnaco, Inc. 426 F. Supp. 44, 48
(S.D. Miss. 1976); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F.
Supp. 1069, 1091 (D. Neb. 1976); Garrow v. Soo Line R.R., 361 F. Supp. 764, 768 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
412, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Nato v. Cia Secula di Armanento, 310 F. Supp. 639, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Broene v. Beaunit Corp., 305 F. Supp. 688, 694 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Brown
v. Margrande Compania Naviera, S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1005 (E.D. Va. 1968); National
Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Jackson
v. General Elec. Co., 514 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alas. 1973); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 577,
227 A.2d 552, 558 (1967); Grand Lodge of Iowa of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows
v. Grand Lodge No. 18, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 178 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Iowa
1970); Shirley v. Drackett Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970);
Mills v. Murry, 472 S.W.2d 6, 14 (Mo. 1971); Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88,
91, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (1971); Musman v. Modern Deb, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 761, 762, 377
N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (1975); Pilot Title Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Bank, 11 N.C. App. 444, 450,
181 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1971); Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash.
App. 721, 732, 524 P.2d 1355, 1363 (1974).
11 In HENN, supra note 1, § 147 at 256-59, it is stated that corporateness may be
disregarded if (1) the corporation is used for an illegitimate purpose or, absent such a
purpose, (2) the corporation is conducted on a personal not a corporate basis (specifically,
in the case of parent-subsidiaries, intermingling of business, lack of formalities, representing to the public that the enterprises are the same), or (3) the enterprise is inadequately
capitalized. Similarly, in FLetCHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209, it is stated that the corporate
veil will be pierced either upon a showing of instrumentality or fraud. Accord, BALLANTINE,
supra note 1, at 302-05. But see Note, supra note 8, at 1125, where the author concluded
that most courts require a showing of both "instrumentality" and "injustice." He observes
that "instrumentality" seems to imply some form of injustice.
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of early New York cases, and the influence of those cases continues today. As a commercial center, New York generated many of
the most important corporate veil cases. Early opinions by distinguished jurists, including Cardozo12 and Learned Hand,43 have
carried great persuasive weight, and Powell himself was a New
York attorney. Moreover, the difficulty of the issues raised by
corporate veil cases, the inability of most courts to develop a
comprehensive independent approach to the problem," and the
force of the New York opinions frequently have caused other jurisdictions to follow New York case law. As a result, the tendency
of New York courts to take a somewhat restrictive view 5 toward
disregarding the corporate entity may be discerned in other jurisdictions.
c. Other attempts to systemize the law
There have been any number of other attempts to systematize the law in the corporate veil area." The California courts
have sometimes emphasized undercapitalization to the exclusion
of other factors in finding grounds for piercing the veil.47 Many
courts have analyzed the problem through an "alter ego" or
' See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
,3 Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
" See generally note 15 supra.
4" See POWELL, supra note 1, at 32-33. See also Eskimo Pie Corp.
v. Whitelawn
Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where in a breach of contract action the
court refused to pierce the veil of a subsidiary because under New York law the creditor
cannot bring an action against the parent until he exhausts his remedy against the subsidiary by the return of an execution wholly or partly unsatisfied. Such a requirement-which
necessitates time and expense in attorney's fees-serves little purpose since one of the
issues in a case of this nature is whether the subsidiary is adequately capitalized. That
issue can be-as it is in other jurisdictions-determined without demanding the return of
execution.
" In 1925, in BALLANTINE, supra note 9, at 20, it was said that the courts usually
pierced the corporate veil upon a showing of (1) agency or (2) the use of the corporation
as an instrumentality to sanction a fraud or promote injustice. Douglas & Shanks, in 1929,
supra note 4, at 218, said that the courts would pierce the veil under circumstances they
categorized as (1) inadequacy of capital; (2) direct intervention which ignores the normal
and orderly procedure of corporate control; or (3) avoiding an inequitable result. The
recent attempts to categorize the case law, see Note, supra note 8, at 1125-28 (inadequate
capitalization and intermeddling) and Hamilton, supra note 22, at 985 (inadequate capitalization and the commingling of shareholder and corporate affairs). All of these considerations and categories are subsumed in the Powell approach.
,7 See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961);
W. CARY, CORPORATIONS at 127 (4th ed. 1969).
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"identity" test, although such an analysis seems to be essentially
the same as Powell's instrumentality rule. 8 Some states have
refused to pierce the veil absent a showing of fraud, the second
leg of the Powell rule, 9 while others, almost eliminating the necessity for a showing of any kind of wrongdoing, hold a defendant
liable where it is shown that the defendant dominated another
corporation and some loss was suffered by the plaintiffA0 A few
courts have utilized the "economic entity" concept, first propounded by Professor Berle."
Under the Berle view, related corporations may be viewed as
a single economic entity so that, in effect, the veil of each corporation is pierced to obtain the benefit of the total assets of all the
corporations.
B.

Analysis of the Powell Rule

The Powell rule, followed in whole or in part by most courts,
consists of three legs: instrumentality, improper purpose, and
proximate causation. In a strict application of the Powell test,
each of these elements must be proven in order to pierce the veil.
11For application of the alter ego approach, see, e.g., House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v.
American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972); Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc.
v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231
(2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974);
Schlecht v. Equitable Builders, Inc., 272 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975); Gentry v. Credit Plan
Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs., Inc., 244 Ill. App. 3d
21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974). These cases use the "alter ego" jargon, but apply at least the
first two legs of the Powell test. Indeed, the Koscot court at 468 F.2d 64, 67 n.2, stated
that although commentators have attempted to distinguish among the various theories,
they are all interchangeable. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.1 at 171, where the alter
ego approach is described in the same terms as the Powell rule:
To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that shareholders' disregard of the corporation made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction
of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist;
and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or
protect fraud.
, See Carolan, supra note 4, at 181. In BALuNr.ME, supra note 1, § 138 at 318, it is
said that the question turns not on instrumentality but rather on inadequacy of capital
or other abuse of control.
' See note 32 supra. See also Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d
667 (1971).
11Berle, The Theory of EnterpriseEntity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947). For a judicial
consideration of this theory see Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp.
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585 (1966).
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We will therefore consider the three legs of the rule separately,
but it must be borne in mind that the demarcation between the
facts showing one element and the facts showing another is by no
means always clear.
1.

Instrumentality

This is the leg of the Powell rule on which the greatest
amount of verbiage has been expended, and it is probably the
most difficult of the three legs to define. The concept is that a
plaintiff must prove that the subsidiary or other subservient corporation was operated not in a legitimate fashion to serve the
valid goals and purposes of that corporation but that it functioned under the domination and control and for the purposes of
some dominant party.52 Such domination must be something substantially more than the control which would be exercised by any
majority shareholder or every corporation would be automatically
subject to having its veil pierced.53 Further, the domination, according to the letter of the Powell rule, must be domination with
respect to the particular transaction attacked as opposed to domi54
nation in general.
a.

The Powell circumstances

Although no single fact or set of facts is determinative, Powell identified eleven circumstances which in a variety of combinations may indicate that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality.
These are as follows:
1. The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of
the subsidiary.
2. The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors
or officers.
3. The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
5' United States v. Wood, 366 F. Supp. 1074, 1083 (1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 1400
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (distinction between managerial and ministerial assimilation); Siboney
Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 521 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (key is whether control over
routine business transactions exists). See BALLANrINE, supra note 1, § 136 at 313 (shareholder must control and manipulate corporation); FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209 (the
corporation must have no separate mind, will, or existence of its own and be merely a
business conduit for its principal). See also Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4 (assimilation
for management purposes).
11FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 33 at 144-46, § 41.2 at 180; § 43 at 210; HENN, supra note
1, § 147 at 256; STEVENS, supra note 7, § 17.

11See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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4. The parent corporation subscribes to all of the capital stock of
the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
5. The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
6. The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or
losses of the subsidiary.
7. The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the
parent corporation, or no assets except the ones conveyed to it by
the parent corporation.
8. In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of
the officers, the subsidiary is described as a department or division
of the parent corporation, or its business or financial responsibility
is referred to as the parent corporation's own.
9. The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its
own.
10. The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary, but take their orders
from the parent corporation in the latter's interest.
11. The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed. 5

b.

The significance of the Powell circumstances

Fact 10-that the officers and directors of the subsidiary do
not act independently-would appear to be the most significant
fact, but it is also more a conclusion than an evidentiary fact.
Many of the other facts simply tend to establish the existence or
nonexistence of number 10. We would prefer to think of the Powell circumstances as "indicia." In some cases, the presence of all
or most of such "indicia" tends to establish that the subsidiary
corporation is not really a separate and independent entity and
is therefore a mere instrumentality of the parent. In other cases,
the presence of most or even all of such "indicia," with the possible exception of number 10, may not necessarily prove that the
subsidiary is an instrumentality. Moreover, in still other cases, a
subsidiary is found to be an instrumentality of the parent where
many of these indicia are not present.5 6 The factors identified by
Powell are therefore by no means a fully satisfactory test for
determining whether one corporation is an instrumentality of
another. They do, however, provide a useful and specific beginning to an analysis of the instrumentality metaphor.
POWELL, supra note 1, at 9.
56 See Caple v. Raynel Campers Inc., 90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

The instrumentality analysis is used by most courts in some
form or another because it provides a basis for determining that
the defendant is a real party in interest. If the defendant dominates the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary has no
will of its own, the parent, in effect, has itself acted to commit
the wrong to the plaintiff. Since the parent was the wrongdoer, it
can not defend itself with a corporate sham. Another way of stating the justification for this leg of the rule is that the shareholder
who treats the corporate entity as if it were another aspect of his
personal business can hardly complain if the court treats the
entity as he does.57
2.

Improper Purpose

If it is found that the subsidiary has been a mere instrumentality with respect to a particular transaction, the next question
under the Powell rule is whether the parent's domination or control has been used for fraud or other improper purpose. The underlying rationale of this requirement is that the corporate veil
should not be lightly pierced.5" The use of a corporation as a mere
instrumentality should not give third parties a license to pursue
the defendant unless some actual fraud or other injurious act can
be proven. This policy is defensible, especially in view of the
obvious indefiniteness of the instrumentality rule. While it may
well be argued that the instrumentality test makes piercing a
corporate veil too difficult for a plaintiff, it is also clear that the
ambiguity of the instrumentality test makes it possible to establish that a corporation was a mere instrumentality in a situation
where there was no improper intent on the part of the shareholder
nor any injurious result. Therefore, in fairness to the parent and
to support the policy of limited liability, improper purpose must
be established before the parent or other dominant party can be
found liable.
a.

The Powell approach to improper purpose

The Powell rule, as adopted by Lowendahl, refers to "fraud
or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other posit See

HENN, supra note 1, § 147 at 257.
Essentially this represents an allocation of the risk and is particularly justified in
the case of a creditor who voluntarily assumes the risk of dealing with the corporate entity.
Thus, the law requires that he show injustice before the risks shift to the corporation. See
Note, supra note 8, at 1130.
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tive duty, or a dishonest or unjust act. . . ,,"I
Other courts have
used the phrase "improper purpose," which we prefer as the general term to describe this leg of the Powell rule.'"
This aspect of the rule may best be appreciated by consideration of a case in which the subsidiary was clearly an instrumentality of the parent, yet no improper purpose was found. In Pauley
Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co.,"' Pauley sought a preliminary injunction which would have required Continental Oil to
cause its wholly-owned subsidiary to cease prosecution of an action against Pauley's wholly-owned subsidiary in Mexico. Pauley's theory was that the action in Mexico should be terminated
because of the likelihood that the Mexican courts would make a
wrong choice-of-law decision by applying Mexican law rather
than Delaware law to the contract at issue. The court found that
Continental's subsidiary was in fact a mere instrumentality of
Continental and that it had similarly been an instrumentality of
Pauley prior to its acquisition by Continental Oil.2 Stating that
piercing the veil was appropriate only when required "in the interest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law
or contract, public wrong, or. . .equitable consideration among
members of the corporation require it,""e the court found that
there was a legitimate reason for the existence of Continental's
subsidiary and that the subsidiary was not being used by Continental for any improper purpose. Specifically, the court found
that it did not know whether Mexican courts would make an
improper choice of law, nor did it know that an application of
1,In

POWELL, supra note 1, § 13, the following illustrations of improper purposes are

given:
1. actual fraud;
2. violation of a statute;
3. stripping the subsidiary of its assets;
4. misrepresentation;
5. estoppel;
6. torts;
7. other cases of wrong or injustice.
For other lists of improper purposes, see generally BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 136 at
314, and, for specific examples, § 130 at 303 (evasion of contracts and obligations), § 131
at 304 (fraudulent conveyance), § 132 at 305, § 12 at 329 (evasion of statutes), § 141 at
326 (abuse of control). See also FLErcHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209, § 45.2 at 268.
0 See, e.g., Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964).
, 43 Del. Ch. 516, 239 A.2d 629 (1968).
62 Id. at 518, 239 A.2d at 631.
03 Id. at 521, 239 A.2d at 633.
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Mexican law would lead to the wrong decision. Accordingly, since
the instrumentality was not being used for any improper purpose,
the court refused to pierce the veil.
b.

Alternative approaches to improper purposes

On the other hand, some cases have found an improper purpose rather easily once the initial question of instrumentality has
been resolved. Thus, in Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v.
4 the court found
Oppenstein"
that an improper purpose was established by the undercapitalization or removal of assets from the
subsidiary corporation by the parent-facts which the court also
considered in deciding that the subsidiary was an instrumentality. Citing May Department Stores Co. v. Union Electric Light
& Power Co.,65 the court, in ConsolidatedSun Ray, stated:
It does seem, however, that the determination of whether there
is a case for equitable relief could and should be decided by the test
of whether or not the arrangement involved is being used for a proper
purpose. Should not all these other suggested tests be used only as
aids for determining the true purpose of the arrangement? Making
a corporation a supplemental part of an economic unit and operating it without sufficient funds to meet obligations to those who must
deal with it would be circumstantial evidence tending to show either
an improper purpose or reckless disregard of the rights of others."

Thus, an improper purpose of some sort must be shown, but
such improper purpose may be as general or as vague as improperly capitalizing the subsidiary corporation at its outset. 7 The
use of the subsidiary for the purpose of evading a statute, 8 creating unjustified procedural roadblocks to legal relief for the plaintiff,69 or misrepresenting the state of affairs to a potential plain,4 355 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964).
341 Mo. 299, 107 S.W.2d 41, 54 (1937).
"' Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 1964).
See, e.g., Bernardin Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); Cohen v. Williams, 294
Ala. 417, 318 So. 2d 279 (1975).
" Compare United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920) with Westcott Constr.
Corp. v. Cumberland Constr. Co., 328 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1975). See text accompanying
notes 29-32 supra and text accompanying notes 105-13 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 106-08, 155-56, infra. See, e.g., Black & White, Inc.

v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963) and Shirley v. Drackett Prods. Co., 26 Mich.
App. 644, 182 N.W.2d 726 (1970). See also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d

1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (holding company allegedly created solely
to protect fraudulently acquired stock from execution of judgment in favor of defrauded
corporation).
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tiff' are other examples of improper purposes. Therefore, the
Powell rule, through its improper purpose requirement, ordinarily
requires that something more than a mere instrumentality be
proven,7 1 but the plaintiff need not prove the equivalent of common law fraud.72 Some equitable wrong will usually be sufficient
to show improper purpose.
3.

Proximate Cause

The final leg of the Powell rule is that not only must the
plaintiff show instrumentality and an improper purpose, but he
must also show that both the control by the parent and the improper act of the subsidiary have caused him some direct damage.7"
Again, consistent with the general policy to support corporate
limited liability, it is not the intent of the corporate veil doctrine
to grant a hunting license to plaintiffs to redress a general wrong
effected by domination of a corporation. The particular plaintiff
must be able to show that he suffered damages as a result of this
domination.
Thus, in Schlecht v. EquitableBuilders, Inc.,74 the trustee of
employee-benefit funds sued the parent of the employer to collect
amounts due to the funds. There was considerable evidence to
show that the assets of the subsidiary had been improperly used
for the benefit of the parent. For example, loans to the parent
were guaranteed by the subsidiary and secured by the assets of
the subsidiary. Nonetheless, the court refused to pierce the veil
because there was no evidence that the control exercised by the
parent or the improper activities of the subsidiary caused an in70 See, e.g., Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967), and text accompany-

ing notes 115-19 infra.
11See, e.g., Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments Corp., 386 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
72 See note 10 supra.
"' Powell argues that proximate cause may be lacking either because the complainant
has not been injured by the domination of the corporation or because the complainant
has an adequate remedy without resort to the corporation. See POWELL, supra note 1, at §
14. Acceptance by the complainant of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary,
independence of the subsidiary when the obligation to complainant arose, availability of
the subsidiary for redress, and, according to Powell, the unresolved situation where the
subsidiary is financially able to satisfy a judgment are examples of the absence of proximate cause. POWELL, supra note 1, at § 15. For resolution of the latter problem in New
York, see Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1, 272 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975). Compare Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d
88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971).
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jury to the plaintiff. In fact, the court pointed out that the improper actions had resulted in a Small Business Administration loan
to the parent and that some of the proceeds of such loan had been
paid to the plaintiff. 5 Therefore, the action at issue, even though
performed by an instrumentality of the parent and perhaps being
improper in some respects, was not injurious to the plaintiff.
Thus, the third leg of the Powell rule serves to support the
policy of limited liability by permitting the piercing of the corporate veil only where equity strictly requires that a particular defendant by reason of that defendant's wrongful acts has caused
injury to the plaintiff. Absent proof of all three legs of the rule,
the plaintiff will not ordinarily be allowed to recover in a jurisdiction following the Powell rule.
II.

A.

THE ULTIMATE ISSUES

Categorizationof the Ultimate Issues

We believe that the courts, whether applying the Powell rule
or some variation or alternative, are essentially concerned with
certain ultimate issues which can be identified in the cases. We
know, however, of no successful effort to integrate all of these
issues into a single simple rule which incorporates the proper
considerations with sufficient specificity to insure uniformity and
predictability of application.7 6 In this equitable area involving as
wide a variety of situations as foolishness or deviousness can contrive, there appears to be no single determinative factor. The
relative importance and usefulness of various factors will vary
from case to case, but at least the relevant factors or ultimate
issues can be identified to some extent.
To some degree, courts pay lip service to the Powell rule and
the circumstances evidencing instrumentality, or to some alternative rule or analysis, while actually basing their decisions on
one or more of the ultimate underlying issues." In other cases, the
courts attempt to apply in an inflexible mechanical way the Powell rule or some other rule and thereby arrive at what may not be
a sound decision. 8
' 272 Or. 92, 95, 535 P.2d 86, 89 (1975).
7 See note 46 supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974)
and United States v. Wood, 366 F. Supp. 1074 (1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A.
1974).
"' See Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert.
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We believe that it is useful to attempt to identify and analyze
some of the ultimate issues which underlie the better-reasoned
decisions. Such ultimate issues may be considered in three categories.
1.

Necessary Preconditions

There appear to be three necessary preconditions for a corporate veil case. These preconditions also exist in many cases where
piercing the veil would not be appropriate. Therefore, such conditions usually provide only a basis for moving forward to the second level of inquiry. They are not determinative in and of themselves. Such factors are: dominance of what we call a "subservient corporation" by some party to whom we refer as the "dominant party;" a beneficial interest by the dominant party in the
subservient corporation; and an injury to the plaintiff reasonably
related to the defendant's dominance of the subservient corporation.
2.

Improper Purposes

In order to justify piercing the veil there should be some
showing of improper purpose in addition to establishment of the
preconditions. These improper acts may be categorized as violations of public policy, misrepresentation, lack of economic substance, participation, and what we have labelled as "joint improper acts."79
3.

Policy Considerations

Finally, it would appear that there are policy considerations
which are utilized by the courts in a close case. We assume, of
course, that the traditional equitable considerations and the
strong policy in favor of preserving corporate limited liability will
always be involved. However, the particular additional policy
considerations which the courts appear to use in the corporate
veil area are the questions of who should bear the risk of loss and
what degree of legitimacy exists for claiming the limited liability
protection of a corporation.
It should be admitted that any attempt to categorize the
factors is somewhat arbitrary and artificial. At all times it should
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
,' For other categories of improper purposes, see note 59 supra.
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be borne in mind that these factors are closely related and that
they tend to merge imperceptibly into one another. Nonetheless,
we believe that there is some usefulness in trying to untangle
them for a brief examination. We will, therefore, discuss the proposed headings separately below.
B.

Preconditions
1.

Beneficial Interest

The Powell analysis was directed only at parent-subsidiary
relationships, presumably because there was perceived no need to
establish the liability of a nonshareholder. Stock ownership, however, is not an absolute requirement for piercing the veil. A more
precise requirement is that the dominant party must have some
beneficial interest in the subservient corporation. Thus, for example, in Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 0 the
defendant had an option to acquire the subservient corporation
but no actual stock ownership. However, pursuant to contractual
agreements, the optionee had effective control over the subservient corporation and a beneficial interest because of its right to
purchase the company. In connection with other factors, it was
found that the dominant party was in fact liable for certain actions taken through the instrumentality of the subservient corporation. Similarly, in Krivo IndustrialSupply Co. v. NationalDistillers & Chemical Corp.,"' a creditor was sued on a piercing-thecorporate-veil theory. There, the court held for the defendant on
other grounds, but acknowledged that the defendant could be
liable by reason of its position as a creditor and its exercise of
certain control rights over the debtor corporation.
Thus, the test is whether or not the defendant has some
beneficial interest in the subservient corporation, as a shareholder, creditor, potential shareholder, or conceivably, in other
respects. The better view in support of corporate limited liability
and judicial economy would, however, seem to require some such
beneficial interest. Otherwise there would be a potential for suits
against parties with only remote relationships with the corporate
wrongdoer.
11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355 (1974).
483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
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2.

Domination

The next precondition is effective domination over the subservient corporation by the dominant party. This is basically the
same question as is addressed by the first leg of the Powell test.82
Many cases appear to be decided almost exclusively on whether
or not the requisite degree of domination exists.8" However, this
merely demonstrates that instrumentality is the most difficult
aspect of most corporate veil cases, not that it is the only issue.
If domination cannot be proven, there is no basis for going forward to other issues. If domination is proven, the very facts which
establish it often demonstrate the other attributes necessary to
pierce the veil.
Consider, for example, a fairly typical opinion with an extended discussion of the domination which established that a
subsidiary was a mere instrumentality. In Consolidated Sun Ray,
Inc. v. Oppenstein,84 there was an action by a landlord to recover
damages for breach of a lease against both the subsidiary which
had entered into the lease and the parent corporation, Consolidated Sun Ray. In determining that the subsidiary was so dominated by the parent as to be a mere instrumentality, the court
found that Consolidated had exclusive control over the subsidiary's bank account, that it pledged the subsidiary's accounts receivable for its own loans, that the subsidiary had no independent
discretion with respect to buying and merchandising, that the
parent in its own name made arrangements for insurance and
advertising on behalf of the subsidiary without any indication of
consultation with the subsidiary, and that the two companies had
common officers and directors. 85 The court then determined that
the parent was liable for the subsidiary's lease obligations without such an elaborate discussion of the other requirements for
piercing the veil. But note that the facts showing domination also
show misrepresentation and undercapitalization, 6 thereby eliminating the need for detailed analysis on those issues.
12 See

note 52 supra.
See, e.g., Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); Chatterley v.
Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971).
335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964).
" Id. at 804-05.
See Ampex v. Office Elecs., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974); see text
accompanying notes 168-75 infra.
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The degree of domination which must be shown varies and,
for example, may depend on the force of the other equitable arguments in favor of piercing the veil. Thus, in Fisserv. International
Bank,"7 the court refused to find that a subsidiary corporation was
so dominated as to be a mere instrumentality where the parentdefendant had negotiated for a ship charter on behalf of the subsidiary, had formed and capitalized the subsidiary, and had chosen all of the subsidiary's officers and directors. The facts seemed
clearly to indicate the presence of virtually all of the Powell
''circumstances," including the fact that the subsidiary existed
exclusively for the benefit of the parent." But the court also found
that the plaintiffs knew that they were dealing with a controlled,
undercapitalized subsidiary and that they therefore could not
hold the parent liable for the subsidiary's inability to perform the
contract. 9
On the other hand, in Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc.,'" the
court found only very general evidence that the shareholder was
the "investing and directing force of both corporations."', However, in that case, the corporation had engaged in an outrageous
line of conduct with respect to the plaintiff, repossessing his truck
without justification, converting certain of his tools and personal
property, charging him a repossession fee based on its promise to
return the truck, and then still refusing to return it. In view of
the conduct of the corporation, the court determined with relatively little analysis that the individual shareholder should be
found liable for the corporation's activities.9 2
The issue of effective domination is one that will often involve a subjective determination by the courts. It is possible that
such determination will turn to a substantial degree on the
court's reaction to the other facts of the case. As a general rule,
,7282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
" Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 239. See also Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments, 386 F. Supp. 862 (D. Pa. 1975)
(instrumentality but no fraud because of creditor's knowledge); Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191
So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
9090 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974).
,Id. at 343, 526 P.2d at 336.
92 Id. at 344, 526 P.2d at 336. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (court pierced veil to hold that its jurisdiction
over Vesco gave it jurisdiction over a holding company formed by him solely for the
purpose of holding the stock he received as a result of his alleged fraud on the plaintiff).
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domination should be addressed as a threshold question; if it is
found to exist, one can then move on to the issue of whether the
domination was used for an improper purpose. But one should be
aware that the degree of domination which the plaintiff must
prove will frequently be dependent on the equity of his overall
position.
3.

Relationship to Injury

The final precondition is that there be some reasonable relationship between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the actions of the defendant. In the Lowendahl adoption of the Powell
rule this is put in terms of "wrongful acts resulting from the
parent's domination being the proximate cause of plaintiff's
loss. 9 3 We submit that this is too restrictive a rule. For example,
in those cases discussed below, under Joint Improper Acts, it
appears that it is sufficient to show some knowing or cooperative
effort between the related parties which results in unjust injury
to the plaintiff,9 4 even though it may not be possible to prove that
the defendant's control directly caused plaintiff's injury.
Although there may be doubt as to the exact scope of this
causation or relationship requirement, the principle of some reasonable connection between plaintiff's injury and the action of
the defendant seems both morally and logically sound. Thus, in
the Schlecht case,15 the mere fact that the defendant improperly
dominated its subsidiary and caused it to perform improper acts
was insufficient to allow the particular plaintiffs to pierce the veil
absent a showing that such plaintiffs were injured by such acts.96
,1 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (1936). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
Another way of stating this requirement is that the defendant's domination must be shown
to harm the plaintiff in the particular transaction at issue. See generally FLETCHER, supra
note 1, § 43 at 209; Hamilton, supra note 22, at 990-91. Compare Bernardin, Inc. v.
Midland Oil Co., 520 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1975) (court pierced veil because improper
purpose related to particular transaction) with Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247
App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 79 (1936).
" See text accompanying notes 142-51 infra.
272 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975).
An interesting variation on this concept is demonstrated by Pilot Title Ins. Co. v.
Northwestern Bank, 11 N.C. App. 144, 181 S.E.2d 799 (1971). There, Northwestern Bank
obtained a mortgagee's title policy to secure a purported debt of a subservient corporation.
The title company prevailed in a declaratory judgment on the title policy on the basis that
the subservient corporation's veil could be pierced to show that the bank had no true
economic interest in enforcing the policy. Thus there was no injury to the bank because
the subsidiary's veil could be pierced.
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This rule-that no plaintiff may avoid corporate limited liability
unless he can prove injury resulting from misuse of the corporation-supports the strong policy of limited liability and offers
some assurance that the plaintiff has standing to complain,
thereby tending to discourage frivolous claims.
C.

Improper Purposes

The heart of most corporate veil cases, explicitly or implicitly, is that a corporation has been used for such an improper
purpose that equity will permit its corporate form to be disregarded. 7 The types of situations in which such improper activities arise can be classified under five headings: 8 Violations of
public policy including evasion of statutes; misrepresentation,
which should be understood to encompass a wider range of actions than common law fraud; lack of economic substance which
subsumes a variety of misconduct; participation, including intervention and direction of the corporation's wrongful acts; and joint
D See notes 6-7 supra.
Another type of improper purpose of factor which courts and commentators often
mention is the failure of the corporation to engage in proper formalities (holding annual
meetings recorded in minutes, etc.). See HENN, supra note 1, § 148 at 258, and Hamilton,
supra note 22, at 990. We suspect that the theoretical origins of this approach may be
somewhat related to defective incorporation-that is, to a concept that the subservient
corporation does not validly exist if it does not have proper meetings, records, and other
formal procedures just as it would not exist if it failed to file its articles of incorporation.
We contend that such an approach is theoretically unsound; witness the failure of most
corporate statutes to penalize a corporation for such failures. For example, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-4-111 (1973) requires an annual shareholder meeting but provides that failure
to hold such a meeting will not work a forfeiture or dissolution of the corporation. See also
DE. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 91 (McKinney 1963). On the other
hand, a Colorado corporation may be declared defunct for failure to file its annual report
or pay its franchise fees. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-10-109 (1973). For similar provisions,
see CAL. CORP. CODE § 1801 (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 502 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
§ 91 (McKinney 1963). Likewise, a corporation may be dissolved for failure to maintain a
registered agent. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1504 (West 1977); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 7-8-113
(1973); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 136 (1974). It may thus be implied that a corporation should
not cease to exist for technical violations other than those for which the statutes provide
such a remedy.
No doubt a failure to follow formalities may be somewhat indicative of treatment of
the corporation as a mere instrumentality. It may also have some tendency to mislead
third parties. However, insofar as there is any valid significance in corporate formalities
which are not required by statute as conditions to continued corporate existence, such
significance is adequately recognized by the misrepresentation issue. See text accompanying notes 110-28 infra. For other criticism of the rise of the "formalities" consideration in
piercing the corporate veil, see Carolan supra note 4, at 186 (inappropriate for small
corporation), Note, supra note 8, at 1126.
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improper acts, an admittedly elusive concept which we will endeavor to clarify.9
These categories are discussed separately below.
1.

Violations of Public Policy

The origin of the corporate veil doctrine and some of the
continued strong bases of the theory arise as a result of violations
or evasions of some statute or other strong public policy through
the instrumentality of a subservient corporation. 00 United States
u. Reading Co.' is an early example of such misuse of the corporate form.
In Zale Corp. & Corrigan-Republic, Inc. v. FTC,12 the
court upheld an FTC cease-and-desist order relating to violation
of Regulation 2. Such order affected Zale Corporation and a network of 1056 wholly owned subsidiaries. In piercing the corporate
veil to hold Zale responsible for the actions of all of the subsidiaries, the court found that the violations of Regulation 2 were for
the use of a form prepared by Zale and distributed to the subsidiary for its use, that advertising for the stores was done in the
name of the total enterprise, and that the nature of the parentsubsidiary organization denied recognition of the separate corporate structure of the subsidiaries. Thus, for the court to recognize
the legitimacy of the separate corporations would frustrate the
statutory policy underlying Regulation 2.
In an interesting Texas case, 03 a local statute prevented businesses from being open on consecutive weekends. Sundaco, Inc.,
an apparently resourceful organization, formed a wholly owned
subsidiary to which it leased its premises on alternate weekends
on the theory that two separate corporations had the right to do
business on consecutive weekends. Viewing this as a transparent
attempt to evade public policy the court pierced the veil.
In United States v. Ira S. Bushen & Sons, Inc. ,04 the court
"

For categorizations of other commentators, see note 57 supra.

"'

See note 7 supra.

253 U.S. 26 (1920). See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
473 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1973).
02 Sundaco, Inc. v. State, 463 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
10, 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973). See also Bruhn's Freezer Meats v. Department of
Agriculture, 438 F.2d 1332, 1343 (8th Cir. 1971) (court upheld cease and desist orders
against individuals who owned the corporation which in turn owned all the stock of
101
.02
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pierced the veil of approximately 40 subsidiaries, each of which
owned a separate vessel, to enjoin the parent from failing to comply with regulations designed to prevent oil spills. The court emphasized the control of the subsidiaries by the parent, the fact
that the parent profited from their activities and the strong public interest in avoiding oil spills. The court also stressed its concern that the parent might attempt to evade regulations by creating additional subsidiaries if the corporate forms were not
pierced. In the case of United States v. Wood,'"5 reversed on appeal, the Customs Court held that the corporate veil could be
pierced when it determined that a Canadian corporation had established an American subsidiary for the purpose of reselling its
goods to such subsidiary in the United States at a low price in
order to reduce import duties.108
There are also a vast number of intriguing cases in which
there have been attempts to avoid not a particular statute but a
general public policy. Thus, in a number of cases which can be
referred to as distributorship cases, large companies have set up
a two-tier corporate structure whereby a wholly owned subsidiary
manufactures products which are sold by the parent or the parent
manufactures the products and distributes them through a subsidiary. 0 7 The purpose of such arrangements appears to be to
complicate the task of a plaintiff in a products liability suit who
may have jurisdiction over the distributor but a claim against
only the manufacturer. The courts have almost uniformly pierced
the veil in such situations. There have also been a number of
instances in which the courts have disregarded the corporate form
where it appeared that a separate corporation was being used for
an inequitable procedural purpose, for example, to allow a statute
08
of limitations to run.'
corporate defendants charged with violations of the Packers & Stockyards Act; if the court
restrained only the corporate defendants, its order "would prove futile as the corporations
could be dissolved and the individual petitioners could then, under the cloak of new
corporations, engage in the proscribed activities and thereby frustrate the purposes of the
Act.").
,, 366 F. Supp. 1074 (1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
10 366 F. Supp. at 1085.
,07See, e.g., Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967); Shirley
v. Dracket Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 182 N.W.2d 726 (1970).
in See, e.g., Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963). Black
& White concealed its defense-that the tort was committed by an employee of Checker
in a cab owned by Checker-until the statute of limitations had run on Checker.
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On the other hand, there is clearly a limit to how far the
courts will go simply because there is a technical evasion of some
statute or rule of public policy which has no clear moral purpose
and where the corporate structure may be justified on other
grounds. For example, in Westcott Construction Corp. v. Cumberland Construction Co.,101 there appeared to be an inadvertent evasion of a technical local statute. Westcott sought a declaratory judgment to determine that its bid on a public project
was acceptable where such bid had not included, as required by
statute, a sub-bid by a corporation controlled by Westcott. Westcott had not included the sub-bid because it had chosen to subcontract the work on this particular project to a lower bidder. The
court held that there was no basis for piercing the veil simply to
enforce a rule that was not intended to apply to such circumstances and where there was no evidence that Westcott was attempting to evade any legitimate concern of public policy. Thus,
although there is a strong tendency to look through the corporate
form to enforce public policy rules of a substantial nature, such
tendency is usually limited to willful attempts to evade malum
in rem rules. Corporate veil misrepresentation must be understood to constitute something quite distinct from common law
misrepresentation." 0
2.

Misrepresentation

The misrepresentation issue sometimes is confusing because
of the tendency of courts to use fraud language in ruling on corporate veil matters. Clearly, if the plaintiff in such cases had a good
fraud claim he would plead it, but in most cases this is not done.
Fraud cases are difficult to prove, and the quantum of evidence
available in most corporate veil cases is considerably smaller than
would be required to carry the burden on a fraud claim."'
Thus, in Paumier v. Barge B.T. 1073,112 Zapetis, the sole
shareholder of the corporation, was held personally liable for expenses incurred in connection with a salvage operation of a tug
328 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
,,0 Although judicial use of the word "misrepresentation" seems too well established
to be displaced, some alternative term such as "misleading," "passive misrepresentation," or "corporate veil misrepresentation" might avoid some confusion.
See note 10 supra.
" 395 F. Supp. 1019 (1974). See also Houston Oil Field Material Co. v. Stuard, 406
F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1969) (misrepresentation to employee).
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leased by his corporation. The court found that Zapetis had advised the creditor in question that the barge pledged as security
for the expenses incurred in the salvage operation was owned by
OSC, a corporation controlled by Zapetis, when in fact OSC did
not own the barge. At the time he made this statement Zapetis
knew that the corporation did not own the barge and had no other
substantial assets."' However, he made the representation in
good faith based on his belief that he could arrange for a security
interest with the owner of the barge, a defense which would presumably have been valid in a fraud case. However, the court held
that such a defense was inadequate in a corporate veil case:
Counsel urges that since Zapetis acted in good faith we should not
hold him liable. The good faith argued for is that when Zapetis
pledged the Barge he fully expected that GMC would stand behind
him. We feel that Zapetis' good faith is immaterial. Although quite
different on the facts, in a case involving going behind the corporate
entity, the Supreme Court stated that good faith was irrelevant as
long as the parties intended to do what they did ....
The principle
is applicable in the case before us. If good faith were to become a
defense in actions of this type, every defendant would claim good
faith of some sort even though he did exactly what he intended to
do in misrepresenting certain facts to an innocent party. This is not
an action for common law misrepresentation in which scienter must
be proven. That distinction must be made. The corporate identity
can be pierced to prevent not only fraud, but any injustice."'

Other interesting cases go even farther, suggesting that confusion, absent a positive misrepresentation, is a basis for piercing
the corporate veil. For example, in My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms,Inc.," 5 the plaintiff had sold products to various
subsidiaries owned by the principal defendant. In seeking to recover from the parent for the refusal of the subsidiaries to return
certain property to it, the plaintiff proved, among other things,
"3

395 F. Supp. at 1039.

Id. Zapetis' good faith might have been difficult to prove. In addition to his misrepresentation to Brawley as to the ownership of the tug, Zapetis through OSC refused to
pay Brawley when Brawley presented the bill for $53,101.81 to OSC. Then Zapetis agreed
to have Ship Sales Corp., another corporation he controlled, lend Brawley $500 to prosecute his claim against OSC, in exchange for 50% of whatever Brawley recovered!
" 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748 (1968). This case also demonstrates the close interrelationship of the various ultimate issues. Although the case involved elements of corporate veil misrepresentation, there were also elements of agency-like intervention in the
form of direct instructions given to employees of the various corporations by the dominant
individual of Cumberland Farms.
"
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that the affiliated corporations used a common name, operated
out of the same office, and otherwise caused confusion to the
parties dealing with them as to the identity of the responsible
corporation. The court accordingly held the parent liable for the
claims against all of the subsidiaries."'
In Zaist v. Olson"7 there was a somewhat similar situation
with the added factor that the subservient corporation was, in the
view of the court's majority," 8 undercapitalized. Mr. Olson operated through several corporations, including the debtor East
Haven. Olson used the services and supplies of the plaintiff on a
number of substantial real estate projects, including some housing developments and a shopping center. Although statements for
such work were originally sent to Olson individually, he directed,
and the plaintiff agreed, to send the bills to East Haven. When
Olson ran into financial difficulties, it was found that all of the
real property and most of the other assets of his real estate empire
were owned by him or other related corporations and that East
Haven was a virtual shell. In view of the fact that the activities
of the corporations were hopelessly mixed up, that they all operated out of the same offices, and that Olson never clearly indicated to the plaintiff what the differences among the various
entities were, the plaintiff was permitted to recover against Olson
individually.'
Misrepresentation requires some of the most difficult balancing decisions which arise in this area of the law. On the one hand
is the strong policy of preserving corporate limited liability. On
the other is the unsophisticated general creditor such as Zaist
who thinks he has good reason to believe that he is dealing with
a debtor with substantial assets. Note that the plaintiff in such
cases is rarely a sophisticated lender who would insist on personal
' The principal shareholders of the defendant corporations had apparently instructed the subsidiaries not to return the racks, which act gave rise to this suit. Id. at
615, 233 N.E.2d at 749.
"'
154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
'l' Id. at 577, 227 A.2d at 559.
A strongly worded dissent suggests that even though Olson conducted his business
in a "free and easy" fashion, he did not use the corporation unjustly in contravention of
the plaintiff's rights. It noted that East Haven had paid the plaintiffs $169,652.66 over a
period of years and was unable to pay the $23,000 (exclusive of interest) in question here
because of the general financial decline of the early 1960's. Heavily influenced by the
necessity of limited liability, the dissent chided the majority for its failure to require a
stronger showing of improper purpose. Id. at 580-83, 227 A.2d at 560-61.
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guarantees and collateral; he is usually a small businessman who
should not, as a matter of policy, be required to investigate his
debtors or incur the legal expenses of securing his trade receivables.'10
The relevant balancing procedures should, therefore, include
not only the usual consideration of the ultimate issues but also
questions of the relative sophistication of the parties and the
legitimate business expectations and practices of the parties.
Where other factors are favorable to the plaintiff, it is equitable
to pierce the veil based on a much lesser degree of misrepresentation than would be required for common law fraud, provided
that there is at least some action by the defendant which encourages plaintiff's misapprehension. 2 ' Compare Fisser v. International Bank, 22 where gross undercapitalization and possible participation in a breach of contract by the parent did not cause the
veil to be pierced because the parent had advised third parties of
its relationship with the subsidiary and the nature of the subsidiary's assets and purposes.
3.

Lack of Economic Substance

Many cases have used undercapitalization as the primary
basis for piercing the corporate veil. At least in some of the California cases, it appears that gross undercapitalization by itself
will be sufficient to pierce the veil. 2 3 On the other hand, most
jurisdictions follow the rule that while undercapitalization raises
very serious questions, there must be some additional factor in
24
order to justify disregarding the corporate entity.
"I Most commentators have taken the position that tort victims should be able to
pierce the corporate veil on a weaker showing than creditors because only creditors voluntarily assume the risk of doing business with the corporate entity. See note 22 supra. It
seems to us that creditors who have behaved reasonably and who have not knowingly
assumed the risks-because of their lack of financial sophistication-should not be held
to the higher standard.
"' See, e.g., Elvalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 450, 525 P.2d 105, 109
(1974) (creditor dealt with general manager of parent in negotiating deal with subsidiary);
Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs. Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 24, 320 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1974)
(undercapitalization and defendant had in past paid creditor for debts of its subsidiary);
Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 726-27, 524 P.2d
1355, 1359 (1974) (representations by parent that it was behind the subsidiary and undercapitalization-subsidiary's bank account kept near zero balance).
"2 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
"2 See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
124 See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960). Compare
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As a starting point, lack of economic substance should be
understood to cover a variety of evils' 5 in addition to undercapitalization. First, it includes traditional undercapitalization, setting up a new corporation with capital that is clearly inadequate
for the needs of the business. 2 Secondly, it includes cases, closely
akin to fraudulent transfers, where a shareholder milks all of the
assets out of the corporation.'"2 Finally, lack of economic substance includes operating a corporation unprofitably or having
the corporation do business exclusively with the dominant party,
such that all of the profits of the transaction are reaped by the
2
dominant party. 1
FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.3 at 191 with HENN, supra note 1, § 146 n.16 & 17 at 253.
See Carolan, supra note 4, for Florida practice.
"I5See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 129 at 302-03, § 137 at 314-15; FLETCHER,
supra note 1, § 44.1 at 249; HENN, supra note 1, § 148 at 258-59. In FLETCHER, supra note
1, § 44.1 at 249, it is stated that:
It is coming to be recognized as the policy of the law that stockholders should
in good faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered capital reasonably
adequate for its prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the risks of loss, this is ground
for denying the separate entity privilege.
26 An example of traditional undercapitalization is Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super.
351, 263 A.2d 188 (1970). In that case, the receiver of Mar Building Co., Inc. (Mar), an
insolvent construction corporation, sought to pierce the corporate veil of Mar to hold
Middlesex Apt., Inc., (Middlesex), the owner of the realty, responsible for obligation due
from Mar to certain creditors. The sole asset of Mar was a contract whereby Mar was to
construct an apartment building for Middlesex for $680,000. In the opinion of the court,
the construction cost would far exceed $680,000. (One expert had suggested the reasonable
cost would have been $900,000). In piercing the veil of Mar to hold Middlesex liable to
the creditors, the courts stressed that this scheme was "all too often seen," that it was
inequitable for the incorporators of Middlesex to "grow fat on the work of laborors," and
that Middlesex had recognized its responsibility to the creditors by undertaking to negotiate with them on behalf of Mar. See also Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344
(2d Cir. 1942). But see Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127
N.E.2d 832 (1955). See, e.g., Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th
Cir. 1920); Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs. Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974);
see Hamilton, supra note 22, at 986. State legislatures have been reluctant to define
adequate capitalization in any helpful way. The statutes that do require minimum paidin capital as a condition precedent to doing business typically require token amounts. See,
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.47 (1975) ($1,000), OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.04
(Page:1964) ($500), TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02 (Vernon:1956) ($1,000).
I" See Note, supra note 8, at 1129, for more specific examples (such as causing the
payment of unwarranted dividends, exacting unreasonable management charges).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.),
aff'd., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (net profits of all
subsidiaries remitted to parent by dividends); Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super. 351, 363
A.2d 188 (1970); Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W.
979 (1916), cited in Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 203.
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The first category should be fairly clear although there are
obvious difficulties in determining what constitutes adequate
capital in a particular case. An example of the second category
is Bernandin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp.,' 9 where a creditor of a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Midland pierced the subsidiary's veil
to recover against Midland. In that case, the subsidiary's plant
had burned down and the parent received the insurance proceeds.
An officer of the parent served as liquidator for the business, and
all liquidation proceeds were paid directly to the parent. The
plaintiff was therefore allowed to recover from Midland.
a.

Unprofitable operation

The more interesting and perhaps challenging cases arise
where the subsidiary is operated on a basis which does not permit
it to make an adequate profit. Thus, in United States v. Reserve
Mining Co., 31 the Government brought an action against Reserve
Mining Co., Armco, and Republic Steel Corporation based on
violations of environmental laws by Reserve. The specific action
arose out of government efforts to terminate the discharge of taconite tailings into the air and into the water of Lake Superior.
The court determined that Armco and Republic owned all of the
stock of Reserve on a fifty-fifty basis and effectively dominated
its board of directors and policymaking procedures. The court
then emphasized that Reserve dealt exclusively with Armco and
Republic, that its debts were guaranteed by the parent companies, and that Armco and Republic never bought Reserve's products at market price. Instead, they simply reimbursed Reserve for
its production costs so that all of the "profits" of the enterprise
were enjoyed by the parent corporations. In view of the large
potential liability involved in the case and the belief of the court
that Reserve was being used to shield the parents from the consequences of their polluting activities, the veil of the subsidiary was
pierced.
The Reserve case exemplifies the interrelationship of the various factors. Lack of economic substance-in this case the conduct of the business in an unprofitable manner-was not the sole
basis for the decision. However, when combined with strong evi"
"

1975).

520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975).
380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
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dence that Reserve was totally dominated by the parents and the
fact that Reserve was engaged in activities contrary to public
policy, the court reached the conclusion that the veil should be
pierced.
b.

Undercapitalizationas the sole criterion

A great deal of attention has been devoted to lack of economic substance, usually in the form of undercapitalization, including suggestions that this should be the sole criterion in some
cases.' It has also been proposed that courts should determine
what would constitute adequate capitalization and then hold the
shareholders liable for an amount up to but not to exceed such
adequate capitalization. 32 Finally, the suggestion has been made
that plaintiffs in tort cases should be permitted to pierce the
corporate veil if the corporation has inadequate capital and inadequate insurance. 1
We object to most of these proposals and submit that, with
the possible exception of California, they have found little acceptance in the courts. 134 Cases which seem to use undercapitalization
as an exclusive test often involve fact situations where there is at
least an implied misrepresentation or other reasons for piercing
the veil. 3 51 Absent such factors, there is no reason why parties
should not knowingly deal with a corporation, understanding that
ultimate payment may be contingent on the corporation's sucfrom piercing
cess, and, because of that knowledge, be precluded
37
the veil should the corporation be unsuccessful.
We would further submit that the courts are not totally competent to determine what adequate capitalization should be for
a particular business.3 8 To give them not only the task of deciding
"' See note 123 supra.
M2See Salomon, Limited Limited Liability: A Definitive Judicial Standardfor the
Inadequate CapitalizationProblem, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 321 (1974); Carolan, supra note 4.
'13 See Comment, supra note 4.
11 See note 124 supra.
'3' See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563,
227 A.2d 552 (1967); Evalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 525 P.2d 105 (1974);
Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974).
"' See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) (initial capitalization
$500); Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 166). See note 89 supra.
IS? But see text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
'
But see Salmon, supra note 132, at 337-38 and Carolan, supra note 4, at 193-95.
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that a company is undercapitalized but the further assignment
of determining what the amount of equity should have been at
some time in the past seems to us unreasonable. Moreover, if the
purpose of such a policy is to encourage investors to capitalize
corporations adequately, such purpose is hardly served by a penalty which limits shareholder exposure to an amount not to exceed what they should have invested in the first place.'
Finally, we submit that a policy of piercing the veil in every
tort action where the corporation is inadequately insured and
capitalized elevates the rights of tort victims above the public
interest in limited liability. 140 How much insurance cost would a
corporation have to incur to assure its shareholders that they
would never be liable for some unforeseen but expensive tort? 4 '
We would contend that if investors are to continue to provide
equity for high risk activities, the general policy of corporate limited liability must be preserved. Of course, undercapitalization
with respect to the predictable needs of the business, combined
with some slight degree of other inequitable conduct, should continue to provide a basis for piercing the veil.
4.

Participation

The concept of participation or direction, treating the subservient corporation in an agencylike way, is a common feature
in corporate veil cases. Thus, in the My Bread' case it was shown
that the controlling shareholder of the Cumberland Bread ComOur point is not to criticize the abilities of the courts but to indicate that the determination of how much capital is necessary at a given time for a given business is an issue illsuited for any adjudicative process. The courts may properly find that a given amount of
capital was inadequate and-in conjunction with other factors-use this as a basis for
piercing the veil. They should not however have the task of making the much more
difficult decision of how much capital would have been enough.
131For analysis of the different policy considerations in this area for the creditor and
tort victim, see Hamilton, supra note 22, at 986-89.
I" Such a policy would, in effect, make all corporations insurers for the benefit of the
general public. It seems improper that such a far reaching policy change should be made
through the medium of the corporate veil doctrine. It further appears discriminatory to
give such insurance protection to the victims of corporate torts as opposed to other classes
of tort victims.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), where the court noted that the
eventual judgments might be in the neighborhood of $100 million. See also text accompanying note 130 supra.
112 My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748
(1968). See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
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pany had effectively dominated the affairs of both the primary
and the affiliated corporations and that in fact he had ordered
certain of the subsidiary corporations not to return display cases
to the plaintiff. The basis for piercing the corporate veil in that
case was therefore that the controlling shareholder was directly
participating in or directing the subsidiaries' wrongful conversion
of plaintiff's property.
In such direct-intervention cases, the basis of liability may
often be agency and there may be a direct claim against the
dominant party. As in other cases, however, the corporate veil
doctrine presents a better evidentiary case for the plaintiff because of the difficulty of proving express agency.
Consider, for example, House of Koscot Development Corp.
v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc. 3 There, Koscot sued Glenn W.
Turner as controlling shareholder of American Line because of a
breach of contract by American Line. The court found that
Turner was directly involved, without going through any corporate formalities, in hiring and firing employees and making other
corporate decisions. Indeed, Turner apparently directed the particular breach of contract in question and was arguably acting as
a principal or a participant in the breach. Therefore, he was found
personally liable for the corporation's activities. Note that
Turner's hiring and firing of corporate employees did not necessarily make the employees or the corporation agents of Turner.
Such actions did, however, form part of the basis for piercing the
veil.
The comparison between agency and corporate veil participation is similar to the comparison between common law fraud
and corporate veil misrepresentation in that the facts establishing the respective types of claims are similar but the plaintiff's
burden of proof is somewhat less onerous in the corporate veil
theory. " '
5.

Joint Improper Acts
a.

Some illustrative cases

A final and particularly interesting category of improper acts
468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972).
For a general discussion of the distinction between the agency and corporate veil
theories, see note 9 supra.
14

'
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exists when two'parties, the dominant party and the subservient
corporation, cooperate to perform some series of actions which, if
all such actions were performed by either of them alone, would
create liability. In ProfessionalBeauty, Inc. v. Gay,"' a salesman
entered into a contract whereby he was given the exclusive right
to commissions on the employer's products in a specific geographic area. The employer thereafter created a subsidiary corporation to sell products in the same area. The court determined
that the sales by the subsidiary constituted a breach of the contract of the parent with the employee.
Similarly, in McDonald Co. v. Kemper,46 the principal asset of the parent corporation was a piece of real estate. The
corporation entered into an agreement with Kemper giving him
exclusive brokerage rights to the property. Kemper then found a
purchaser who, at the suggestion of the corporation's shareholder,
ultimately purchased the stock of the corporation rather than the
real estate thereby attempting to evade the brokerage fee. Kemper sued for his commission and the court found in his favor. Note
that in such a case as this there is no suggestion that the dominant party directed the corporation to do anything; yet there is
clearly inequitable conduct.
By contrast, in Tiernan v. Sheldon"' an individual lessee,
pursuant to a ninety-nine year lease, had the right to assign his
lease to any party without the approval of the lessor. The lessee
formed a wholly owned corporation without any significant capital, assigned the lease to it and thereby relieved himself of any
lease obligation. The court rejected an effort by the lessor to
pierce the veil and hold the individual liable on the lease. One
can only conclude that the court decided that a lessor who signed
a lease permitting an assignment to anyone at the lessee's discretion, and without further liability of the lessee, must have had
fair warning that the lease could be assigned to an insolvent

party. 148
45 463 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
...
386 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
14" 191 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
41 See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) for a similar example.
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b.

Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

A variation in structure is demonstrated in Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.' CBS Films, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of CBS, developed pilot films and other projects for
sale to CBS or other outlets. The directors of Films were employees of CBS as were many of the officers of Films. The testimony showed that lines of executive authority flowed from Films
to or through executives at CBS and that CBS employees regarded Films as a "division" of CBS. The opinion indicates that
CBS effectively controlled, or at least had the ability to control,
Films, and therefore had access to projects developed by the subsidiary without any general responsibility for its actions.
In 1965, the plaintiff contacted Films to discuss his idea for
an annual fashion show. A Mr. Levitan, a CBS executive, accompanied a Films' representative to Las Vegas, viewed Berger's
show and expressed interest in using his idea for an annual television production. Thereafter, Films entered into a contract with
Berger obtaining a right of first refusal for television rights to the
fasion show. Subsequently, a Mr. Cowley from a New York model
agency approached Mr. Levitan and sold CBS a substantially
similar idea. Berger then sued CBS on the theory that its transaction with Cowley breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing of the contract between Berger and Films. The trial
court entered judgment for Berger based on its determination
that Films was a mere instrumentality of CBS; the appellate
court reversed, holding that the instrumentality test of Lowendahl had not been satisfied.
It appears that Films acquired the right of first refusal because Levitan, on behalf of CBS, liked the fashion show idea. It
may fairly be inferred that CBS rarely entered into contracts for
pilot shows directly and that CBS had established Films in part
for the purpose of developing new shows. It further appears that
because of CBS's effective control of Films, the contract between
Films and Berger for all practical purposes gave CBS a right of
first refusal on the Berger production. In refusing to pierce the
corporate veil, however, the appellate court focused on the absence of adequate proof that CBS completely controlled and di'

453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972).
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rected Films with respect to the transaction attacked. 50
The appellate court's analysis is consistent with the
Lowendahl rule. 5' Yet the court seems not to come to grips with
the equitable issue of the case. The real transaction attacked was
the contract with Cowley, a transaction entered into by the parent, not by the subsidiary. The only relevance of the subsidiary
was that it had previously entered into an agreement with Berger
which was allegedly breached by the CBS-Cowley contract.
c.

Critique of Berger

We suggest that the inflexible application of Lowendahl was
inappropriate in the Berger case. There was no doubt that CBS
had the potential to control Films, although there was a lack of
proof of complete domination with respect to the Berger contract.
It appears inequitable that CBS should have such control of its
subsidiary that it had all the practical advantages of a direct
contract with Berger yet none of the responsibilities. Neither
Films nor CBS alone could have contracted first with Berger and
then with Cowley with impunity. Where there was a cooperative
transaction with Berger involving both CBS and Films, where
CBS had the ability to dominate Films and to take advantage of
the Berger idea, and where CBS had a beneficial interest both in
Films generally and in the Berger transaction particularly, we
think the. veil should have been pierced.
It therefore appears that the better reasoned cases in the
mutually improper act cases go beyond a mere rote application
of the Powell rule, a rule that was designed to apply to a parent
which used its subsidiary to carry out an unjust act. In the mutually improper act sphere, the dominant party and the subsidiary corporation jointly perform some unfair action. It hardly matters which party performs the act. What does matter is that both
parties have a common interest and knowledge, that one is generally responsible, because of its dominance, for the acts of both,
and that they deal inequitably with a third party. In such cases,
piercing the veil appears appropriate.
We would submit that the foregoing five categories cover the
various instances in which the corporate veil will be pierced. One
110Id. at 996.

"I See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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starts with the assumption that all of the three preconditions will
be present in any valid case and then proceeds to determine
whether one or more of the five categories-violation of public
policy, misrepresentation, lack of economic substance, participation, or mutually improper acts-is also present. If so, there is a
basis for piercing the corporate veil. The determination of how to
treat these factors, what importance to give them, and how they
relate to each other must be made in the context of the degree of
impropriety involved and must further be based on certain overriding policy considerations as hereafter discussed.
D. Policy Considerations
If all of the necessary preconditions are found to be present
and if one or more improper purposes exist to a sufficient degree,
then the corporate veil will ordinarily be pierced. The question of
whether there is a sufficient degree of improper purpose is, however, difficult, and the courts are often left to struggle with this
issue for which no rule offers much useful guidance. In such situations, general policy considerations are often helpful.
As indicated before, there are applicable general policy considerations, including the importance of preserving corporate limited liability'52 and the customary considerations that govern any
equitable case. No additional discussion of these factors seems
useful here. There are, however, two particular policy considerations that deserve some separate discussion: legitimacy of corporate purpose and the risk of loss.
1. Legitimacy of Corporate Purpose
In determining the propriety of piercing the corporate veil,
courts seem to consider whether there is a legitimate purpose for
' Although courts frequently
the existence of the corporation. 53
state that the same general rule applies to all situations,'

it

would appear that a parent-subsidiary relationship will be more
closely scrutinized and may be more readily subject to having the
veil pierced than would a close corporation with individual shareholders.
,52See generally note 4 supra.
' Such legitimate purposes would include the full range of purposes which are recognized as a matter of economic policy as justifying corporate limited liability,
,' See note 23 supra.
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For example, in Zubik v. Zubik,1 5 the court found that an
individual shareholder had set up a closely held corporation, had
undercapitalized the corporation, and had dealt with it in a
highly informal way, including a failure to memorialize his lease
arrangements in writing or to maintain written minutes of meetings. The court also found that the shareholder had casually intermingled his personal and corporate assets, including payment
of personal expenses out of corporate accounts. However, in holding that the individual shareholder was not liable for damage
done by his corporation's barges, the court pointed out that the
shareholder was old, in ill health, and illiterate and that he had
legitimate reasons for incorporating the business to provide limited liability protection for himself in a business over which he
had little active control. It seems doubtful that a similar conclusion would have been reached in a situation where a corporation
set up a subsidiary to insulate itself from similar liability.
It would appear that there are at least two considerations at
work here. First, the degree of sophistication of the shareholders
is to be taken into account, and, consequently, an illiterate old
man should not be held to the same standard of conduct that
would apply to a sophisticated corporate defendant. Secondly, it
may be recognized that there is less justification for providing
multiple-limited-liability insulation to a corporation which
wishes to segregate high risk activities than there would be for an
individual shareholder or a group of individuals who wished to
take advantage of the corporate limited-liability feature. The fact
the law permits corporate limited liability may not be a license
for creating an infinite series of corporations, each with the same
degree of limited liability that would be granted to individuals
who form an initial corporation. While it may be necessary as a
matter of good public policy to provide limited liability to encourage the infusion of capital into new corporations, it is less clear
that limited liability through subsidiaries is necessary to encourage existing corporations to enter into new and perhaps riskier
businesses.
An example of the courts' consideration of the legitimacy of
the subsidiary corporation's purpose is found in the distributorship cases. 5 ' In these cases there appears to be no reason for
.' 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
1"4See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
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multiple corporations except to try to provide insulation from
products liability suits. Note that these cases do not generally
involve a lack of economic substance. Both the distributing company and the manufacturing company ordinarily have adequate
assets and insurance to bear whatever financial risk is involved.
Instead, the goal appears to be to create procedural roadblocks
to force a plaintiff to sue the manufacturer who may be subject
to process only in a foreign jurisdiction.
Thus, the courts apparently feel that the right to corporate
limited liability is by no means an absolute right and that cynical
misuse for something more than merely limiting liability in a
traditional sense will be scrutinized closely.
2.

Bearing the Risk

Riskbearing is an economic concept generally applicable to
tort cases. The distinction between tort and contract cases in the
corporate veil area is one that is frequently made.'5 7 In a contract
case there is likely to be a much higher degree of reliance by the
plaintiff, for example, with respect to misrepresentations as to
the relationship of the dominant party and subservient corporation, than is true in the tort area. There is also a greater degree
of volition in the contract case, when the plaintiff voluntarily,
albeit often unwisely, 5 8 elects to do business with the subservient
corporation. In a tort case, on the other hand, there is both a
moral and an economic concern that the risk of injury or loss not
be apportioned in an unreasonable way. 5 ' This is an area in which
the courts have had great difficulty, as illustrated by the two
following cases.
In Black & White, Inc. v. Love,"'6 the plaintiff had called the
Black & White Cab Company and ordered two taxis. Two cabs
were sent, one a Black & White cab and the other a Checkers cab.
The plaintiff's wife was injured in an accident while riding in the
Checker cab. The evidence showed that Black & White shared a
radio dispatcher, used the same switch board operator, and that
both operator and dispatcher were on the payroll of Black &
White. While there is some confusion in the opinion as to whether

"5
"'

See note 22 supra.
See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF Tom, § 4 (4th ed. 1971).

'o

236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963).

"7

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

or not the decision was based on a joint venture theory or on a
piercing-the-corporate-veil theory, the result was that the plaintiff was allowed to recover against Black & White.
By contrast, consider Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical
Corp. 6 There, Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corporation (RTAC)
had a substantial business with several airplanes engaged in the
air carrier business. The sole shareholder of RTAC also owned
Turner Aviation Corporation (TAC) which had a single airplane
as its principal asset. When the plaintiff requested transportation
to Chicago, an airplane from RTAC and another airplane from
TAC were made available. The plane from TAC crashed, killing
the passengers, and the decedent's estate brought an action
against RTAC on a piercing-the-veil theory. The court held that
the corporate veil of RTAC could not be pierced despite the fact
that the corporations had the same shareholder and substantial
identity of officers and directors and that the second airplane was
provided to customers who had contracted originally with RTAC.
There seems little doubt that there is a discernible tendency
for businessmen who are engaged in high risk activities to divide
their operations into separate corporations." 2 This tendency
seems objectionable on several bases. First, there is a moral objection to a policy that prohibits one injured in an accident involving
a substantial economic organization from having recourse against
the total organization. This seems to be a perversion of the traditional notion that investors can limit their personal exposure by
creating a corporation. Secondly, any sound economic analysis
would suggest that the most effective way of distributing the risk
should be to assign liability to the total organization and that the
law should encourage such organization to insure fully and adequately. Finally, it seems absurd to have a legal policy which
encourages the proliferation of corporations, with all of the consequential legal and administrative expense, for the sole purpose of
protecting against tort liability. It therefore appears that the
Black & White case presents the better view-the total organization should not be allowed to be artifically subdivided for the sole
purpose of limiting liability. This is not to endorse any general
policy of piercing the veil simply to place the risk of loss on an
SI

324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963).

62 See Comment, supra note 4, at 1191.
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economically identifiable party. But where there are other factors
indicating the propriety of piercing the veil, consideration may
83
properly be given to risk of loss factors.
E.

Relationship of Ultimate Issues

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that all of the ultimate
issues discussed above are closely interrelated. For convenience
there is some value in discussing them individually and attempting to analyze separately the considerations applicable to each.
In a particular case one consideration may control while in another the overall analysis and the relative weight and importance
of each of the other ultimate issues will have to be decided within
the context of the specific facts. For example, grossly inadequate
undercapitalization may be a sufficient basis by itself, or in conjunction with other minor factors, to cause the corporate veil to
be pierced. Similarly, a very substantial breach of some important public policy through the subservient corporation may similarly cause the veil to be pierced almost without regard to other
factors. On the other hand, lack of economic substance combined
with some misrepresentation and indications that the dominant
party is using the corporate structure for an illegitimate purpose,
may cause the veil to be pierced where no single factor by itself
appears to be overpowering. The courts can provide us with no
formula for the application of these factors, but the ultimate
issues may at least provide a starting point for focusing the inquiry.
A.

III. WEAVING AN IMPENETRABLE
PracticalApplications v. Theory

VEIL

It is no doubt appropriate that an article written by a law
professor and a practicing corporate attorney should take a somewhat bifurcated approach to analyzing the problems of piercing
the corporate veil. On the one side, we must be concerned with
63

For example, one factor common to both the Black & White and Turner cases is

that the plaintiff contracted with the corporate defendant and may have believed that the
taxi and plane respectively were controlled by the corporate defendant being sued. Arguably, this misrepresentation could shift the risk of loss to the defendant. For other discussion of the risk of loss consideration, see Douglas & Shanks supra note 4, at 195; Hamilton,
supra note 22, at 986-87; Comment supra note 4, at 1195-96. See also Gentry v. Credit
Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975), where the court said that the
problem was essentially one of allocating the loss.
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the underlying rationale of the courts, the true importance and
relationship of the ultimate issues which they should or do consider, and the policies that may influence the decisions. On the
other side, we must recognize that the concern with the ultimate
issues which we perceive in the opinions has little obvious relevance to many decisions. In practice, there is a somewhat confused
approach and what often seems to be a superficial application of
the Powell circumstances or some similar checklist. The courts
often state a vague general rule, list various factors, and announce a decision, often without articulating how the decision
relates to either the rule or to the factors. From the corporate
client's point of view, the reality of what he can or cannot do must
be of considerably more importance than the theoretical soundness of the approaches which the courts are taking. However, it
is helpful and often crucial for the practitioner to understand the
issues that are of real concern to the better reasoned cases, as well
as the rules and factors courts recite to justify conclusions
reached by their application of the ultimate issues. Thus far, this
article has identified and analyzed the ultimate issues; the remainder of the article will suggest a list of factors noted by courts
in recent decisions.
Some of the practicalities of how to structure a corporation
and its business operations in such a way as to minimize the
likelihood of the veil being pierced are demonstrated by the following cases.
B.

A Successful Attempt

The case of American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.'64 illustrates how to establish and operate a
subsidiary so as to avoid having a court pierce the veil. Moreover,
the case shows how to defeat a claim at the summary judgment
stage. The parent corporation, Fischbach & Moore Electrical
Contracting, Inc., installed electrical wiring in a large Chicago
exhibition hall, giving rise to the subject litigation. The building
was subsequently destroyed by fire, allegedly because of improper
wiring. In an action for losses arising out of the fire, the court
determined that the subsidiary was not a mere instrumentality
of the plaintiff under a variation of the Powell rule." 5 The follow'0
"'

311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
Id. at 415.
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ing facts were considered by the court in reaching its decision to
grant a summary judgment in favor of the parent. At the time of
the tort, all four of the subsidiary's directors were also directors
of the parent and four of its eight officers were officers of the
parent. However, the corporations maintained separate offices
and conducted separate directors' meetings, the subsidiary maintained its own financial books and records, and the subsidiary
had a separate bank account and negotiated its own loans from
third parties, even though the loans were reviewed and guaranteed by the parent. The subsidiary had borrowed money from the
parent, but only under very formal circumstances, that is, the
loans were evidenced by notes and called for interest at the prime
rate. The subsidiary and parent filed separate tax returns even
though their financial statements were consolidated. Their payrolls were separate although the salary levels which were determined by the subsidiary were subject to review by the parent. The
two corporations had never purchased goods or services from each
other. Labor relations were independently handled by each corporation.'
Although the subsidiary notified the parent of bids made on
contracting jobs and of contracts awarded, neither bids nor contracts were reviewed by the parent. The manner of performance
and the materials to be used on the projects were not subject to
review by the parent but the profit mark-up contracts exceeding
$5 million was to be determined only after consulting with the
parent. The subsidiary also forwarded schedules to the parent
regarding new jobs acquired and contracts on hand for each threemonth period and submitted reports on material purchases, estimates, salary changes, and financial data on a more frequent
basis, but there was no evidence that the parent acted as a result
of any of these reports." 7 Other evidence tending to show morethan-typical-shareholder interest or control by the parent included the following: On one occasion, the subsidiary sought review by the parent of a lease it had negotiated for additional yard
space for its equipment; the parent had determined on other
occasions which of its subsidiaries should bid on a particular
project; and the parent's management considered the subsidiary
l Id. at 414, 416.
187Id. at 414.
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to be part on its family, as evidenced by its annual reports and
advertising in Fortune magazine, where the parent had claimed
credit in its own name for projects, including the Chicago exhibition hall project at issue in the instant case.' 8 There was, however, no showing that any of the plaintiffs had been misled as to
the identity or financial resources of the subsidiary.
The court also examined financial data relevant to the subsidiary. The subsidiary's net worth was $511,503 in 1966 and
$684,574 in 1967. The subsidiary had paid dividends of $100,000
in 1966 and $369,000 in 1967, which had amounted to substantially all of its after-tax earnings. These figures represented approximately 4.42% and 8.07%, respectively, of the consolidated
gross income of the parent and all its subsidiaries. The parent's
gross income, apart from the income from subsidiaries, approximated $77 million in each of the two years. The court concluded
that the subsidiary had a very adequate capitalization and that
the parent had not isolated a great deal of its income through the
creation of subsidiaries. More importantly, the claims at issue
were covered by $15 million of insurance, which exceeded aggregate claims.' 9
The court observed that the facts showed, at most, that the
parent exercised supervision and guidance of the general performance of the subsidiary. The court noted that "such participation
in a subsidiary's affairs does not amount to the domination of
day-to-day business decisions and disregard of the corporate entity necessary to impose liability on a parent." 0 Finally, it was
apparent that formalities in this case had been followed to the
"nth degree" and the court concluded that "separate corporate
identities had been scrupuously maintained." 7 '
C.

An Unsuccessful Attempt

A case which illustrates the circumstances in which the corporate veil is likely to be pierced is Ampex Corp. v. Office Electronics, Inc."' There, the plaintiff-creditor was allowed by the
court to pierce the veil of a subsidiary to find Office Electronics,
1i' Id.

Id. at 414-15.
I'
,0 Id. at 415.
171
17

Id.
24 I1. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974).
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Inc., the parent corporation, liable. The court, using an instrumentality-alter ego theory, 7 3 first determined the extent to
which the parent had intervened in the operation of the subsidiary. The following factors were enumerated by the court: (1) Two
of the three directors of the subsidiary were officers of the parent;
(2) the parent owned fifty-one percent of the subsidiary; (3) when
the plaintiff had refused to grant corporate credit to the subsidiary, the parent agreed to inventory $20,000 worth of tapes for the
benefit of the subsidiary; (4) the parent advanced monies to the
subsidiary for its commission sales accounts; (5) the parent received merchandise for the subsidiary from the plaintiff, along
with monthly statements and invoices; and (6) the parent did all
the shipping and billing to the customers of the subsidiary. In
addition, the parent had continued to pay for verbal orders made
by the subsidiary, even after the parent had given written instructions to the plaintiff not to conduct business on this basis. These
factors established not only direct intervention by the parent, but
they also showed that the plaintiff-creditor was misled by the
parent since the creditor really dealt with the parent as the person
in charge as opposed to the subsidiary. That is, the plaintiff sent
the statements and inventories to the parent, met with the parent
and the subsidiary when discussing the subsidiary's credit arrangements, and received payment from the parent for the merchandise sold to the subsidiary. Finally, the subsidiary may have
been inadequately capitalized. It had, initially, capital of $16,000
with no other assets, although, from the outset, it planned to
inventory $20,000 worth of magnetic tapes as well as incur other
expenses.
A comparison of Fischbach and Ampex demonstrates the
desirability not only of being right, but of being right by a wide
margin. It does the defendant relatively little good to prevail
ultimately on the facts after an expensive and time-consuming
trial. Instead, the object should be to prevail on a motion on the
pleadings or by a summary judgment motion, which is in fact the
stage at which an unusually large number of corporate veil cases
seem to be decided. 74
"

See note 48 supra.

"' See, e.g., Overstreet v. Southern Ry., 371 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1967); Steven v.

Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963); Fanfan v. Berwind Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 793 (D. Penn. 1973); American Trading & Professional Corp. v. Fischbach
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The Practitioner'sChecklist

Recent court decisions have identified a number of factors
which should be taken into consideration when attempting to
keep the corporate veil intact. One should attempt to comply
with as many of these factors as possible. To the extent that not
all of the factors can be complied with, it should at least be one's
object to stay on the right side of those which are clearly substantive matters going to ultimate issues, as opposed to those which
are likely to be found in any parent-subsidiary relationship. The
factors tending to support separate corporate entities in recent
cases include the following: '
1. The shareholder is not a party to the contractual or other obligation of the corporation.17'
2. The subsidiary is not undercapitalized.'
3. The subsidiary does not operate at a deficit while the parent is
showing a profit.178

4. The creditors of the companies are not misled as to which company they are dealing with. 7 '
5. Creditors are iot misled as to the financial strength of the subsidiary."'
6. The employees of the parent and subsidiary are separate and the
parent does not hire and fire employees of the subsidiary."'
& Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (D. Ill. 1970); Brown v. Margrande Compania Naviera,
S.A. 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968); Fawcett v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 242 F. Supp. 675
(W.D. La. 1965). But see FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.3 at 191: "[Ailthough summary
judgment may be granted in a proper case where no genuine issue of fact is raised or
shown, the determination of whether there are sufficient grounds for piercing the corporate
veil should not ordinarily be disposed of by summary judgment in view of the complex

economic questions."
"I There is no firm relationship between the ultimate issues and the factors. The
factors, to a large extent, are relevant in demonstrating that the corporation in question
is an instrumentality and to a much lesser extent can also show an improper purpose.
,'7 See, e.g., American Trading & Professional Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311
F. Supp. 412, 413 (D. II. 1970).
'"
See text accompanying notes 120-41 supra.
,7, See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (all profits and tax losses of
subsidary flow through to parent); Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.
1975) (subsidiary had operated at deficit for number of years).
,' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 416, with My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748 (1968) and Zaist v. Olson, 154
Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552, 557 (1967) (confusion led to misunderstanding).
"' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 416, with Puamier v. Barge BT 1793,
395 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 (E.D. Va. 1974).
"' Compare American Trading, discussed in text accompanying notes 155-62 supra,
with Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355
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7. The payroll of the subsidiary is paid by the subsidiary and the
salary levels are set by the subsidiary.'
8. The labor relations of the two companies are handled separately
83
and independently.'

9.

The parent and subsidiary maintain separate offices and tele-

phone numbers.'8

10. Separate directors' meetings are condpcted.'"
11. The subsidiary maintains financial books and records which
contain entries related only to its own operations.' 8
12. The subsidiary has its own bank account.'87
13. The earnings of the subsidiary are not reflected on the financial
reports of the parent in determining the parent's income. 88
14. The companies do not file joint tax returns.'
15. The subsidiary negotiates its own loans or other financing 9 0
16. The subsidiary does not borrow money from the parent.''
17. Loans and other financial transactions between the parent and
subsidiary are properly documented and conducted on an arm'slength basis.'
(1974) (same employees) and House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics,
Inc., 468 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1972) (Turner fired American line and Koscot employees)
and Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. 528 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex. 1975) (controlling corporation interviewed, evaluated, and selected managers).
82 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414 (paid by subsidiary but subject
to review by parent) with Elvalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 525 P.2d 105,
108 (1974) (paid by parent and court does pierce veil) and House of Koscot, 468 F.2d at
66 (paid by parent and court does pierce veil) and Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968) (employees paid by parent but court does not pierce
veil).
'
See, e.g., American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414.
Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Elvalsons v. Industrial
Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 446, 525 P.2d 105, 108 (1974) and My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 616-17, 233 N.E.2d 748, 750 (1968).
"5 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc.,
26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667, 669 (1971), and United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F.
Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974) (subsidiary board had not met since 1971 and when it did it
merely rubber stamped the decisions of parent boards).
I" Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Gentry v. Credit Plan
Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975) (management firm hired by parent keeps records).
"7 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Soderberg Advertising, Inc.
v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355, 1359-60 (1974) (subsidiary held
own bank account but balance kept at zero).
8
But see Jackson v. General Elec., 514 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alas. 1973).
81 Compare Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975), with
United States v. Wood, 366 F. Supp. 1074, 1081-82 n.11 (Cust. Ct. 1973) rev'd, 505 F.2d
1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (court said ministerial cooperation was permissible).
See, e.g., American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414.
'
See, e.g., Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524
P.2d 1355, 1362 (1974).
"2 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414 (loans evidenced by formalities)
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18. The parent does not guarantee the loans of the subsidiary or
3
secure any loan with assets of the parent.
19. The subsidiary's income represents a small percentage of the
total income of the parent. "
20. The insurance of the two companies is maintained separately
and each pays its own premiums."
21. The purchasing activities of the two corporations are handled
separately."
22. The two companies avoid advertising as a joint activity or other
public relations which indicate that they are the same organization.' 7
23. The parent and subsidiary avoid referring to each other as one
family, organization, or as divisions of one another."'
24. The equipment and other goods of the parent and subsidiary
are separate."'
25. The two companies do not exchange assets or liabilities.2"
26. There are no contracts between the parent and subsidiary with
respect to purchasing goods and services from each other.2 "
with Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355,
1357 (1974) (unclear if formalities observed).
"I Compare United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974)
(debts of subsidiary guaranteed by parent) with Schlecht v. Equitable Builders, Inc., 272
Or. 92, 95, 535 P.2d 86, 89 (1975) (loans to parent guaranteed by subsidiary and other loans
secured by assets of subsidiary but court did not pierce veil because no harm to plaintiff)
and Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 521 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (parent
guaranteed only certain of subsidiary's debts and these were discharged by subsidiary).
"'

CompareAmerican Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414 (small percentage of income) with

Shirley v. Drackett Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 648-49, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970)
(parent's only source of revenue was sales of subsidiary).
"

Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc.

v. Oppenstein, 355 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1964).
"' Compare Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 521 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975) (president of subsidiary did not require parent's authorization in making purchases
and sales within ordinary course of business) with Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. KentMoore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1974) (parent paid bills).
"'

Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, and Soderberg Advertising, Inc.

v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 725, 524 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (1974) (both cases
involved some joint advertising; veil pierced in Soderberg but not in American Trading)
with Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1964) (parent
controlled advertising).
"' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with GAF Corp. v. Hanimex

Corp., 294 F. Supp. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (corporation referred to as Chicago office of
another) and Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir.
1963) (TAC not described as a division).
"'

See, e.g., American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 415.

Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 415, with Soderberg.Advertising, Inc.
v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 729, 524 P.2d 1355, 1362 (1974).
"I Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Shirley v. Drackett Prods.,
26 Mich. App. 644, 648-49, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970) (exclusive distributorship).
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27. The subsidiary and the parent do not deal exclusively with
each other."'
28. The parent does not review the subsidiary's contracts, bids, or
other financial activities in greater detail than would be normal for
a shareholder who is merely interested in the profitability of the
business.2 3
29. The parent does not supervise the manner in which the subsidiary's jobs are carried out."
30. The parent does not have a substantial veto power over important business decisions of the subsidiary 5 and does not itself make
such crucial decisions.
31. The parent and subsidiary are engaged in different lines of
business.2 "

E.

Using the Checklist

The above factors are not necessarily presented as a logical
or preferable measure for determining when to pierce the corporate veil.m7 They are, however, factors which have been listed by
one or more courts as relevant considerations to be taken into
account in making such a determination. Therefore, anyone attempting to set up a subsidiary which will be fully viable should
try to comply with as many of them as possible. In many cases it
will be noted that compliance is, after all, a fairly easy matter and
2 CompareBay Sound Trans. Co. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D. Tex.
1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1973) (no other business) and Shirley v. Drackett
Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 648-49, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970) (exclusive distributorship) and United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974) (no
other customers) with Jackson v. General Elec., 514 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alas. 1973).
20 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 415, with My Bread Baking Co. v.

Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 620-21, 233 N.E.2d 748, 753 (1968) (parent
negotiates for subsidiary).
20 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with My Bread Baking Co. v.

Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 620-21, 233 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1968) (corporate
defendant ordered not to return racks giving rise to cause of action) and Elvalsons v.
Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 445-46, 525 P.2d 105, 108 (1974) (manager of subsidiary required to report to parent's general manager).
25 See, e.g., House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, 468 F.2d 64,
66 (5th Cir. 1972); Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871, 876 (S.D.

Tex. 1971); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974).
2
Compare Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975), with
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1963), and Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 113 (7th Cir. 1974).
For other lists of factors, see BALLAN'rNE, supra note 1, § 136 at 314; FLETCHER,
supra note 1, § 41.3 at 191; HENN, supranote 1, §§ 147, 148 at 256-59; Douglas & Shanks,
supra note-4, at 195-96; Note, supra note 8, at 1126; Hamilton, supra note 22, at 998. For
a list of factors by Colorado courts, see Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
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the slight additional effort and expense should be incurred to
insure corporate indestructibility.
We do not mean to suggest that mere mechanical compliance
with the foregoing factors will insure an impenetrable veil.2'" The
ultimate issues discussed in the foregoing sections are of direct
and major importance. In structuring any corporate relationship,
careful thought should be given to such ultimate issues and to the
effect that they have on each other. For example, the most stringent efforts to satisfy some mechanical check list will not protect
a corporation where it is being used to violate an important public
policy.
In establishing any corporation which is intended to withstand efforts to pierce the veil, overkill is justified. That is, not
only should one attempt to meet the minimum standards for
preserving the corporate entity, but one should greatly exceed
those minimum standards if at all possible. The reasons for this
are at least two-fold.
1. Summary Disposition
First, an unusually large number of cases in this area are
resolved at an early stage in the pleadings by a motion to dismiss
or by a summary judgment.2 19 Obviously, it is of great value to
the client to prevail in a law suit at such a stage, without incurring the substantial legal expenses involved in preparing a case
for trial with the attendant interruption of business activities.
Moreover, the defendant in a corporate veil case usually has
available most of the evidence that would support piercing the
veil and, if success can be achieved at some early stage of the
proceedings, there is little opportunity for the plaintiff to develop
such discovery.
2.

Preparing for the Unforeseen

Second, no matter how carefully structured the transaction
may be, it is always possible that some developments will occur
which will make a decision in favor of the plaintiff seem equitable. For example, it is entirely possible in the Reserve Mining
"IFor a more general checklist of procedures to be followed to weave an impenetrable
veil, see STEVENS, supra note 7, at 87-88; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 196-98, and
Hamilton, supra note 23, at 993-94.
"I See note 164 supra.
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case 10 that the organizers of the corporation never anticipated
that enormous potential damages for violations of environmental
laws might accrue. Once such damages were alleged, it became
more likely that the subsidiary corporation would be found to be
lacking in economic substance and violative of a strong public
policy. Thus, no matter how strong the case for an impenetrable
veil may seem at the time a corporation is established, there is
always the possiblity that future developments may greatly
weaken its position."'
The conclusion, therefore, should be that one attempting to
weave an impenetrable veil should comply with as many of the
mechanical factors listed by the courts as possible. Such a party
should also keep in mind the importance of complying with basic
policy considerations and, specifically, of staying on the right side
of the various ultimate issues discussed previously.
This section would not be complete without a brief discussion of the problems of the plaintiff in a corporate veil case.
Several suggestions may be useful to such a plaintiff. First, like
the potential defendant, the plaintiff should bear in mind both
the factors, the mechanical tests, which are listed above, and the
ultimate issues which should control the decisions of most courts
and the relationship, if any, of the factors to the issues. Second,
the plaintiff should be aware that in applying traditional variations of the Powell rule, courts tend to focus heavily on proof of
actual instrumentality with respect to the particular improper
act at issue. Accordingly, evidence must be mustered, not simply
to show general domination of, or potential to control, the subservient corporation, but actual control and direction with respect
to the particular transaction. Far too many plaintiffs fail to provide the necessary minimum of evidence of instrumentality because they focus on questions of general rather than specific control. Third, the plaintiff must be aware that most of the evidence
he needs is in the hands of the defendant."' Moreover, much of
210380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). See text accompanying note 130 supra.
"I See, e.g., Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963),
where causal handling of two separate corporations proved disastrous after one of them
carried passengers for the other and was involved in a fatal accident.
2' See, e.g., Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (the
veil was not pierced to find parent liable for subsidiary's pricing policies which were
allegedly in violation of Robinson-Patman Act. The case was decided on a summary
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his evidence is intangible, for example, the motivations of a key
executive at the time he took some crucial action. It is important
to conduct an immediate and aggressive discovery campaign, to
examine such documentary evidence as may be available and, in
particular, to take extensive depositions before the defendants
have an opportunity to rationalize their own behavior in terms
that will avoid penetration of the veil.
From a practical point of view, it is quite difficult to structure a case either for or against piercing the veil with complete
certainty. The rules are equitable and their relative importance
varies from one case to another. However, the foregoing guidelines
and careful consideration of the effect of the ultimate issues may
be helpful in focusing legal efforts.
CONCLUSION

The case law and the commentators are by no means totally
successful in attempting to formalize and simplify the rules applicable to piercing the corporate veil. This, we would submit, is
not the fault of the judges or the commentators but is an inherent problem in this area of the law. We believe that "piercing the
corporate veil" is only a general term under which are subsumed
a multitude of fact situations. No useful general statement can
be made about such situations except that, despite the strong
public policy in favor of preserving corporations, there are situations in which equity will require that the corporate form be
disregarded. We have categorized some types of cases and fact
situations in connection with our discussion of the ultimate issues. We have no doubt that other situations have arisen or will
arise in which equity will demand that the corporate form be
disregarded. No doubt it is useful to attempt the classifications
and rules, but, as Judge Cardozo pointed out, we must not become lost in the mists of metaphor."'
We are reminded of the analogy drawn by the great analytic
philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein pointed out that
judgment because the only facts presented were that the subsidiary was wholly owned and
an affidavit of the plaintiff which claimed generally that the parent controlled the subsidiary's pricing policies, which was unequivocally denied by the parent and the subsidiary).
See also Fanfan v. Berwind Corp., 362 F. Supp. 793 (D. Pa. 1973).
2I Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 217 N.Y.S. 156 (1926). See
text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
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there are at least some words for which there is no single definition or common denominator which will be found in'all definitions. Instead, he proposed an analogy comparing such words to
a piece of thread composed of many fibers, with no fiber running
the entire length of the thread, but all of which are intertwined
and together form a single strand."' We would suggest that the
corporate veil is woven from Wittgensteinian threads. We can
identify what we have called "ultimate issues," but we cannot say
that any one will control every case. We hope, however, that an
identification of such ultimate issues may be helpful in focusing
the inquiry and leading to an equitable result.
The resolution of any corporate veil case involves the collision of an irresistible force-the power of equity-with an immovable object-corporate limited liability. Each case must be
decided on the basis of its unique factors. Efforts at simplistic
rules-e.g., piercing the veil whenever there is inadequate capitalization-may have disastrous effects not only on the theoretical structure of corporate law but on the much more important
underlying economic policies. We therefore suggest that the law
must continue to struggle with concepts and rules that may lack
logical purity but which enable the courts to continue their delicate balancing act.
L.

§ 67 (1953):
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way.
Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has
a-direct-relationship with several things that have hitherto been called
number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other
things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does
not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but
in the overlapping of many fibres.
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CORPORATE SIGNATURES ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
By

NEIL

0.

LITTLEFIELD*

INTRODUCTION

A corporate signature must necessarily be executed by a natural person. Normally, the signature will include the name of the
corporate entity and the name of an individual. Where such a
signature appears on a negotiable instrument to designate an
obligor, the question arises: Who is liable? There are four possible
answers: The corporation, the individual, both, or neither. Had
the parties responsible for executing and accepting the instrument with such a signature verbalized their intent, it is conceivable that any of these four answers would have been given. However, such intent often is neither expressed verbally nor stated
clearly and unambiguously on the instrument. To insure the relatively routinized transfer of such instruments, there must be a
predictable, uncomplicated answer to the question of who is liable. On the other hand, prevention of unnecessary or unexpected
liability suggests that an individual examination of each transaction in context is appropriate to determine liability.
Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to
articulate a set of rules' regarding the liability of signers of corporate instruments. However, an analysis of the case law to date
under the Code rules will show that the application of Code rules
does not result in the desired predictability. It is suggested that
the Code drafters have chosen relatively mechanical rules which
have an inherent logic which is out of touch with the patterns of
human conduct to which the rules apply.
The underlying problem with the Code approach to the question of corporate signatures arises out of its application of the
principle underlying the parol evidence rule. That rule, succinctly
stated, dictates that parol (outside) evidence is inadmissible to
vary or contradict the terms of a writing.' However, either by way
* Professor of Law, University of Denver; B.S., 1953, University of Maine; LL.B.,
1957, Boston University; LL.M., 1956, S.J.D., 1961, University of Michigan. The author
wishes to thank James Chalet for his assistance in researching this article.
U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 3-403, 3-404 (1972 version).
2 For a statement of the parol evidence rule, see, L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 98 (2d ed.
1965). A more complete analysis will be found in Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53
YALE L.J. 603 (1944). The parol evidence rule for Article Two of the U.C.C. will be found
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of exception or because it falls outside a chosen definition of the
rule, it is clear that evidence is admissible to resolve an ambiguity
apparent from the writing.' The parol evidence rule applies, ipso
facto, to a negotiable instrument inasmuch as an instrument is
an integrated, written contract.' The Code rules to be discussed
recognize the ambiguity exception and state, in effect, that where
an ambiguity exists in the form of the signature, parol evidence
is admissible; otherwise it is not. As will be demonstrated, the
Code rules articulate a mechanical test to determine if an ambiguity exists; the mechanical test is then unfortunately combined
with the unnecessary protection of remote parties subsequently
acquiring the instrument.' The result is that, given an admitted
ambiguity, the remote purchaser is entitled to the most favorable
construction. Application of this latter rule forces courts either to
misapply the parol evidence rule in certain cases or to forego
prevention of unexpected and perhaps unnecessary liability.
A comment might be added here with regard to the fact that
this discussion focuses on corporate signatures. The principles of
the Code being discussed are equally applicable to other agency
situations. It is also true that the Official Comments to Code
section 3-4036 give examples where the agent, Arthur Adams,
signs on behalf of the principal, Peter Pringle. However, it is
assumed that the bulk of representative signatures involve a corporate entity. More than fifty cases under the Code involve corporate officers while less than a handful involve agents of individual
principals, trustees, and the like.
I. PRE-CODE LAW
Where a signature on a negotiable instrument indicated
ambiguity as to whether a principal or an agent or both were
signing, pre-Code cases presented a bewildering split of authority.
in § 2-202. It is not felt necessary for the purpose of this article to investigate in depth
the policies and varying interpretations of the rule.
3 L. SIMPSON, supra note 2, § 101.
See U.C.C. §§ 3-118 and 3-119 (1972) and Official Comment One to § 3-118.
One of the basic consequences of negotiability is that the holder in due course,
defined in U.C.C. § 3-302 (1972), takes free of defenses and claims of ownership, § 3-305.
This policy favoring remote purchasers is carried over into the cases interpreting § 3-403.
See text accompanying notes 95-106 infra.
I U.C.C. § 3-403 (1972) and Official Comment Three. Perhaps some of the unsatisfactory character of the Code rules is explained if the draftees were overimpressed with the
atypical situation, as indicated by Comment Three.
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The issue raised in most cases was to what extent and in which
situations parol evidence would be admissible for the'purpose of
determining liability. For those jurisdictions where the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law7 was in effect, the appropriate sections of the act were less than helpful. Section 19 of that act
simply recognized the efficacy in bending the principle, that the
signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent.'
Section 20, unhelpfully, provided:
Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a
representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was
duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as
an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing
his principal, does not exempt him from liability.

A.

Liability of the Principal
It is not necessary, for the present purposes, to outline in
detail the case authority under the N.I.L.1 Cases and authorities
seemed to assume with little discussion that where the principal
is named and the agent is authorized the principal can be held
liable irrespective of whether the plaintiff is an immediate or a
remote party. 0 This result follows naturally from the language of
section 19 that "The signature of any party may be made by a
duly authorized agent ...

and the authority of the agent may be

established as in other cases of agency." No policy seemed to exist
to require that a named principal be bound only where a particular form of signature is used.
The converse was also well accepted: Where the principal is
not named on the instrument, parol evidence is inadmissible to
bind the principal on the instrument, even in those cases where
I The UNIFORM

NEGOTLLZ INSTRUMENTS LAW [hereinafter cited as the N.I.L.] is the

statutory predecessor of Articles three and eight of the U.C.C. It was promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1896 and was enacted
in all jurisdictions. The version used here is that found in J. BRANNAN, BEUtEL's BRANNAN
NEGoTuBiLE INsTRuMENTs LAW 209 (7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as Beutel's Brannan].

N.I.L. § 19 provided: "The signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized
agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose; and the authority
of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency."
I A good source of the cases decided under the N.I.L. can be found either in BEUrrEL'S
BRANNAN, supra note 7, or W. BmRrroN, Bm'rrON ON BiLLs AND NoTs (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as W. BRMroN ].
10 W. BRITrON, supra note 9, § 162, and cases cited therein.
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the agent is authorized." This result follows even when the immediate parties both knew that the agent was signing on behalf of
the unnamed principal." This conclusion was said to flow necessarily from the language of section 18, which provided, that "No
person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon ... "13 Application of the parol evidence rule to the
question of liability on the instrument, however, should not be
interpreted as prohibiting liability dehors the instrument. Cases
permitted suit against the principal on theories other than suit
on the instrument.
B. Liability of the Representative
Most of the litigated cases under the N.I.L. involved the
question of when an authorized agent would be able to escape
personal liability on the instrument through the introduction of
parol evidence to establish that the signature was intended to be
made only in a representative capacity. The language of section
20 provides little guidance and makes no distinction between
cases involving immediate parties and those involving remote
parties. Cases generally proscribed the use of parol evidence in
suits between remote parties where the agent had signed in an
ambiguous manner. 5 Assuming ambiguity on the face of the instrument, courts, applying (or not applying) section 20 of the
N.I.L., went their individual ways where litigation involved the
immediate parties to the instrument. Two types of situations can
be identified. In the first situation, the ambiguity was created
because the party represented was named, but there is a failure
to indicate that the individual signer was signing in a representative capacity. In the second situation, the party represented was
W.
"

BRITrON, supra note 9, § 167.

See cases cited in Bau.TnrL's BRANNAN, supra note 7, § 18, at 404.

The application of this principle has been less clear. See text accompanying notes
29-35 infra.
" See cases in W. BarrON, supra note 9, § 167 nn. 7-8, and BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, supra
note 7, § 18 at 404-06.
," See cases cited and discussion in W. BRrrrON, supra note 9, § 163, which, however,
suffers somewhat in not always making it clear whether the plaintiff was a payee or a
remote party. A more complete, but less organized presentation of cases is found in
BEUr EL's BRANNAN, supra note 7, § 20 at 411-33.

Courts were sometimes unclear or contradictory as to what constituted an ambiguity
for the purposes of the parol evidence rule. It appears unnecessary to pursue this issue,
under the N.I.L., for the purposes of this article.
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not named, but the individual signer indicated in some fashion
that it was a representative signature.
In a suit between the immediate parties, when the signer
named the party represented, most courts under the N.I.L. permitted the introduction of parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity
created by the absence of any indication of the representative
capacity."6
In the second situation, when the principal is unnamed but
some representative character is indicated, courts under the
N.I.L. also split where the action involved immediate parties.
Most cases barred parol evidence and held the signer individually
liable. 7 The minority rule is best known by the New York case of
Megowan v. Peterson.'5 In that case, the firm of Johnson & Peterson had entered into an agreement with its creditors whereby all
assets of the firm were transferred to Peterson, as trustee for the
firm's creditors. As trustee, Peterson undertook to complete the
firm's construction contracts. The note in question was issued to
the plaintiff (one of the firm's creditors), allegedly to pay for
lumber purchased to carry out the agreement with the creditors.
The note was signed "Charles G. Peterson, Trustee." In a suit to
enforce the obligation against Peterson individually, the trial
court dismissed the complaint after the introduction of parol evidence, and the plaintiff-payee appealed. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court explicitly on the ground that
there was conflicting evidence of the purpose of the purchase and
the plaintiff's knowledge of that purpose. It was held that the case
should have gone to the jury. However, the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the form of the signature bound the

11See generally BauTEL's BRANNAN,

supra note 7, § 20 at 411-33. This situation in-

volves signatures such as:
ABC Corporation
Prexy Preston
Peter Principal
Arthur Agent.
When the agent names the party represented, a bewildering and inexplicable pattern
emerges depending upon whether the agent is a corporate officer, corporate employee, a
simple agent, a trustee, or otherwise. See W. BarTroN, supra note 9, §§ 164-165. As the
U.C.C. has made such a distinction irrelevant, no further word need be said here. See
U.C.C. § 3-403(2)(b).
'1

W. Bnr-rON, supra note 9, § 164.

I" 173 N.Y. 1, 65 N.E. 738 (1902). This case is referred to in U.C.C. § 3-403, Comment
Three.
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defendant personally as a matter of law. Thus, Megowan stands
for the proposition that any ambiguity in the form of the signature which suggests representative signing permits the introduction of parol evidence between the immediate parties to resolve
the ambiguity. This result seems to fly in the face of the (admittedly less than determinative) language of N.I.L. section 20.
IH.

THE CODE APPROACH

Given the known split of authority existing under the N.I.L.,
it is surprising that the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code
did not result in a more satisfactory resolution of the problem of
representative signatures on negotiable instruments. The existing
record of what the Code drafters or commentators had in mind is
sketchy. The 1952 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code attacked the problem of the personal liability of the representative
with a blunt instrument. Section 3-403(2) simply provided:
An authorized representative who signs his name to an instrument is also personally obligated unless the instrument names the
person represented and shows that the signature is made in a representative capacity. The name of an organization preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in a representative capacity.

The policy
tion 20, is
authorized
the section

of the 1952 version, simply a rewording of N.I.L. secapparent. Unless the signature is unambiguous, the
agent is to be personally liable. As the Comment to
stated:

[Ilt excludes parole evidence for any purpose except reformation
The rule here stated is that the representative is liable personally unless the instrument itself clearly shows that he has signed
only on behalf of another named on the paper. If he does not sign in
such a way as to make that clear the responsibility is his .... 9

The 1952 version of section 3-403(2) had the advantage of
simplicity. However, it carried the policy of the parol evidence
rule to an extreme. This subsection was objected to by the New
York Law Revision Commission in 19560 as overturning the prior
majority rule where the signature was of the form,"ABC Corporation, Arthur Adams," and the New York (minority) rule of
Megowan, where the signature was of the form, "Arthur Adams,
" U.C.C. § 3-403, Official Comment Three (1972).
REPORT OF THE LAw REvLSION COMMISSION FOR 1956, at 408 (1956).
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Agent." The rule is too harsh on agents or officers, given what is
apparently wide-spread practice in signing in a representative
capacity. Professor Hawkland has suggested: "To most businessmen, a signature following the name of a corporation on a negotiable instrument clearly means that an officer of the company has
signed in his representative capacity, even though his name is not
followed by a description of his office or his agency status."2 ' At
least one case decided under the 1952 version of the Code2 held
parol evidence between the immediate parties inadmissible to
avoid the personal liability of an authorized officer where the
corporation was named, but the representative capacity was not
indicated.3
The present version of section 3-403, which remains unchanged since the 1956 version, is more receptive to the use of
parol evidence than was the 1952 version. The present version
reads in full as follows:
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and his authority to make it may be established as in other
cases of representation. No particular form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to
an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither
names the person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names
the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, if the instrument does not name the person represented but does show
that the representative signed in a representative capacity.
W. HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPosrrs AND

CoLLEcrIONs 81 (1967).
2 Pennsylvania was the only jurisdiction to adopt a 1952 version of the U.C.C. Subsequently, Pennsylvania amended its code to conform to the 1956 version. The latter version
of the code resulted from the attempts of the Uniform Commissioners to respond to the
reactions of the New York Law Revision Commission. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4 (1972) and authorities there cited.
23 In re Laskin, 204 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1962). This case was reversed, In re Laskin,
316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963) by permitting parol evidence under the equity powers of a court
in bankruptcy. Another Pennsylvania case of the period is indeterminate in its holding
inasmuch as the payee was dead and the testimony of the maker was inadmissable. See
Bell v. Dornan, 203 Pa. Super. 562, 201 A.2d 324 (1964).
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(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organization preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized
individual is a signature made in a representative capacity.

The Comments to the 1956 version were extensively rewritten to
conform to the inherent change in policy contained in section 3403.3 The Comments expressly mention the adoption of the preCode majority rule where the signature is made in the form,
"Peter Pringle, by Arthur Adams, Agent," (that is, where the one
who is represented is named) and of the adoption of the majority
rule where the signature is of the form, "Arthur Adams, Agent."2
However, the Comments have not been of as much help as they
could have been because they only speak of cases regarding principal and agent. But, of the nearly sixty litigated cases to date
under section 3-403, more than fifty involve signatures where the
party represented is a corporation." A discussion of the cases
litigated under the Code will reveal the weaknesses of the present
Code rules as applied to the corporate context.
A.

Liability of the Named Party Represented

Because the signature of an organization almost always must
be made by an individual,27 the question of the liability of the
organization necessarily requires the introduction of parol evidence. Even where the signature is of the classic representative
form, "ABC Corporation, By: Arthur Adams, Pres.," it is necessary to establish that Arthur Adams was authorized to sign on
behalf of ABC Corporation, before the corporation can be held
liable. This rule is articulated by section 3-403(1): "A signature
may be made by an agent or other representative, and his authority to make it may be established as in other cases of representation." Those few cases which have posed the issue are in accord
with the rule of this section. 8 One case, while not holding to the
1 Comment Three was also revised in 1966.
U.C.C. § 3-403, Official Comment Three (1972).
s Research has found fifty-seven cases involving clear legal issues necessitating the
application of § 3-403. Fifty-two of these cases involve an allegedly corporate signature,
one involves "an account," one an Elks Lodge, one a partnership, one an unexplained
"trustee," and only one involved a classical principal-agency relationship. The latter case
is First Nat'l Bank v. Maidman, 2 U.C.C.R. 1048 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
" An interesting exception may be provided by the facts of Walton v. William H.
Corby, Inc., 12 Ches. Co. Rep. 43, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 703, 1 U.C.C.R. 271 (1963), where
the court opinion reports that the form of the signature on a note was simply, "Walter H.
Corby Inc. (SEAL)."
0 Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div. 2d 597, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226 (5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1185)
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contrary, introduces unnecesssary confusion. In Chiles v. Mann
& Mann, Inc.,29 a note was signed, "Chiles Planting Co., By: E.B.
Chiles, Jr." While the issue litigated concerned only the individual liability of the signer,10 the court did comment that the form
of the signature "meant that Chiles Planting Company was the
trade name of E.B. Chiles, Jr., and he could not offer parol testimony to vary that meaning." '3' Insofar as that dictum states that
parol evidence would be inadmissible in a suit against a corporation entitled "Chiles Planting Company," it flies in the face of the
language of section 3-401(2) which reads: "A signature is made
by the use of any name, including any trade or assumed name,
upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of a
written signature." The correct result is indicated in Nichols v.
Seale 2l where the party represented was named "The Fashion
Beauty Salon." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, referring to the
above quoted section, properly stated: "Consequently, extrinsic
evidence was admissable to show that 'The Fashion Beauty
Salon' was an assumed name for 'Mr. Carl's Fashion, Inc.'"
It should be obvious from reading sections 3-401 and 3-403
that the question of the liability of the named party represented
is completely independent of the question of liability of the representative. As indicated, the liability of the party represented
depends upon that party being named plus a showing dehors the
instrument that the signing party was authorized to act on behalf
of the party represented. As will be seen, the question of personal
liability of the signer (the representative) is governed by 3-403(2).
Thus, it is incorrect to suggest that if the representative is liable,
the party represented is not. Part of the holding on this issue in
the lower court decision, Grange National Bank v. Conville,3 is
clearly wrong. In that case, the signature was in the form:
John P. Conville
Doris E. Conville
Hughesville Mfg. Co. Inc. (Seal).
(1968); and Musulin v. Woodtek, Inc., 260 Or. 576, 491 P.2d 1173 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
162) (1971).
" Chiles v. Mann & Mann, Inc., 240 Ark. 527, 400 S.W.2d 669 (1966).
30 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra for discussion on that point.
" Chiles v. Mann & Mann. Inc., 240 Ark. 527, 531, 400 S.W.2d 667, 667 (1966).
493 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd on a procedural point, 505 S.W.2d
251 (1974).
3 5 Lyc. 170, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 616 (1956).
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Apparently there was conflicting evidence as to the liability
of the Convilles, but the court stated: "We find, however, that the
Hughesville Manufacturing Company, Inc. is not liable on the
notes even though John L. Conville and Doris E. Conville may
have been authorized to sign for the company, for the notes do
not show that the signatures were made on behalf of the company."" The court could have reached this result only by assuming that the necessity of adding language to escape personal liability leads to the necessity of adding5 language to bind the party
represented. This is a non sequitur.
B.

Liability of Unnamed Parties

Section 3-401(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code is brief
and to the point: "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon." The language is a continuation of the
law of the N.I.L.6 The principle on its face is sensible in that one
ought not to be liable on a negotiable instrument unless or until
one signs. After all, a basic requirement of a negotiable instrument under Article Three is a "signed writing. ' 37 However, where
an authorized representative has "signed" a negotiable instrument, why should not the party motivating the signing also be
liable? The Article Three principle is in contrast to the liability
of an undisclosed principal under agency law. There, the obligee
may hold the undisclosed principal liable even where the obligee
3
at the time of contracting did not know of the undisclosed party. 8
It is difficult to articulate a policy to support the rule that
an undisclosed principal cannot be liable on the note. Professor
Britton, in his discussion of section 18 of the N.I.L., simply states
that it codifies "the common law rule which rendered inapplicaId. at

-,
D. & C.2d at 620.
While it is true that the Conville case was decided under the 1952 version of the
Code, the point involved here was the same under both versions of the Code as well as
under the N.I.L. See Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div. 2d 597, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226 (5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1185) (1968). There are very few cases where the liability of the named party
represented is at issue. Presumably, litigation only arises where the corporation is insolvent and personal liability of the representative is sought.
-"Section 18 of the N.I.L. reads, in part, as follows: "No person is liable on the
instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly
provided." The last clause of § 18 referred to liability by virtue of collateral and virtual
acceptances (§§ 134-135) both abrogated by the Code. See U.C.C. § 3-401, Official Comment One (1972).
- U.C.C. § 3-104 (1972).
" See W. SEvvY, LAW OF AGENCY, § 56 (1964).
31
"
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ble to bills and notes the doctrine of undisclosed principal."3 He
points out that "[tihe rule has been applied in numerous
cases." 0 A quote from a cited case states: "This exception to the
rule is based upon the reason that each party who takes a negotiable instrument makes his contract with the parties who appear
on its face to be bound for its payment . . ...
"
It is submitted
that this begs the question. Why is each party who takes a negotiable instrument bound by the contract on its face? In analyzing
the policy, a distinction should be made between two situations.
In the first situation, an authorized agent has signed his name
with no indication of representative capacity. In the second situation, the authorized agent has signed his name and has indicated
that he is signing in a representative capacity such as by prefacing his signature with "By:" or by adding "Trustee," "Pres.," or
"Agent"-but has not named the party represented. In the second situation, parol evidence ought to be admissable to establish
both the name of the principal and his liability. After all, under
section 2-403(2)(b),4 2 the agent may introduce evidence to disprove personal liability. What further violation of the policy favoring integration of contracts on negotiable instruments occurs,
since the payee and holders have a right to assume that someone
is liable?
The clear language of the Uniform Commercial Code does
not prevent the holding suggested here. It is true that section 3401(1) says, "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon." But it does not read, "No person is
liable unless his name appears thereon." Additionally, section 3401(2) says, "A signature is made by use of any name, including
a trade or assumed name . . . ." (emphasis added). Section 3403(1) says that an agent's authority to make a signature "may
be established as in other cases of representation." The definition
of "Signed" in Article One simply "includes any symbol executed
or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a
writing."43 Arguably, the clear language of the statute seems to
n W. BsrrrON, supra note 9, at § 167.
O Id.
" Pratt v. Hopper, 12 Cal. App. 2d 291, 55 P.2d 517, 518 (1936).
a See text accompanying note 58 infra.
U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1972) (emphasis added).
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lead to a different result from that indicated in the Official Comment to 3-401 which reads in relevant part:
The chief application of the rule has been in cases holding that a
principal whose name does not appear on an instrument signed by
an agent is not liable on the instrument even though the payee knew
when it was issued that it was intended to be the obligation of one
who did not sign."

Assume an authorized representative signs an instrument
"Arthur Adams, Pres." Assume further that the party represented authorized Adams to use Adams' name as the principal's
5
name. Then, "Arthur Adams" would be the assumed name of
the principal and the principal could be bound on the instrument.
Why could not the same result be reached by presuming that
where the authorized representative signs "Arthur Adams,
Pres.," the party represented has authorized the agent to use that
name as the principal's? It is submitted that this logic would have
the desirable effect of erasing the illogic of the Megowan rule of
section 3-403(2)(b):41 After the agent shows that he did not intend
47
to sign personally, no one is liable on the instrument.
Only one case decided under the Code holds that parol evidence is inadmissable to establish liability of an unnamed corporate organization,"8 although a number of cases give lip service to
the rule. One of the cases seems to suggest the contrary. In
Dynamic Homes, Inc. v. Rogers,' the signature showed representative capacity through use of the word "by," 5 but failed to name
the corporation allegedly intended to be liable. The unnamed
corporation appealed a trial court judgment against it, arguing
u U.C.C. § 3-401, Official Comment One (1972) (emphasis added).
See U.C.C. § 3-403(2) (1972).
',See text accompanying note 18 supra.
, j. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at 403 and n.10 points out the illogic of
that case, but assumes it to be compelled by the Code.
' Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty Co., 21 Ariz. App. 231, 517 P.2d 1278 (14 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 152) (1974).
'5 331 So.2d 326 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
The signature in that case was as follows:
by /s/
Arthur J. Maas (SEAL)
by /s/
Janet H. Maas (SEAL)
/s/Arthur J. Maas (SEAL)
ARTHUR MAAS-Individually
/s/Janet H. Maas (SEAL)
JANET MAAS-Individually
Id. at 327 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 561).
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that it could not be liable on the note since it was not named on
it and that parol evidence was wrongly considered on the point.
The Florida District Court of Appeals, incorrectly discussing section 3-403(2)(b) and the Code adoption of the Megowan rule, 5'
assumed that parol evidence was admissable to establish that the
corporation was intended to be the party liable. However, the
court did hold that there was an absence of evidence that the
individual signers were authorized or that they intended to sign
in a representative capacity, and therefore reversed the judgment
against the corporation.
A second case seeming to apply the rule that an unnamed
principal cannot be held liable on the note is not good authority
on the point; the evidence clearly established that the parties
intended the note to be a personal obligation of the stockholders
only and not that of the corporation. 51 In a third case, section 3401(1) was applied where the unnamed party sought to be held
was an individual, and there was no indication of3 agency or the
name of the alleged principal on the instrument.
An interesting possible exception to the generally accepted
rule of section 3-401(1) is provided by what must be characterized
as a correct decision of the Illinois appellate court. 54 In that case,
a note was made payable to a corporation. It was in the hands of
the plaintiff bank which attempted to assert the rights of a holder
in due course.5 5 The defendant-maker asserted that the bank
could not be a holder in that the only indorsement on the back
of the note was in the form, "By Is! Eugene Tarkoff, Sec.Treas." Defendant did not "otherwise deny the plaintiff is the
owner of the note, nor

. . .

deny the validity of the signatures on

the note or the authority of Tarkoff" to act for the corporate
payee." The court properly phrased the issue as "whether or
not a note made payable to a corporation by its corporate name
can be legally endorsed by the signature of an individual fol31U.C.C. §

3-403(2)(d) (1956) and the Megowan rule properly relate only to the
personal liability of the representative, and are inapplicable to the question of whether or
not the party represented is liable. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
52 Potts v. First City Bank, 1 Cal. App. 3d 341, 86 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1970).
First Nat'l Bank v. Maidman, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1048 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
' American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scenic Stagelines of Savannah, Inc., 2 Ill.
App. 3d 446, 276 N.E.2d 420 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 416) (1971).
U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (1956).
" American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scenic Stagelines of Savannah, Inc., 2 Ill.
App. 3d 446, 448, 276 N.E.2d 420, 422 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 416, 418 (1971)).
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lowed by a description of his position but without reference in
the endorsement itself to the entity for which he purports to
act. 5 7 In referring to section 3-403(2)(b), the court pointed
out that because the agent could escape liability, "there is a
strong inference . . . that where the note names the corporation
as payee that an endorsement signed by its agent in his own
name, followed by a description of his position, is a significant
indication that the individual signer is acting as an agent for
the named payee and that such endorsement is legally sufficient." 58 It was pointed out that to rule otherwise would be to
deprive the plaintiff bank of any rights. "Such a result would
seem to be untenable."59 The case is obviously correct and can be
distinguished from a holding that an unnamed principal cannot
be liable because the name of the principal did appear as payee
on the front of the note.
A few cases have been decided under the Code where the
unnamed party sought to be held was an individual."0 In all of
these cases, the courts routinely applied section 3-401(1) to hold
that the alleged obligors were not liable on the instrument. The
cases are correct even on a generous reading of section 3-401(2)
inasmuch as the parties did not intend that the individuals be
bound on the note. For example, in Jennaro v. Jennaro,1 an attempt to hold an individual as a guarantor of a corporate note
failed because the individual did not sign.
There is one clear exception to the rule that an unnamed
party will not be liable on the instrument. It is represented by
McCollum v. Steitz. 2 The note in that case was signed "/s/ W.
F. Hamrick, Desert Inn," followed by an address. The payee
plaintiff sued William Steitz and the evidence showed that the
note was signed as a partnership obligation of the Desert Inn and
that William Steitz was a partner. In holding that the nonsigning
partner was liable on the note, the California District Court of
Appeals pointed out: "One may be liable under a trade name
Id. at 449, 276 N.E.2d at 422 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419).
Id. at 449, 276 N.E.2d at 423 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419).
59 Id.
N Jennaro v. Jennaro, 52 Wis. 2d 405, 190 N.W.2d 164 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1259)
(1971); First W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bookasta, 267 Cal. App. 2d 910, 73 Cal. Rptr. 257,
267 (5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1181) (1968).
11 52 Wis. 2d 405, 190 N.W.2d 164 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1259) (1971).
12 261 Cal. App. 2d 26, 67 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1968).
'"
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even though one's own name is not on the instrument.""3 The
result follows from partnership law that all partners are jointly
liable for partnership obligations. 4 There are pre-Code cases
under section 18 of the N.I.L. to the same effect.6 5 While it may
be argued that this results from partnership law, the real question
is the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the partnership,
the names of the partners, and the resultant liability of the unnamed partner. It would appear just as logical to admit parol
evidence where the signature was "Arthur Adams, Pres." to establish a corporate obligation and the name of the corporation.
Many courts faced with the problem of the liability of the
unnamed principal properly point out that relief may be had on
the underlying obligation. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
said, "A note given in a transaction as collateral security is not a
bar to a suit on the primary obligation even though the primary
obligor did not sign the note.. . ."" This principle has been used
to hold an individual liable on the underlying obligation as a joint
venturer,6 7 and to permit suit against a nonsigning dominant
stockholder under the alter ego principle.6 However, the unnamed corporation will not be liable on the underlying transaction where parol evidence establishes that the payee of the note
never intended to hold the corporation liable, but relied entirely
on the liability of the individual signers.69
PersonalLiability of the Individual Signer

C.

Most cases in the corporate signatures area concern the question of when an individual signer is personally liable on the instrument. The basic rule is that where there is no ambiguity, the
question of liability will be determined without reference to parol
evidence. The corollary is that where the party has signed in an
ambiguous manner, parol evidence will be admissible to avoid
"

Id. at 29, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 706.

" See

J.

CRANE

& A.

BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP

§ 358 (1968).

Frazier v. Cottrell, 82 Ore. 614, 162 P. 834 (1917) and Locatelli v. Flesher, 220 Mo.
App. 447, 276 S.W. 415 (1925), cited in BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, supra note 9, at 406.
' In re Eton Furniture Co., 286 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1961).
, McClung v. Saito, 4 Cal. App. 3d 143, 84 Cal. Rptr. 44 (7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 517)
(1970).
" First W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bookasta, 267 Cal. App. 2d 1016, 73 Cal. Rptr. 657
(5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1181) (1968).
" Potts v. First City Bank, 7 Cal. App. 3d 341, 86 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1970).
"
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personal liability in an action between the immediate parties, but
not as to remote parties. The key issue is what constitutes an
ambiguity. While the articulated Code statement of the above
rules is an improvement on prior law 0 and reduces somewhat the
confusion and splits of authority, the drafters chose a rather inflexible rule. The pertinent section is 3-403(2) which reads:
An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the
party represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the party represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name the person
represented but does show that the representative signed in a representative capacity.

The Code is strangely silent on when the representative is not
personally obligated on the instrument. The matter is left to implication. It is true that subsection (3) states: "Except as otherwise established the name of an organization preceded or followed
by the name and office of an individual is a signature made in a
representative capacity." But nowhere is the reader of the statute
given a rule as to the effect of a representative signature. Clearly,
an additional sentence should read to this effect: "Where an authorized representative signs in a representative capacity, and
the represented party is named, the representative will not be
liable on the instrument." Courts are fairly uniform in assuming
such to be the intent of the draftsman, and have so held, where
the signature is in the form:
ABC Corporation
/s/ Arthur Adams, Pres.
or
Arthur Adams, Pres.
ABC Corporation"
70 See text accompanying note 15 supra.

7' Southeastern Financial Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1043) (N.D. Ala. 1975); First Nat'l Bank v. C & S Concrete Structures Inc., 128 Ga. App.
330, 196 S.E.2d 473 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 913) (1973); Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v.
Pound, 123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 483) (1971); Grotz v.
Jerutis, 13 Ill. App. 3d 543, 301 N.E.2d 60 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1164) (1973); Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Morse, 265 Ore. 72, 508 P.2d 194 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
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This result should follow whether the individual signer is sued by
an immediate party or a remote party. The principle is based
upon a clear policy that the writing is unambiguous and that
parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict the plain meaning of the words.7 2 The implied rule of section 3-403(3) removes
some of the confusion which existed in pre-Code cases as some
courts had previously required
the representative to use "By" to
73
escape personal liability.
Two cases decided under section 3-403, both split decisions
of an appellate court, indicate that confusion continues to exist.
The cases are markedly similar and both involve multiple and
repetitious signatures. In Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman,7 4 the
facts demonstrate the foolishness of the rule, "The more signatures, the better." In that case, the face of the note bore the
following:
The Shoe Rack
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres.
X Michael Klausman, Pres.

The back of the note was endorsed as follows:
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres.
X Michael Klausman, Pres.
The Shoe Rack
X Mark Klausman, Sec.

The trial court dismissed the complaint brought by the payee of
the note against the individuals Mark and Michael Klausman for
failure to state a cause of action. A majority of four of the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the trial court wrongfully dismissed the complaint without permitting evidence. The majority
pointed out that it was illogical for the corporation to endorse its
own note. Presented with this ambiguity, parol evidence was ap520) (1973); see also Bennett v. McCann, 125 Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 851) (1972), and Security Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 250 Md. 241, 242 A.2d 482 (5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 621) (1968).
712The remedy, if any, for the party who relied upon the individual liability of the
authorized representative is through the equitable remedy of reformation.
72 See discussion in BEurrEL's BRANNAN, supra note 7, at 413-15.
, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 400,296 A.2d 275 (11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 787) (1972). A questionable reference is made to example (c) in Official Comment Three to § 3-403-"Peter
Pringle, by Arthur Adams, Agent"-as most closely resembling the signatures in the case.
Id. at 406-07 (dissenting opinion).
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propriate. The dissent (three judges) in the Klausman case
agreed with the trial court.
The second case is First National Bank of Atlanta v. C. & S.
Concrete Structures, Inc.75 In the words of the court, the note,
payable to the plaintiff, was "signed C. & S. Concrete Structures,
Inc. by Vernon Crutcher, President, and G. E. Strickland, Secretary and Treasurer." On the back of the note, the name of the
corporation was repeated, "then followed under appropriate columns information with regard to the loan, such as interest, due
date and amount,"7 and finally the names of the two officers were
signed and titles typed in. The trial judge granted a judgment on
the pleadings for the individual defendants and six of the nine
judges of the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court opinion relied upon section 3-403(3) with little discussion, and cited
Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v. Pound," which is distinguishable. The three dissenting judges argued that the illogic of a
corporation endorsing its own note presented an ambiguity
necessitating the introduction of parol testimony.
There are three possible solutions to the problems presented
by these two cases. Assuming corporate signatures-both naming
the corporation and indicating representative capacity-appearing on the front and the reverse of a negotiable instrument, the
first solution is to hold that they are both representative signatures as described in section 3-403 and thus the individuals are
not bound and parole evidence is inadmissible to show otherwise. This is the holding of C. & S. Concrete Structures, Inc.
The second solution, applied in the Klausman case, permits parol
evidence in that the multiplicity of signatures introduces an ambiguity. The third and most logical solution, ignored by both
cases, would use the multiplicity of the signatures plus the illogic
of a corporation signing in two places to opt for unambiguous
personal liability of the individual signers.
The proper result in cases of this type should be to recognize
an ambiguity and to permit parol testimony. To argue that there
is an illogic presented which compels a conclusion as a matter of
law is to beg the question. It is obvious that the parties have not
71128 Ga. App. 330, 196 S.E.2d 473 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 913) (1973).
76 Id.
7 123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 483) (1971).
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clearly indicated what they were trying to do. The multiplicity of
signatures suggests that the payee anticipated multiple liability.
The use of titles in conjunction with the name of an organization,
however, suggests that the individuals contemplated action in a
representative capacity.
1. Liability of the Unauthorized Signer
One may sign a negotiable instrument in an unauthorized
manner either by forging a signature or by signing in a representative capacity while lacking the authority to bind the purported
principal. In the forgery situation the forger himself arguably is
not liable on the instrument inasmuch as one cannot be liable
unless named. Thus, before the N.I.L., the holder was reduced to
a common law cause of action against the forger.78 Where the case
involved an unauthorized agent, the rule under the N.I.L., by
implication from section 20, was that the unauthorized agent or
representative was personally liable.7" Section 3-404(1) clearly
expresses this rule and also applies it to the forgery situation in
the following language:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from
denying it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized
signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument
or takes it for value.

It should be noted that this subsection permits the taker for
value to sue on the note. This results in a judgment based upon
the face value of the note as contrasted with a judgment based
upon damages caused by the lack of authority or forgery. The last
clause of the subsection limits the application of the rule. In the
words of the comment, "[O]ne who knows that the signature was
unauthorized cannot recover . . . . ,Sr In First National Bank of
Elgin v. Achilli,5 ' a note was signed:
HIGHLAND MOTOR SALES (printed by hand)
/s/Ruth Achilli
/s/Howard Achilli
See W. BRITTON, supra note 9, § 166.

"

The leading case is New Georgia Nat'l Bank v. J. & G. Lippman, 222 App. Div.
383, 226 N.Y.S. 233, aff'd., 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928). The language in § 20 of
the N.I.L. was: "(The agent) is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized
.... " The implication accepted by most courts was that the individual signer was liable
if unauthorized. Prior to the N.I.L., holders were relegated to an action for breach of an
implied warranty of authority. See W. BarrrON, supra note 9, § 166.
U.C.C. § 3-404, Official Comment Two (1976).
'
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The individual signers appealed a denial of a motion to open a
confessed judgment by the payee. Affidavits indicated that Highland Motor Sales was a sole proprietorship owned by the deceased Sam Achilli and that the signers were sole heirs and
representatives of the estate although not authorized to sign the
note in question. The Illinois appellate court held that the ambiguity present in the signature permitted parol testimony to disestablish individual liability and also held that if the defendants
could establish that the plaintiffs knew that the defendants had
no authority, section 3-404(1) required that the motion to open
the judgment be granted.
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v.
Morse"' illustrates that in the corporate situation the question of
authorization can be an important issue. A note was signed in a
representative manner naming the corporation and giving the
titles of the individual signers. However, the state of California
had suspended the corporation's powers for failure to pay state
corporation taxes. Plaintiff-payee argued that section 3-404(1)
applied to bind the unauthorized individual defendants. The
Oregon Supreme Court, applying California law, held that the
effect of suspension of powers under the California statute was to
be distinguished from the effect on a forfeiture of a corporate
charter. Noting that a suspended corporation could not disaffirm
its contracts, the court held that section 3-404(1) did not apply.
This case should be interpreted as holding that the individuals
were not "unauthorized" within the meaning of section 3-404(1).
One statement of the Oregon court must be questioned. In
pointing out that the corporation would be bound, the court unnecessarily said: "Under the Uniform Commercial Code the unauthorized signer of a note can be held liable only if the purported
principal is not bound." There seems to be no basis for this
statement other than a generalized notion of "not having one's
cake and eating it, too." There is no basis in the Code's rules for
this logic.Y The question of the liability of the representative may
turn on ratification. Section 3-404(2) reads: "Any unauthorized
signature may be ratified for all purposes of this Article. Such
14 Il1. App. 3d 1, 301 N.E.2d 739 (13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 505) (1973).
265 Ore. 72, 508 P.2d 194 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 520) (1973).
Id. at 81, 508 P.2d at 198 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 525).
1 See discussion note 79 supra.
2
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ratification does not of itself affect any rights of the person ratifying against the actual signer." The second sentence of section 3404(2) should be read to permit courts to decide on the facts or
particular cases whether ratification which results in liability of
the party represented will result in release of the unauthorized
signer. Relevant facts to be examined would be the assumptions
of the parties at the time of signing, the circumstances of the
ratification, and the posture of the payee or taker at the time of
the ratification and thereafter.
A recent Colorado case ignored the Uniform Commercial
Code and thus did not reach the question of a difficult application
of section 3-404(1). In MacKay v. Lay, 85 three notes, admittedly
issued for corporate purposes, were signed:
Cert-a-Corporaton
Thomas C. MacKay, President
The trial court found that MacKay had never been duly authorized by the corporation to borrow money on its behalf."8 Other
relevant facts included: First, the payee-plaintiff was dealing
with the corporation and not the individual at all times; second,
the corporation made part payments on the note; and third, the
corporation was insolvent at time of suit. The trial court found
the defendant unauthorized and therefore personally liable.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, surprisingly, made no mention in its opinion of Article Three which is clearly applicable."
In reversing the trial court and ordering a dismissal, the appellate
court applied the rule that if an agent exceeds his authority, his
principal may complain, but a third party may not. It is submitted that this rule is inapposite to the language of section 3-404(1).
The test is whether the signature operated "in favor of any person
who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value." The
28 Colo. App. 70, 470 P.2d 614 (1970).
This finding resulted from a correct application of the principle that the person
relying on authority must establish it. See U.C.C. § 3-403(1) (1972). Apparently the
individual defendant in the case was unable to show authorization as required by the bylaws because of casually kept corporate minutes.
" It is possible that the promissory note in question was not negotiable as not complying with U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1972). The case is silent on the point. However, it is believed
that if one has a nonnegotiable note, there is a strong argument that the rules of §§ 3-403
and 3-404 ought to apply. The reasons for the rules apply equally in the case of negotiable
or nonnegotiable notes. See Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479, 258 N.Y.S. 274
(1934).
"

"
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rule states, in effect, that, assuming lack of authority as between
the individual signer and a holder (including a payee) for value
in good faith, the unauthorized signer loses.
The MacKay case could have been decided the same way had
the court faced section 3-404(1). For example, the court could
have held that there was a ratification by the corporation which
the payee took advantage of and that the payee could not take
an inconsistent position. In certain cases, facts constituting
waiver or estoppel might be present which would permit a holding
that the individual is not liable."5 However, the decision in the
MacKay case clearly calls into question the wisdom of the Code
rule of section 3-404(1). It is evident that the Colorado Court of
Appeals did not wish to throw the risk of the insolvency of a
corporate maker upon an innocently unauthorized individual
signer. This is not a new thought. Shortly after the promulgation
of the N.I.L., Dean Ames made the following comment upon the
rule in section 20:
Under this section, an agent signing without authority of the principal is, by implication, liable on the instrument. This is unjust and
a departure from the English Act and the almost uniform current
of judicial decisions by which the agent is liable only on his implied
warranty of authority. According to this rule the measure of damages would be nominal, if the principal should happen to be bankrupt; whereas under sec. 20 it would be the amount of the instrument."

Dean Ames' reference to the difference in effect is correct. Where
the holder sues the unauthorized signer on a breach of the implied
warranty of authority, the damages are limited to those caused
by the breach. When the principal is insolvent, the inability to
w See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1972), which reads: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions."
0 Shortly after the promulgation of the N.I.L., which had been quickly drafted by J.
J. Crawford, it was attacked by Dean Ames, one of the leading authorities in the field.
Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L.R. 241 (1900). Judge Brewster, Chairman of the ABA Committee on Uniform Laws, came to its defense. Brewster, A Defense
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901). The reply from Harvard,
Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law - Necessary Amendments, 16 HAav. L.R. 255
(1903), concluded what is known as the "Ames-Brewster Controversy." See McKeehan,
The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy, 50 AM.
L. REG. 457 (1902). The quote in text is from Beutel's Brannan, supra note 7, at 411.
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collect is not due to the unauthorized signature. Suit under section 20 of the N.I.L. or section 3-404(1) of the U.C.C. gives recovery of the face amount of the instrument (less payments made or
less value of valid defenses). The Code statement of the rule is
too mechanical; recovery should be allowed on the instrument,
but with exceptions. To provide flexibility, the last clause of section 3-404(1) perhaps should read: "But (an unauthorized signature) operates as the signature of an unauthorized signer not acting in good faith in favor of any person who in good faith pays
the instrument or takes it for value."
2.

Failure to Indicate Representative Capacity

The bulk of the cases both before and after the enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code involve negotiable instruments
bearing a corporate name and personal signature which fails
clearly to indicate representative capacity. Section 3-403(2)(b)
states the mechanical rule that, "except as otherwise established
between the immediate parties, [an authorized representative]
is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show ... representative capacity . .. ."
The wisdom of the rule is questionable, at least insofar as the
rule on its face prevents the introduction of parol evidence between remote parties in certain cases of corporate obligations. A
well-reasoned opinion by the unanimous Supreme Court of New
Jersey on clear facts seems a logical starting point for discussion,
even though it is a pre-Code case. In Norman v. Beling,90 a series
of thirty-six notes, each for fifty dollars, was executed to repay
an obligation of the Teal Corporation for services rendered. In the
space for the maker's signature appeared the following:
Teal Corporation [typed]
/s/ J. Harole Semar
/s/ Christopher A. Beling
The notes were negotiated to the plaintiff who the courts assumed
was a holder in due course. The first twenty-one notes to become
due were presented to and paid by the corporation. When the
remainder of the notes went unpaid, plaintiff brought this action
against Beling. The trial court permitted evidence which supported a finding that the individuals were officers of the corpora- 33 N.J. 237, 163 A.2d 129 (1960).
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tion and never intended to bind themselves personally. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed, holding that judgment
should have been rendered for the plaintiff,9 and defendant appealed.
After indicating that section 20 of the N.I.L. offered no answer to the case, the court in Norman v. Beling engaged in a
three-step analysis to hold that the trial court was correct in
permitting evidence of intent. First, the court referred to a number of cases where parol evidence was held admissable as between
the immediate parties when the signature was in the form, "ABC
Corporation, John Doe." Next, the court discussed the applicability of that rule to the fact situation of the instant
case-namely, when the corporate name was followed by two
signatures, both lacking titles. Arguably, the first individual
name is ambiguous in a sense that the second is not because at
least one signature is universally expected to authenticate the
signature of the corporation. But the court refused to distinguish
between the two names, saying, "We do not consider this factor
decisive, however, because it is a frequent occurrence for corporate by-laws to require the signature of two officers on instruments binding the corporation.""2 Lastly, the court applied the
principle allowing parol evidence even though the plaintiff was a
holder in due course. It is the last step in this analysis which
creates the greatest divergence from the bulk of prior cases and
is contrary to the plain language of the above cited Code subsection. The New Jersey court's support of the last step fights a basic
assumption of many cases. The court said, "When a defect by
way of ambiguity is suggested by the face of the instrument the
purchaser is put on inquiry because to ignore such a warning with
impunity has no sound basis. 9 3 Many would argue that the fact
of the ambiguity of the signature should not put the purchaser on
inquiry. Such a rule is felt to "clog negotiability" and thus be
invidious. Both pre-Code and post-Code cases are confused, however, inasmuch as they fail to come to grips with a key question:
What degree of ambiguity is necessary in order to insulate remote
parties from a duty of inquiry? It is apparent that the New Jersey
58 N.J. Super. 575, 157 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1959).
92

Norman v. Beling, 33 N.J. 237, 244, 163 A.2d 129, 133 (1960). The court referred to

the accounting practice of requiring two signatures. Id.
" Id. at 246, 163 A.2d at 133.
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court in the Beling case felt that a purchaser of notes signed in
the manner presented would most likely assume that the notes
were corporate obligations. It does not seem to clog negotiability
unnecessarily to require the purchaser to inquire for the limited
purpose of personal liability of the signers. After all, there is no
impediment to purchase where the purchaser contemplates only
the purchase of a corporate obligation. It is also apparent that
many of the purchasers (and perhaps even immediate parties)
have questions about personal liability only after the fact, that
is, after the insolvency of the corporate maker. It seems unnecessarily harsh in many cases to hold the corporate officer liable
when the choice is between the corporate officer who admittedly
was somewhat inartful in the manner of his signing and the holder
of an instrument who made no simple inquiries at the time of
execution or purchase.
As between immediate parties, it is clear under section 3403(2)(b) that where a signature is simply in the form,
ABC Corporation,
John Doe,
parol evidence is admissable to establish that John Doe was not
intended to be personally bound, and the cases so hold. 4 Norman
v. Beling involved remote parties and thus is changed by the
Code. No case has followed Beling.15 Three cases decided under
the Code have reasonably indistinguishable facts from Beling in
that a note was signed with the name of a corporation followed
by the signatures of one or two individuals, and the plaintiff was
a remote party suing an individual signer. All of the cases hold
contra to Beling." Distinguishable from Beling are cases where an
" Speer v. Friedland, 276 So.2d 84 (12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 509) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Achilli, 14 Il1. App. 3d 1, 301 N.E.2d 739 (13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
505) (1973); Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Southdale Pro-Bowl, Inc., 301 Minn. 346, 222 N.W.2d
789 (15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 669) (1974); Chips Distributing Corp. v. Smith, 48 Misc. 2d
1079, 266 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 177) (Sup. Ct. 1966); North Carolina Equip.
Co. v. DeBruhl, 28 N.C. App. 330, 220 S.E.2d 867 (18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1011) (1976);
Viajes Iberia, S.A. v. Dougherty, 87 S.D. 591, 212 N.W.2d 656 (13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1096)
(1973).
, Certain cases decided independently of the U.C.C. under "Bad Check" statutes do
accord with Beling. See Southeastern Fin'l. Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1043) (N.D. Ala. 1975) and ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 131(1) (Supp. 1973).
" Perez v. Janota, 107 Il.App. 2d 90, 246 N.E.2d 42 (6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 357) (1969)
(one signature); O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d
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officer has signed a note twice, once without designation of office
and once with the designation. 7 In this case, the second personal
signature without the designation of representative capacity removes any ambiguity and the individual signer is liable.
One group of cases, which were correctly decided under the
Code, can be distinguished from Beling. An example is
Lumbermen Associates, Inc. v. Palmer,"'where a corporate note
was issued to the plaintiff and signed by the individual defendant
on the back of the note without using the name of the corporation.
Here, arguably, the "instrument names the party represented,"
in that the individual signed for the corporation on the front,
using title and name of the party represented. The court properly
held that the individual was liable as an indorser." Other cases
support the idea that the facts of the signing rather than an
automatic application of section 3-403(2) should be decisivie.1'"
The true explanation of the cases is that the total appearance of
the note, front and back, presents no ambiguity. A corporate note
signed with an authorized representative signature on front and
the unadorned name of an individual on the back can suggest
only one explanation: An individual was lending his or her credit
to the obligation expressed on the front. The ambiguity of multiple signatures with representative capacity indicated, front and
back,' 0 1 is not present in this category of cases.
Two decisions in this group can be distinguished. In
722 (7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 302) (1969) (one signature); Abby Fin'l. Corp. v. S.R.S. Second
Ave. Theatre Corp. (11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1011) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (two signatures).
" See, e.g., Gramatan Co. v. MBM, Inc., (6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 865) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968) where the note was signed:
MBM, Inc.
by-Janet Meyerson, Pres.
JM-Janet Meyerson
MM-Milton B. Mejias, Sec.
Milton B. Mejias.
" 344 F. Supp. 1129 (11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 359) (E.D. Pa. 1972).
" The court summarily referred to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-402, which provides,
"Unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some other capacity
it is an indorsement." This is inapposite in that the section determines what liability the
signature imports, (see, U.C.C. § 3-414(1) (1972), setting forth the condition liability of
the indorser) and not whose liability is set forth.
"I Other cases with similar facts are: Agfa-Gevaert, Inc. v. Bueding, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 794 (Md. 1972); Central Trust Co. v. J. Gottermeier Dev. Co., 65 Misc. 2d 676, 319
N.Y.S.2d 25 (8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1297) (1971).
IO See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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Southern National Bank v. Pocock 12 an instrument was signed on
the front by the corporation in an unambiguous manner, but "Ian
I. Pocock, Pres." appeared on the reverse under a printed
"Guaranty of Third Persons."' 13 The trial court had admitted
testimony from the plaintiff-payee and the defendant Pocock as
to the circumstances surrounding the signing and the jury had
found for the plaintiff. Citing section 3-403(2)(b), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that evidence was admissible as between the immediate parties but held that there was sufficient
evidence to justify the jury verdict and denied the appeal by the
defendants. A signing even more demonstrative of the need for
parol evidence is found in National Bank v. Ament. 0 4 The front
of the note had three blank lines. On the first line appeared "R
& A Concrete" and on the second line appeared the handwritten
"By: Grover Roberts." The latter name was typed below the signing so that the last blank on the note was partially filled. On the
reverse of the note appeared "John Ament, Sec. & Treas." The
trial judge dismissed as to Ament in a suit by the payee. On
appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals, citing section 3-403(2)(b),
held that the jury should "consider all of the circumstances of his
signing, including the facts that the complete, correct name of the
corporate defendant-maker was not utilized; that Ament indorsed the note on its reverse side, rather than on the line for
maker on the face of the note; and that he (or someone else) may
have considered that there was insufficient space in which to
indorse on the face of the note."' 5 The court is correct in permitting parol evidence to solve the ambiguity. A strong indication of
ambiguity exists in that one could ask why only the "Sec. &
Treas." would sign for accommodation and not the other executives. The facts of this case would give extreme difficulty to a
court were the plaintiff a remote party. The clear application of
section 3-403(2)(b) to deny the admissibility of parol evidence
29 N.C. App. 52, 223 S.E.2d 518 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565) (1976).
10 The instrument executed was a "Security Agreement" which on the face included
1*

the note and chattel mortgage and on the reverse contained a printed guaranty agreement.
Obviously, this instrument would not qualify as Article Three paper under U.C.C. § 3104(1) (1972), but the court without discussion applied U.C.C. § 3-403 (1972). The rule of
the section can appropriately be applied to nonnegotiable instruments. See note 87 supra
and accompanying text.
104127 Ga. App. 838, 195 S.E.2d 202 (1973).
0 Id. at 839, 195 S.E.2d at 202-03.
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would seem to work an injustice. Again, it would seem that the
remote purchaser should be on notice that possibly the signature
on the reverse was only a continuation of the signature on the
front. Suppose, for example, it were shown that the corporate bylaws required two signatures to authenticate a corporate undertaking on a note of this kind.
In spite of the perhaps beguiling reasoning of the Beling opinion, the Code seems to clearly favor the remote party where the
individual signer has named the party represented, but has inadvertently omitted the designation of capacity or office. As indicated, the few cases decided under the Code apply the rule holding the individual liable. But the Code rule in the "ABC Corp.,
John Doe" context is too rigid; splits of authority may develop
where courts find fact situations that denote equities in favor of
the Beling result.
3.

Failure to Name the Party Represented

As indicated above, the 1956 version of section 3-403 overturned the majority rule in favor of the New York rule of
Megowan v. Peterson.' Where the signature is simply in the
form, "John Doe, Pres." or "Charles Peterson, Trustee," without
naming the party represented, parol evidence is admissible as
between immediate parties to disestablish personal liability, but
not as to remote parties. As to remote parties, the individual
signer is personally liable. Very few of the cases litigated under
the Code present fact patterns like Megowan. Conjecturally, this
is explainable in that the issue is clear cut under the Code. However, perhaps the paucity of cases reflects the fact that such a
signature form is rarely used. It is so ambiguous on its face that,
even at the time of signing, one or both of the immediate parties
would surely move to cure the ambiguity.
One case, Kramer v. Johnson,107 does present the issue
squarely. In that case, a note was signed:
Leo W. Palmer, Governor
George W. Johnson, Secy.
Hubert C. Alligood.
'
',

See text accompanying note 20 supra.
121 Ga. App. 848, 176 S.E.2d 108 (7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1335) (1970).

1978

CORPORATE SIGNATURES

The note did not name the corporation. The Georgia Court of
Appeals, citing Megowan v. Peterson and section 3-403(2)(b),
held that parol evidence was admissible between the immediate
parties to disprove personal liability. Kramer is interesting in
that it is one of the few cases, if not the only one, where a question
is raised by the facts as to the meaning of "immediate parties."
The plaintiff in that case was the transferee of the payee bank
and her deceased husband was an indorser. The court assumed
without discussion that she was an immediate party.
The cases very properly have little discussion as to the meaning of the term "immediate parties." The rule does not need to
permit parol as between the principal and agent as to authority.
The problem to which section 3-403 responds is the liability of the
signers to the takers of instruments. Where a taker has dealt with
the agent or officer, the taker is obviously an "immediate party."
The immediate party is almost always the payee of the instrument. A purchaser from the payee, often a holder in due course,
is a remote party.
4.

Authorized Signatures on Checks

Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to
notes, drafts, checks, and certificates of deposits." 8 The sections
which I have discussed apply to "signatures" or "instruments."'0 9
Thus, logically, there is no reason to treat the problem of signatures on checks any differently than the problem of signatures on
notes. However, one apparently significant fact of life is ignored
by section 3-403: Many corporate or other organization checks are
issued routinely without the clear signature form of "ABC Corporation, Jane Doe, Treas." 0 The cases therefore need explaining.
It is submitted that it is no answer to the problem to say that
U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (1972).
U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(e) (1972) defines "Instrument" as meaning a negotiable instrument, and U.C.C. § 3-104 (1972) sets forth the requirements of a "negotiable instrument
within this Article .... "
110Unfortunately, there is no survey or empirical study known to this writer measuring the exact magnitude of this fact. However, in the last several years of teaching this
subject, I have been amazed at the number of organizational checks I have seen where
the signature of the drawer is simply a handwritten, stamped, or printed name of an agent
without designation of representative capacity. My salary checks come in that form. I have
also received a check from a municipality in a land sale transaction and a check from my
stock brokers in that form. Numberless checks have been shown to me by my students
over the years similarly subject to the problem of the cases discussed here.
"'
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compliance with section 3-403 will resolve the question. The question, properly put, is: Should executing corporate obligations in
the commonly accepted manner expose the authorized signer to
liability?
Perhaps the best known case, Pollin v. Mindy Manufacturing
Co., I"presents the problem with startling clarity. In September
of 1966, Mindy Manufacturing Company issued a number of payroll checks" 2 and cashed some $2,252 of these indorsed checks for
a small fee. Before the checks were paid by the drawee bank, that
bank had exhausted the payroll account because of a demand
note of Mindy's held by the bank. Plaintiffs, probably holders in
due course and undoubtedly remote parties, brought suit against,
inter alia, Robert Apfelbaum, who had signed the checks without
a designation that he was President 3 of Mindy Manufacturing.
Summary judgment against the individual defendant was entered by the lower court, based on the clear language of section
3-403(2)(b).
A description of the checks in question is given by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the appeal:
The checks ... are boldly imprinted at the top, Mindy Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 26th & Reed Streets, Philadelphia, Penna. 19146 - Payroll
Check No. -, and also Mindy Mfg. Co., Inc., is imprinted above
two blank lines appearing at the lower right hand comer; also on the
lower left hand corner appears Continental Bank and Trust Company, Norristown, Pa., in type. Under the imprinted name of the
corporate defendant, on the first line, appears the signature of defendant Robert L. Apfelbaum without any designation of office or
capacity ...."'

The court properly pointed out that in an action by a remote
party against the signer, to avoid personal liability under section
3-403(2), not only must the representative be named, but there
must be a showing that "the representative signed in a represent211 Pa. Super. Ct. 87, 236 A.2d 542 (4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 827) (1967).
The opinion says no more about the character of the plaintiffs. In a generalized
fact pattern of the problem we should be able to hypothesize professional check-cashing
services, liquor stores, grocery stores, loan companies (when monthly payments are made),
or cashing banks as the plaintiffs.
"' Were the reader to be pleased that the individual made liable was the "Big Gun"
of a close corporation, put the generalized fact pattern in terms of the defendant's being
a salaried clerk, secretary, treasurer, or other agent of the insolvent corporation. Perhaps,
his or her check also "bounced."
"' Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 87, 89-90, 236 A.2d 542, 544 (1967).
"'
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ative capacity." Admitting that the instrument failed to show the
office held by the signer, the court went further:
However, we do not think this is a complete answer to our problem,
since the Code imposes liability on the individual only ". . . if the
instrument . . . does not show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity . . ." [sic] This implies that the instrument

must be considered in its entirety."'

The court then went on to hold that this requirement of the Code
had been met, considering the entire instrument. The court
pointed out the distinction between a note and a check, the fact
that there was a double line beneath the printed "MINDY MFG.
CO.," and that the check clearly showed that it was "payable
from a special account set up by the corporate defendant for the
purposes of paying its employees.""'
The logic of the Pollin decision should be accepted under
section 3-403. It is one of the few cases which underscore the
necessity of examining the entire instrument to determine
whether there is a signature in a representative capacity. The
approach of the Pollincourt is to make the rather wooden formula
of section 3-403 more flexible and fact-responsive. It is conjectural
whether this approach will ever be extended to the promissory
note cases. One might argue that the promissory notes which
have been litigated have not presented characteristics analogous
to those on a payroll check." 7
Surprisingly, in view of the enormous number of corporate
checks issued daily, there are only two cases which may be said
to follow Pollin."s s Bennett v. McCann"' involved a series of
checks signed, "McCann Industries, Inc., Payroll Account, /s/
J.Y. McCann." Without discussion, and citing only Pollin and
the Code, the court said, "The petition clearly shows that this
12
was the corporation's liability and not that of an individual."' 0
The case is distinguishable in that the suit was by the payee of
the checks rather than a remote party. However, the decision was

"'
''

"'

IId. at 91, 236 A.2d at 544-45 (emphasis added).
Id. at 92, 236 A.2d at 545.
But see discussion of Beling case in text accompanying notes 90-97 supra.
Bennett v. McCann, 125 Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 851)

(1972); Bailey v. Polster, 468 S.W.2d 105 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 611) (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
"I

Bennett v. McCann, 125 Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 851)

(1972).

I-Id. at 393, 188 S.E.2d at 165-66 (10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 851).
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an affirmance of the granting of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, which is tantamount to holding that parol evidence is inadmissible because the checks were, unambiguously, only a corporate obligation. Bailey v. Polster" is distinguishable on its facts
and in its procedural setting, but does rely upon Pollin. The instrument was an insurance draft drawn on the insurance company. The action was a suit in equity by the payee to enforce a
compromise settlement of a personal injury case. The court, of
course, had no problem in holding the company as the drawer of
the draft, but the claim against the agent was predicated upon
the fact that the agent signed the draft "as the ostensible drawer
without anything under his signature to indicate the capacity in
which he was acting.""' The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held
that section 3-403 of the Code should not be applied "to fix personal liability on an employee of an insurance company who is
hired to pay approved claims ....The true relationship between
the parties was clearly shown by undisputed evidence."'' 3
Some ten years after the date of the Pollin case, there seems
to be little judicial motivation to extend the decision beyond the
precise facts of that case. The Texas Supreme Court distinguished Pollin in Griffin v. Ellinger.2 4 In that case, payee sued
on a check drawn on a standard check form.' 2 5 The name
"Gateway Bldg. Co., Inc.," below which was an address, appeared in the upper left-hand corner of the check. A single blank
line in the lower right-hand corner bore the handwritten signature
of the defendant with no indication of representative capacity.
The amount of the check, $1,310, had been stamped on the check
by a "check protector"'' 26 which imprinted not only the amount
of the check but the company's name. The lower court admitted
evidence on the issue of personal liability and found against the
defendant. The defendant appealed, alleging that the instrument
' 468 S.W.2d 105 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 611) (Tex. Ct. App. 1971). Interestingly
enough, the case also cites Norman v.Beling for its holding. See text accompanying notes
90-97 supra.
,2 Bailey v. Polster, 468 S.W.2d at 109 (9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 614) (Tex. Ct. App.
1971).
InId.
' 19 Tex. S. Ct. J. 340, 538 S.W.2d 97 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 587) (1976).
" The case is one of the few which reproduces the form of the instrument as executed.
Id. at -,
538 S.W.2d at 99 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 589).
I" Id., 538 S.W.2d at 99 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 589).
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showed conclusively on its face that he was signing in a representative capacity. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
action. Defendant's contention that the "check protector" imprint should control was rebuffed: "Although the stamp clearly
reveals the name of the principal, it does not aid petitioner because it gives no information as to the capacity in which he signed
the instrument." (Emphasis supplied by the court.)' 27 Griffin is
distinguishable from Pollin in the degree to which the check in
each case evidenced a purely corporate character. However, it is
submitted that the check protector imprint on a corporate name
included ought to be as indicative as the legend "Payroll Account." The basic difference between the two cases is that the
Pollin court focused on the "instrument as a whole," whereas the
Griffin court focused on form of the signature and found no indication of representative capacity.
The logic of section 3-403(2)(b) can present a court with a
"Catch 22" situation. An instrument such as was presented in
either Ellinger or Pollin may persuade a court to introduce evidence as between the immediate parties to resolve the ambiguity
and this result should not be criticized. However, such a holding
leads inexorably to the result that the individual signer is personally liable to remote parties and parol evidence is inadmissible to
avoid such liability. Thus, if the Griffin and Pollin cases-the
first between immediate parties, the second between remote-involved the same instrument or indistinguishable instruments, the two results could not logically coexist. Why does the
Code rule exclude the factual possibility of instruments which on
their face present ambiguity necessitating parol evidence between the parties and also prevent evidence of "corporateness"
which ought to permit an authorized signer to resist unexpected
personal liability as to remote parties?
An unexplained amendment in 1966 to the Official Comment
Three of Section 3-403 may indicate that the U.C.C. Permanent
Editorial Board is less than sure about the matter being discussed
here.' 8 Prior to 1966, Comment Three listed a number of possible
forms of signature. The last two were
'

Id. at

"ISee

__,

538 S.W.2d at 99 (19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 590).

PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BOAM

3 at 25 (1967).

FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
(e)
(f)

VOL. 55

Peter Pringle
Arthur Adams.
Peter Pringle Corporation
Authur Adams.

The Comment in discussing case (e) explained that the section
admits parol evidence as between immediate parties and adds:
"Case (f) is subject to the same rule." The revised Comment in
1966 deleted case (f) and the reference thereto. There is no explanation for the change. Perhaps the Permanent Editorial Board
has become aware of the fact that corporate signatures present
different parol evidence problems than simple principal-agency
situations.
In another context, American Exchange Bank v. Cessna' 9
does present a check case involving remote parties which is distinguishable from both Pollin and Griffin. In that case, the instrument was a standard form check with the legal "Cessna
Ranch" and an address in the lower left-hand corner. The individual defendant signed without indicating representative capacity and, when sued by a remote party, attempted to show that the
check represented a corporate obligation and that Cessna Ranch
was a California corporation. The court applied section 3403(2)(b) to exclude the evidence. In this case, the ambiguity
should favor the remote party because the remote party had no
reason to know whether "Cessna Ranch" was a sole proprietorship, a trade name, a partnership, or a corporation. Even using
the instrument-as-a-whole test of the Pollin decision, there is
nothing to warn a purchaser that the check is a corporate rather
than a personal obligation.
CONCLUSION

The counseling suggestions are obvious. And it is obvious
that counseling suggestions are neeeded. Where the instrument
is a promissory note and it is not intended that the individual
signers be liable, the form of the signature should be
ABC Corporation,
by, /s/ Jane Doe, Pres.
by, /s/ Richard Roe, Treas.
All signatures should be in close proximity to each other. The use
1" 386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okla. 1974).
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of the word "by" is recommended, under the principle that careful counseling reduces the chance of litigation, but, as has been
indicated, it is not essential. Where the instrument is a promissory note and it is intended that the individual signers be liable,
the recommended form is:
ABC Corporation,
By, /s/ Jane Doe, Pres.
By, /s/ Richard Roe, Treas.
and, as individuals with liability,
/s/ Jane Doe,
/s/ Richard Roe.
The above signature form would bind the individuals as comakers. In the event that the individuals bargained for the secondary liability of indorsers, 31 the individuals should sign on the
reverse of the note without designation of office or other representative capacity.
The counseling suggestion with respect to checks is likewi,
simple, but it must be borne in mind that most corporate checks
are on printed forms. Thus, clients should be urged to include in
the printing process appropriate notations which would save an
individual signer from unexpected liability, as in the Pollin case.
It is best that the printed check form include under the line for
the signature of the drawer appropriate words indicating representative capacity to avoid inadvertent omissions. Thus, where
the treasurer is authorized to sign, the printed word "Treasurer"
would appear beneath the individual's signature. In many factual
situations more than one officer or employee of a corporate entity
may be authorized to draw checks for corporate obligations. If
such is the case, the legend below the drawer's signature line
could read "Authorized Signature," or words to that effect. While
to my knowledge the matter has not been litigated, it would be
surprising for a court to hold 'that where the corporation was
named on the check and the individual's signature was followed
by the words "Authorized Signature," such a signature was not
a representative signature within the meaning of section 3-403(3).
"

See U.C.C. § 3-414 (1972) for the contract of an indorser.

FACULTY COMMENT
COLORADO SOFTENS THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

By THOMPSON G.

MARSH*

A 1949 recorded agreement provided that:
1.

The City hereby gives . . . unto the Atchisons the

. .

.

prior

right at the option of the Atchisons to repurchase. . . the lands...
at the same price and upon the same terms and conditions upon
which the City is willing to sell . . . to any third person; and the
City shall not sell . . . to any third person unless . . . the City...
shall first offer . . . to sell . . .to the Atchisons at the same price

and upon the same terms and conditions as in the case of such other
sale

. .

.

to any third person ....

3. The rights of the Atchisons under this agreement shall be
deemed not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy in them and
the survivor of them, their assigns, and the heirs, and assigns of such
survivor.'

In 1956 the City leased to Martin for twenty-five years, with
an option to purchase at $158 per acre. No offer was made to the
Atchisons.
In 1966 Martin elected to exercise its option to purchase and,
in 1967, the City sold to Martin. No offer was made to the Atchisons.

In 1969, in an action brought by the Atchisons for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of their preemptive right, the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that, because of paragraph "3"
the agreement was "void" because it violated the rule against
perpetuities.
The Atchisons then brought an action seeking either reformation of the 1949 agreement and specific performance thereof or
rescission of the 1949 conveyances to the City and damages.
In 1973, the court said that in 1969 "we were silently assum* Charles W. Delaney, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.

Atchison v. Englewood, 568 P.2d 13, 16, 17 (Colo. 1977).
2 Atchison v. Englewood, 170 Colo. 295, 463 P.2d 297 (1969). The court quoted Gray's

statement of the rule: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." Id. at 300, 463
P.2d at 299.
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ing that the Atchisons could go to the trial court for other relief,"
and held that the prior decision did not bar the Atchisons' second
action .3
In 1977, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to reform
the agreement by deleting the provision which had violated the
rule.' In the course of its opinion the court said:
In its "Conclusions of Law," . . . the trial court inferred from its
findings of fact that the parties intended to extend the rights to the
Atchisons' heirs and assigns and that they mistakenly believed that
such a provision would be enforceable. We decline to follow the trial
court's conclusion of law in this regard. The findings of fact and the
record demonstrate that the parties intended to create personal
preemptive rights exercisable only . . . during their joint lives and
by the survivor of them during his or her life.'

If the decision is limited by this finding of fact, it is, of
course, of no particular significance.
However, there is other language which would justify reformation upon the findings of the trial court:
Even if we were to hold . . . that the parties' mistake was one
of law, and not of fact, reformation would nevertheless be appropriate because this mistake concerns the private rights of the parties
involved. A "mistake as to particular private rights may be treated
as a mistake of fact. ...

Could there be a contract in which a mistake as to enforceability would not concern the "private rights of the parties"?
In other words, whenever the parties are mistaken in their
belief that a contract is enforceable, even though it does in fact
violate the rule against perpetuities, it may be reformed so as to
make it enforceable!
The rule has been undergoing continuous deterioration in
recent years, and while there has never been a decision like this
one, it is analogous to In re Chun Quan Yee Hop,7 where a remote
provision was validated by reforming a will to read "twenty-one
years" instead of "thirty years." This was said to be an application of "the doctrine of equitable approximation (also known as
' Atchison v. Englewood, 180 Colo. 407, 414, 506 P.2d 140, 143 (1973).

Atchison v. Englewood, 568 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1977).
Id. at 17.
Id.
52 Haw. 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970).
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the cy-pres doctrine)." Analogous reformation would be required
under a Connecticut statute which provides that "[i]f an interest in real or personal property would violate the rule against
perpetuities . . . because such interest is contingent upon any
person attaining or failing to attain an age in excess of twentyone, the age contingency shall be reduced to twenty-one. . . .',
Colorado has now taken a step in the same direction.
After the court had approved the reformation which validated the agreement, it directed that damages be paid to the
Atchisons:
[T]he contract was repudiated by the City when it sold the property to Martin on November 8, 1967. Because we have held that
Martin took the property subject to the Atchisons' rights, Martin is
liable to the Atchisons for the difference between the market value
of the land on November 8, 1967, and the amount that Martin paid
for the property together with interest as provided by law.'

Martin is liable, but the City is not! 10The court does not say why.
Martin's 1956 option to buy was at $158 per acre." At the
trial the Atchisons' expert witness testified that the fair market
value of the land was $1000 per acre when the City sold the land
to Martin in 1967.
It is apparent that the Atchisons suffered a substantial loss
as a result of the breach of the agreement and that the court's
measure of damages is a proper measure of that loss and of Martin's gain. However, the City gained nothing by its breach of the
reformed contract. It sold for $158 per acre land that was said to
be worth $1000 per acre.
If the recovery were based upon the usual rule for breach of
contract, the City would be liable for the loss sustained by the
Atchisons even though the City had not profited. But that is not
what the court held.
§§ 45-96 (1958).
6 COLO. LAw. 1630, 1636 (1977).
0 On September 6, 1977, petitions for rehearing were denied, and the opinion was
"modified" to read, "[Tlhe defendants are liable to the Atchisons ....
568 P.2d at
22 (emphasis added). A "modification" would not seem to negate the basis of the opinion,
and therefore, following long established judicial precedent, this case comment is minimally modified only by the inclusion of this footnote.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

1 Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9.
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It seems, therefore, that the basis for Martin's sole liability
is unjust enrichment.
The opinion states that:
In June, 1956, Martin received from its attorneys a title opinion
discussing the Atchisons' prior recorded interest. There was testimony that this discovery of the preemptive rights caused anxiety
and "many sleepless nights."' 2 Yet no action was taken by Martin
or its attorneys to obtain from the Atchisons a waiver, consent, or
release. '3

It is apparent that at that time everyone knew of the existence of
the words which purported to create a preemptive right and that
no one knew of the existence of the rule against perpetuities.
If Martin's liability is based upon a theory of unjust enrichment, and if the decision is limited to the supreme court's finding
of fact, 4 then the injustice consisted of buying land in violation
of a preemptive right which was at that time void for remoteness,"2 but which was validated a decade later by a decree of
reformation based upon testimony concerning circumstances of
which Martin could hardly have been aware."
If Martin's liability is based upon a theory of unjust enrichment, and if the decision is broadly based upon the trial court's
finding of fact, 7 then the injustice consisted of buying land in
violation of a preemptive right which at that time was void for
remoteness, but which was validated a decade later by an unprecedented decision.
This is undoubtedly a landmark case, but in what direction
from this landmark will the law develop? What will a title exam2

How could such testimony have been elicited?

* 568 P.2d at 21.
" See text accompanying note 5 supra.
* The court did not use the orthodox word "void" but said "partially defective," a

concept new to the law of perpetuities.
" The opinion states:
The lawyer who drafted the preemptive rights agreement testified that
his responsibility had been merely to draft an agreement previously worked
out by the parties and that he had followed in this instance his usual practice
during that time period of inserting this standard provision in all real estate
contracts. Further he testified that he doubted that this paragraph's meaning or effect had been discussed with anybody. The Atchisons testified that
there had never been any discussion or agreement to the effect that the
preemptive rights would run to their heirs.
568 P.2d at 17.
"7 See text accompanying note 6 supra.

1978

COLORADO SOFTENS THE RULE

101

iner do about a recorded deed which contains a provision that
violates the rule against perpetuities? Will he assume that it is
reformable, and if so, to what extent? Will lapse of time or the
death of some of the parties affect his decision?"8
Another possible development is based upon a recent opinion
by the Supreme Court of Virginia."9 It is there suggested that the
recognition of the validity of "savings clauses" may encourage
deliberate violations of the rule because it may happen that no
one will ever raise the question of remoteness, and if anyone does,
no great harm will be done. It would seem that the ready availability of reformation might encourage the same practice.
" For example, are the provisions which were held to be void in Barry v. Newton,
130 Colo. 106, 273 P.2d 735 (1954) and Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 148 Colo. 415,
366 P.2d 577 (1961) still subject to reformation?
" Hagemann v. National Bank and Trust Co., 237 S.E.2d 388 (Va. 1977).

COMMENTS
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona:
A

CONSUMERS' RIGHTS INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST

AMENDMENT ENDS BANS ON LEGAL ADVERTISING
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' delivered an opinion that will prove critical to new developments in
first amendment adjudication. The Court held that blanket suppression of legal advertising does not violate the Sherman Act,
but does abridge first amendment rights. By so holding, the Court
confounded its historic valuation of speech categories and significantly enhanced its evolving protection of consumers' rights.
The legal advertising controversy, which in the two years
prior to Bates had stirred the American bar to unparalleled debate and self-analysis,' was finally channeled into a constitutional question of the first order by two Phoenix, Arizona lawyers,
John R. Bates and Van O'Steen. On February 22, 1976, the attorneys placed an advertisement in the Arizona Republic announcing fees for certain routine services provided by their legal clinic.
They were well aware that they were violating a disciplinary rule
of the Arizona Supreme Court.4 The state bar initiated discipli97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62

A.B.A.J. 855 (1976) (winner of the ABA's Ross essay competition for 1976). The debate
was ushered in by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), in which the Court
held that legal services may be subject to federal antitrust laws. Goldfarb did not directly
address the question of legal advertising; nevertheless, the fact that the legal profession
could be brought within the compass of the Sherman Act, and thus its surrounding case
law which holds that restraints on advertising are potentially illegal restraints on trade,
led to the inescapable conclusion that traditional bans against the advertising of legal
services were open to challenge. The question was finally settled in Bates, where the Court
concluded that restrictions on legal advertising do not violate federal antitrust laws. 97
S. Ct. at 2696-98. See note 83 infra.
2 The advertisement is reproduced in Appendix I.
ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1977). The rule provides in part:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through
newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or televison announcements,
display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of
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nary proceedings and recommended that the attorneys be suspended for one week. 5 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the disciplinary rule6 but reduced the sanction to censure because the attorneys had acted
"in good faith to test the constitutionality" of the rule.7 Bates and
O'Steen brought an immediate appeal to the United States Supreme Court, which had hinted broadly in two prior cases 8 that
it was prepared to decide the legal advertising question. The case
proceeded swiftly to oral argument on January 18, 1977, and the
groundwork was laid for the dismantling of one of the oldest canons of professional conduct in Anglo-American law.
That dismantling came about on June 27, 1977. In an opinion
canvassing the justifications traditionally advanced by the bar in
support of advertising bans, Justice Blackmun, writing for a 5-4
majority,' held that the disciplinary rule was an unconstitutional
abridgment of first amendment rights. The holding, while pointedly narrow, declared all across-the-board bans of legal advertising constitutionally impermissible and presented guidelines for
the promulgation of rules to prevent misleading legal advertisements. 0 In the course of his opinion, Justice Blackmun in effect
upbraided the legal profession for clinging to hidebound justifications for antiquated protectionist practices, and appealed to the
bar to heal itself.
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his
behalf.
The Arizona rule on attorney advertising, like those of the other states, is borrowed
almost verbatim from the ABA formulation. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILrry, DR 2-101(B) (1976).
The proceedings were held pursuant to an official complaint filed by the president
of the State Bar of Arizona. A special committee heard the matter and recommended a
suspension of six months. Upon further review the board of governors of the bar revised
the recommendation to a one-week suspension. 97 S. Ct. at 2695.
In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
Id. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
1 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun in the
majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist filed opinions
concurring in that portion of the majority opinion dealing with the antitrust claim, and
dissenting from the Court's determination on the first amendment claim. Justice Stewart
joined the opinion of Justice Powell.
,0 97 S. Ct. at 2708-09. The holding was limited to newspaper advertising of prices
and availability of certain routine legal services. See text accompanying notes 72-93 infra.
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Bates completes a series of cases which began with Bigelow
v. Virginia."I Although these cases have been noted primarily for
the abolition of the commercial speech doctrine,"2 they are even
more significant in their cautious development of a constitutional
basis for the affirmative protection of advertising as first amendment speech. Bates was preceded by an intriguing permutation
of doctrine that gradually gathered definition. The essence of that
doctrine is that, in the interest of informed decisionmaking, the
public has a compelling first amendment right to receive commercial information.
Bates' ramifications for first amendment methodology and
philosophy could ultimately overshadow the practical effect of its
holding on the subject of legal advertising. The Court expatiated
on a first amendment strict scrutiny test which had earlier
been expressed in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Counci' 3 and Linmark Associates v. City of
Willingboro. 4 This test has taken the form of a rigorously skeptical examination of the acceptability of asserted state justifications for suppressing speech. Bates may signal the Court's intent
to abandon its long tradition of applying a double standard of
preferred and less preferred speech,' 5 and to institute instead a
single strict standard for reviewing any legislation that infringes
upon protected speech. The decision also marks a triumph for the
democratic idealism that prizes an informed polity over the paternalism that values social institutions as stewards of the public
421 U.S. 809 (1975). See text accompanying notes 33-46 infra.
The commercial speech doctrine was enunciated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), and abandoned in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The doctrine held that purely commercial
speech, which included advertising, was entitled to no first amendment protection. See
note 21 infra.
.3 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977). See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
, A double standard which applied to first amendment protections was articulated
in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Prior to that case,
the Court had been struggling with a long history of judicial preference for economic over
human liberties in several areas, notably due process. Carolene criticized that order of
preferences, and suggested that it be reversed by the establishment of a presumption in
favor of state regulation in the economic area. Bates appears to indicate not a return to a
pre-Carolenescale of values, but a disavowal of a hierarchichal system of first amendment
protections.
2
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interest. In Bates the consumerism of this decade has found an
eloquent statement.
I. THE "SLIPPERY SLOPE" FROM Bigelow TO Bates
As Justice Blackmun emphasized in his majority opinion, 6
the bedrock of the Bates rationale was the Court's repudiation of
the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.17 Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Bates, expressed alarm at this development, arguing
that it placed the Court on a "slippery slope" away from a doctrine that was "constitutionally sound and practically workable."' 8 In fact, the commercial speech doctrine never enjoyed a
great deal of favor with either the Warren or the Burger Court.
After its "casual, almost offhand"'" appearance in Valentine v.
Chrestensen,20 it somehow lingered for thirty-three years as an
adventitious doctrine of convenience, never independently controlling a decision, asserted most often to shore up principal theories, and regularly impugned by the Court's critics.' The eviscer1197 S.
17

Ct. at 2700.

425 U.S. 748 (1976).

97 S. Ct. at 2720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
So Justice Douglas described the genesis of the commercial speech doctrine. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
The commercial speech doctrine's advent in Valentine was accompanied by almost
no explanation other than an implicit warning that commercial motives would deny first
amendment protection to the publication of information. The doctrine was first applied
in three "handbilling" cases: Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). The last two cases
established a primary motive test by which door-to-door canvassing would be protected
against anti-littering ordinances if it could be shown that the chief purpose of the activity
was the dissemination of ideas or information, or the proselytizing of religion.
Martin broke from this pattern by balancing homeowners' interests in privacy and
burglary prevention against first amendment rights in a religious handbilling context. The
Court found first amendment freedoms paramount, as handbilling was "essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people." 319 U.S. at 146. Martin might be seen as having
presaged Bigelow's balancing test except that the Court continued to employ the motive
analysis initiated in Valentine. In addition, all three cases might well be distinguished as
having been concerned with religious freedoms. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951),
enforces that view. Breard's door-to-door sale of magazine subscriptions was held to be
unprotected, unlike Murdock's sales of religious tracts. Although Breard became the
hallmark of the Valentine motive test, the opinion also employed an alternative-meansof-distribution test: The availability of other methods of obtaining subscriptions to magazines which did not intrude on homeowners' privacy militated toward the reasonableness
of the regulation. It is likely that the commercial speech doctrine did not actually engender the outcome of these four cases, that each was either a religion case, or a time, place,
"
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ation of the Valentine doctrine from Bigelow v. Virginia2 through
Bates should be viewed not only as the step-by-step emancipation
of a previously unprotected category of speech, but as the vehicle
for an expansion of first amendment theory. Bates stands as both
the epitaph of the commercial speech doctrine and the efflorescence of the use of the first amendment to advance consumers'
rights.
The apparatus for this development was the gradual shaping
and manner case, masquerading in freedom-of-expression garb.
After Breard, active use of the doctrine declined, but its availability as an ancillary
theory continued, to the distress of its critics. In three unfortunate opinions, the doctrine
operated as a kind of scapegoat-a supportive argument used to carry the burden of some
questionable results. In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), pandering of
materials not clearly obscene in themselves stripped the purveyor of first amendment
rights. Though the finding that commercial exploitation is not protected speech certainly
reflects the Valentine-Breardprimary commercial motive test, the opinion was principally
supported by an inference of obscenity derived from the appeal which pandering allegedly
makes to prurient interests. The commercial speech doctrine was mentioned by analogy.
383 U.S. at 474 n.17.
In Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973),
classified advertisements segregated by sex were held to be "classic examples of commercial speech," unprotected, and therefore subject to equal rights regulation. Id. at 385. The
newspaper's argument that such regulation interfered with protected editorial discretion
in selection and layout of the advertisements was rejected. Id. at 387. Pittsburgh Press
would have marked a revival of the doctrine except for the decisive fact that the advertisements were illegal. Id. at 388. The Court, even while relying on the doctrine, forecast its
demise: That "the exchange of information is as important in the commercial realm as in
any other" may, in other contexts, warrant discontinuing "the distinction between commercial and other speech." Id.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), decided one term before
Bigelow, a prohibition against political advertisements on bus placards did not trigger first
amendment guarantees. This normally.highly protected public speech, merely because it
was in commercial form, merited only a cursory minimum rationality test. The plurality
opinion was written by Justice Blackmun, who guided the abolition of the commercial
speech doctrine in the Bigelow- Virginia Pharmacy-Bates trilogy. Justice Douglas concurred. Lehman remains inexplicable, an example of the dangers of not discarding obsolete doctrine, but probably aberrational in light of that doctrine's subsequent debasement.
The commercial speech doctrine has controlled the outcome of one or more issues in
a number of state and lower federal court cases. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88, 96-97 (D.R.I. 1972);
Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969) (an unsuccessful
attack on the same statute ruled unconstitutional in Virginia Pharmacy)(PattersonDrug
Co. is discussed in note 47 infra); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J.
144, 152, 93 A.2d 362, 366 (1952) (Judge Brennan, prior to his appointment to the United
States Supreme Court, here affirming the lack of all protection for commercial speech);
Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 346, 225 A.2d 728, 739 (1966); HM
Distribs. v. Department of Agriculture, 55 Wis. 2d 261, 272-73, 198 N.W.2d 598, 605 (1972).
- 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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of a standard of review for judging the suppression of commercial
information. The Court experimented with a succession of
tests-analyzing motive, then content, then balancing interests-before evolving a first amendment strict scrutiny capable
of striking bans on legal advertising.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,2 3 the Court made its first
break from the Valentine v. Chrestensen "primary motive" doctrine which had held that speech for the purpose of profit was not
protected.24 Sullivan focused on the unprotected category of libelous speech, not commercial speech. But if Valentine had had any
real clout, the libel issue would not have been reached. The
Times' purpose in publishing the clergymen's advertisement was
primarily commercial: The editors had no voice in the content of
the advertisement, and it was sold in the same quotidian manner
as any other advertising space.25 An application of Valentine
would, therefore, have stripped the advertisement of constitutional protection.2 6 But the Court contrived a content analysis,
characterizing the advertisement not as commercial but editorial
-"for the promulgation of information and ideas . ...,1 By
means of a content analysis, the Court could circumvent the
commercial speech doctrine and reach the desired result.
Sullivan was prematurely heralded as signaling a golden age
in first amendment adjudication;2s the Supreme Court appeared
to have embraced Professor Meiklejohn's thesis that the first
amendment is the mainstay of an enlightened democracy. The
source of this fanfare was the Sullivan content test, by which
speech directed to "public affairs" could be protected despite
"

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

2

316 U.S. at 54. See note 21 supra.

The advertisement was purchased by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It contained a lengthy description of the
tribulations of the civil rights movement in the South, and the resistance of local officials
to the movement. It also appealed for contributions. For a criticism of Sullivan's disposal
of the commercial speech issue, see Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a
Chimera, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 45, 60-68.
" See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See note 21 supra.
21 376 U.S. at 266.
" See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191. Professor Kalven quotes Professor Meikeljohn's response to the Sullivan decision: " 'It is . . .an occasion for dancing in the
streets.'" Id. at 221 n.125.
" See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
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defamatory content (absent malice), despite commercial form,
and, implicitly, despite commercial motive.3 0 Subsequent developments have subjected the Meiklejohn thesis to a curious twist
at the hands of the Supreme Court. It has been in the area of
commercial and not political expression that the argument for the
first amendment's service to an informed polity has borne fruit
since Sullivan. 3 Meanwhile a double standard which derogates
commercial speech and elevates political expression, as embodied
in the Sullivan content analysis,32 has withered on the vine.
But eleven years later Justice Blackmun turned to the
Sullivan content analysis when striking the first overt blow
3
against the commercial speech doctrine in Bigelow v. Virginia.
Bigelow, managing editor of a Charlottesville, Virginia newspaper, had been convicted under a state statute making it a misdemeanor to publish, by advertisement or otherwise, any information that would "encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion or miscarriage.

.

..

" Bigelow's weekly newspaper had car-

ried an advertisement purchased by a New York City abortionreferral agency. The Supreme Court struck down the conviction,
explicitly stating what could have been inferred from Sullivan:
Advertising per se is not unprotected.3 5 In other words, commercial form does not preclude protectable content. Valentine3 was
somewhat incorrectly distinguished, as it would be in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,3 as having proposed merely time, place, and manner
restrictions, rather than exception from protection for commercial speech.3 8

The Valentine primary motive test surfaced again after Sullivan in Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), and in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). See note 21 supra.
" Justice Brennan, interestingly, has stated that his majority opinion in Sullivan was
not necessarily an expression of the Meiklejohn thesis, but rather a restatement of the
redeeming social importance test he had devised for obscenity cases. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HAv. L. REv.
1, 19 (1965).
12 In a sense the Supreme Court has not abandoned a content test; rather, the content
of "mundane commercial transactions" is now viewed as equally worthy of the protection
given "urgent political dialogue." 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
- 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
" Id. at 812-13.
" Id. at 820.
' 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 421 U.S. at 819.
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Justice Blackmun offered the following indicia of protectability: The speech contains "factual material of clear 'public
interest,'" communicates newsworthy information and opinion
of value to a diverse audience on matters pertaining to constitutional interests, and is legal. 9 These presumably would be guidelines for culling from the commercial context that speech worthy
of constitutional protection, such as information relating to abortion, civil rights, or politics.4"
In a later opinion, Justice Blackmun somewhat exaggerated
the effect of Bigelow by stating that in it "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene."'"
What Bigelow actually accomplished was the displacement of a
pure content determination of what is or is not protected speech.
Although the Court, following Sullivan, initially evaluated the
advertisement by its content, the case was decided by a balancing
analysis, wherein the right to speak and the public benefits were
weighed against the state's interest in regulating the speech.4 2
The introduction of a balancing test precluded the mechanical
assertion of either the pure content test of Sullivan, or the primary motive test of Valentine. This shift in methodology had the
effect of inviting a new argument that important constitutional
interests might exist in wholly commercial speech. Bigelow thus
put the Supreme Court on what Justice Rehnquist called "the
slippery slope"43 away from the commercial speech doctrine, and
blazed a trail for the genuine pioneering that would take place in
Virginia Pharmacy.
Another notable aspect of Bigelow was the shading of the
editor's press and speech freedoms into the public's interest in
receiving information. But the Bigelow approach seems primitive
11Id. at 821-22. That the abortion information was legal in New York was the Court's
toehold for distinguishing Bigelow from Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
0 For an extensive recent discussion of political speech, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). See note 54 and text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
" 425 U.S. at 759.
" The Court balanced Virginia's interest in maintaining the quality of medical care
against Bigelow's freedoms of speech and press, coupled with the public's interest in the
advertised information. Virginia's interest was given "little, if any, weight," because the
abortion clinic was in New York and thus did not adversely affect medical care in Virginia.
421 U.S. at 826-28.
" 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
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by contrast to the strong public interest rationale that was decisive in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates."
By holding that commercial form and purpose do not alone
undermine first amendment guarantees, Bigelow clarified
Sullivan's evasiveness about the commercial speech doctrine. But
Bigelow's analytical weaknesses were cognate with Sullivan's.
Their content tests have at least two serious drawbacks: the inconsistency of protecting commercially-motivated speech only
when it treats certain acceptable subject matter, and the burden
on courts to determine in each case what is or is not of public
interest. Bigelow took the necessary first step of dispelling any
notion that speech in commercial form was peremptorily beyond
the scope of the first amendment.45 It remained for Virginia Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council" to resolve
the issue of commercial content.
In Virginia Pharmacy a consumer group challenged a state
prohibiton against the advertisement of prescription drug prices.
The Court held that (1) Prescription drug consumers were entitled to the same first amendment protection as advertisers; (2)
advertising, regardless of content, did deserve first amendment
protection; and (3) even substantial state interests did not justify
the prohibition of the dissemination of drug price information.47
This combination of factors-that the listener's interest could
outweigh the state's, that first amendment protection would not
be accorded strictly on the basis of content, and that state claims
would be strictly scrutinized where they operated to curb commercial expression-created a formidable new weapon which, as
Bates demonstrated, would be capable of outlawing any wholesale suppression of commercial speech.
That the plaintiffs in Virginia Pharmacywere consumers was
a crucial factor in the decision." In Bigelow, the plaintiff was the
425 U.S. at 765; see, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2704.
,' Otherwise astute critics have failed to see that Bigelow was an important point of
departure. Professor Schiro wrote that Bigelow was "best viewed as an attempt to buttress
. . .the abortion decisions." Schiro, supra note 25, at 78. He even claimed that the case
"declared that commercial speech has no First Amendment status." Id. at 87.
", 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 425 U.S. at 756-57.
' Id. at 753. An unsuccessful action to invalidate the same statute had been brought
by pharmacists as frustrated potential advertisers several years earlier. Patterson Drug
Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
4'
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speaker-publisher, and the Court was forced to tailor its decision
to traditional first amendment theory regarding the rights of the
speaker and the press. In VirginiaPharmacy, however, the listeners'-consumers' rights to receive information had been violated;
thus the Court could directly engage the ideal of informed decisionmaking which had colored but not controlled the decision in
Bigelow. In Virginia Pharmacy Justice Blackmun asserted that
"the free flow of commercial information

. . .

is indispensable to

the formation of intelligent opinions."" With a direct reference to
the Meiklejohn theory and to Sullivan, Blackmun then suggested
that such information could well serve "to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy. '"" He pronounced that speech which
does "'no more than propose a commercial transaction' "-the
touchstone of the Valentine doctrine-does not necessarily lack
"all protection."'" In effect, commercial speech was promoted to
the status of public speech, and for public speech of any type
there would be one standard of review.
That standard was discussed at great length in Buckley v.
Valeo,5 which in part considered political information presented
in commercial form.53 Buckley's version of first amendment strict
scrutiny is based on the following premise: Even a substantial
government interest (in this instance, preventing public corruption) is an inadequate ground absent compelling justification, for
a regulation which "heavily burdens core First Amendment expression.

'4

The Court had traditionally reserved the method of

425 U.S. at 765.
Id. & n.19. For a discussion of the Meiklejohn theory, see text accompanying note
29 supra and text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
1, Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). This language would appear to be a direct criticism of
the reasoning of that case, and its reliance on the commercial speech doctrine.
52 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The decison is 293 pages long.
3 Buckley held unconstitutional certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 which imposed ceilings on campaign expenditures by candidates, limited
independent political expenditures by individuals and groups, and limited candidates'
personal expenditures. The Court said these restrictions impermissibly burdened the right
of free expression and could not be sustained on the basis of governmental interests in
"

preventing corruption or in equalizing candidates' resources.
The Court characterized the test employed as "exacting scrutiny," id. at 16, and a
"rigorous standard of review," id. at 29. "The subordinating interests of the state must
survive exacting scrutiny." Id. at 64. The strict test was applied in detail to each provision
in issue; some succumbed and some survived.
" Id. at 48.
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exacting scrutiny for questions that turned on political expression, racial discrimination, access to justice, and other important
constitutional interests. Virginia Pharmacy'sreal doctrinal innovation was to apply this first amendment methodology to purely
commercial speech, when a mere minimum rationality test might
have been expected. 5
Precedents for the exacting scrutiny test in Buckley are found in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
In O'Brien, a Vietnam War protester unsuccessfully challenged his conviction under
a provision of the Selective Service Act which made it a crime to burn or destroy a draft
card. Chief Justice Warren formulated the following test:
[A] government regulation [of speech] is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
In Button the NAACP challenged a Virginia statute that made it an offense for an
organization to solicit business for an attorney. The NAACP had offered the services of
its legal staff for suits challenging racial discrimination. The Court held that the state
interest in prohibiting professional misconduct by attorneys was insufficient to justify the
state's abridgment of constitutional rights of expression and association. The Button strict
scrutiny analysis was phrased to require that broad prohibitions of protected first amendment activity be justified by a "substantial regulatory interest" in preventing
"substantive evils." 371 U.S. at 444. The Court noted that "[biroad prophylactic rules
in the area of free expression are suspect." Id. at 438.
Button differed from Bates in that it focused on litigation as political expression and
as the means to achieve equal treatment under the law. Solicitation was not regarded as
advertising but as group activity. Therefore, the holding had no actual precedential value
for Bates, except as an example of strict scrutiny in a closely related area.
NAACP v. Alabama held a state statute requiring organizations to disclose the identity of their members an unconstitutional abridgement of the members' first amendment
rights of free association. The statute was deemed to lack a "controlling justification"
for a "compelling" or "substantial" state interest. 357 U.S. at 463-66.
Other cases which have employed analyses which could be designated as strict scrutiny of first amendment violations include Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); Kusper v. Pointikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59
(1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 343 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305, 307 (1965); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
1 Under the minimum rationality test, if a regulation may reasonably be expected
to further a purpose legally within the state's purview, it can withstand constitutional
attack. For an extreme example in the freedom-of-expression context, see Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (the Court affirming Gitlow's conviction for advocating mass
labor strikes under New York Criminal Anarchy Statute on the ground that the statute
was not an unreasonable exercise of state police power).
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The Court theoretically continued to "balance" interests in
Virginia Pharmacy. However, as in other first amendment strict
scrutiny cases, the Court applied the balancing test with a decidedly libertarian cast, 5 weighting speech heavily and placing the
burden on the state to justify its suppression. Justice Blackmun
determined that three interests were furthered by advertising:
The consumer's interest in receiving information, the societal interest in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system,
and the advertiser's interest in free expression.57 These he balanced against the state's regulatory interests, especially that of
"maintaining professionalism" 8 in the pharmaceutical business.
The state interests were characterized not as "compelling" but
nevertheless as "indisputably . . .strong."5 Justice Blackmun

described his analysis of whether the ban in fact furthered that
strong interest not as "strict scrutiny," but as "close inspection." 0
The analysis was indeed close. The Court found not only that
Virginia's justifications were patently insubstantial next to the
interests of the consumer, but that the likely effect of an advertising ban would be to protect the profits of inferior pharmacists'l-the opposite result from that claimed for the ban. The
analysis was completed with an implicit inquiry into whether the
restriction was "no greater than is essential" to the furtherance
of the state interest.62 The Court asserted that the ban was "a
protection based in large part on public ignorance,"" and was
certainly not the least restrictive alternative available for accomplishing that state purpose of maintaining professionalism.
But the Court hedged in several important ways in its analysis.4 The meaning of Blackmun's assertion that advertising mer" See note 96 infra.

7 425 U.S. at 762-65.
' Id. at 766.
59 Id.

0 Id. at 769.

I
Id.
Overbreadth is the last element in the four-part test in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See note 54 supra. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine
as it colors Virginia Pharmacy see Note, Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment,
6 CAP. U.L. R~v. 75, 88 (1975). But see note 73 infra and accompanying text: In Bates,
the overbreadth doctrine was expressly not applied. 97 S. Ct. at 2707.
" 425 U.S. at 769.
" See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAv. L. REv. 142, 147 n.34 (1976). The
"
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ited a different degree of protection from other protected speech
is unclear. It could be read as signifying either less protection, in
the Valentine5 tradition, or simply different regulatory characteristics. It was difficult to discern from the opinion whether the
rigorous test could be correctly designated as strict scrutiny,
whether it would be applied in future commercial speech cases,
or to what infractions it would attach. Despite the stirring language in Virginia Pharmacy, the opinion remains ambiguous as
to what constitutional standard of review would be controlling in
the commercial speech area.
author identified Virgnia Pharmacy's test as strict scrutiny, but stressed its ambiguity:
"[Tlhe degree of rigor with which it will be applied in the future is uncertain. This is
particularly true of the 'compelling interest' component of the test."
Express exceptions to comprehensive protection for commercial speech were: (1) Advertising is subject to time, place, and manner restrictions (the bounds of which were left
completely undefined in both Virginia Pharmacyand Bates); (2) the electronic broadcast
media present "special problems"; (3) advertising is specially suited to regulation to
prevent untruth and deception because it is more verifiable than such speech as political
commentary. Commercial speech might warrant a "different degree of protection" than
does other speech in that: Advertisements may be required to appear in a certain form,
or to contain warnings, information, or disclaimers; prior restraint prohibitions may be
inapplicable; advertising regulations will be less susceptible to attack on the ground that
they "chill" speech. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. These exceptions were each incorporated into
the regulatory guidelines of Bates. See text accompanying notes 75-85 infra.
A fourth explicit hedge was the provocative footnote 25, now mooted by Bates. Its
salient language reads: "[W]e express no opinion as to other professions ....
Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products, they render professional services . . . with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception
if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. Footnote 25
may be the most curious episode in the checkered history of commercial speech. It added
enormously to the ambiguity of Virginia Pharmacy's holding. Its apparent expression of
disfavor with advertising professional services does not comport with the reasoning of the
case, and certainly did little to adumbrate Bates. One analyst has noted that footnote 25
did not even comport with Bigelow, which treated an advertisement for medical services.
See Note, Constitutional Law-Limitation of the Commercial Speech Exception to First
Amendment Protection, 51 TUL. L. Rxv. 149, 153-54 (1976).
There are several possible explanations for the inclusion of footnote 25. The Court
may have been genuinely undecided. The Court may have wanted to restrain lawyers from
immediately advertising on the strength of the holding. The Court may have wanted to
direct conspicuous attention to the issue, Considering Justice Stewart's and Chief Justice
Burger's hesitant commitments to the holding, footnote 25 was perhaps required to cement a majority. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, in their dissents in Bates,
insisted on reading it according to its more obvious light: that advertising of commodities,
not services, merited protection. 97 S. Ct. at 2710, 2712. It seems certain that footnote
25-shrugged off by Justice Blackmun, and forming the principal thesis of the dissents-was the dividing point between the majority and minority in Bates.
" 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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Justice Rehnquist's image of a "slippery slope" 6 'suggests
that once the Court took the first tentative step away from
Valentine it was bound to lose its balance and tumble headlong
into the abyss of Bates. In fact the passage from Bigelow 7 to
Bates was an exceedingly orderly one, with each succeeding case
correcting and building on the doctrinal foundation laid by its
predecessor. An incremental process was probably required to
refine first amendment methodology to the point of being capable
of striking down bans against legal advertising. Sullivan5 and
Bigelow had responded to the failure of the primary motive test
to protect highly valued speech. But Bigelow's balancing test,
encumbered by the commercial speech doctrine, would have
proven unwieldy with any but the most compelling public speech.
Virginia Pharmacy resolved these inadequacies by eliminating
the commercial speech doctrine, and by modifying the balancing
process with strict scrutiny. But VirginiaPharmacy'sambiguities
still needed to be clarified, and its rigor tried.
The first opportunity to test the Virginia Pharmacy protections came with Linmark Associates v. City of Willingboro. 9
There the Court applied the new doctrine to a city ordinance
which prohibited homeowners from posting "For Sale" signs in
front of their houses. The municipality claimed that the ordinance would further stable, racially-integrated housing, the idea
being that a block littered with "For Sale" signs would provoke
panic selling by whites. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous
Court, found that the ordinance restricted the flow of truthful
commercial information, was directed at the content of speech
rather than its time, place, or manner, 0 and as such was an
unconstitutional abridgment of first amendment rights.
11Justice Rehnquist himself is left on the summit, the lone supporter of the Valentine
doctrine, having dissented in Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and Bates, and having not
particpated in Linmark.
67 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
6 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
- 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
70 Id. at 1618-19. One commentator assessing the appellate court opinion, 535 F.2d
786 (3d Cir. 1976), assumed that the Supreme Court would treat the ordinance as a time,
place, and manner regulation. 11 GA. L. REv. 230 (1976). This comment is a good example
of how the ambiguity of the Virginia Pharmacy test could lead one astray. The author read
the test as conventional balancing and felt confident that the Willingboro ordinance would
survive based on the municipal interest in the stabilization of neighborhoods. But Virginia
Pharmacy had not proposed conventional balancing, and the ordinance in Linmark was
strictly scrutinized.

1978

LEGAL ADVERTISING

Linmark expanded the protections accorded to advertising in
Virginia Pharmacy, and advanced the first amendment doctrine
which that case had announced for commercial speech. It is noteworthy that homeowners' and consumers' interests in commercial
information were strong enough to prevail over the traditionally
highly valued objective of integrated housing. Thus, the protected status of commercial speech was substantially fortified by
this case.
But by itself Linmark would have been weak precedent for
Bates: The ordinance arguably bore no relation to preventing
"white flight," and thus could have been stricken by a minimum
rationality test.7' The fact that Marshall seized the occasion to
apply an exacting scrutiny test in the name of Virginia Pharmacy
is accountable as part of the seriate development of protection for
commercial speech. When Justice Blackmun wrote Bates, all the
doctrinal tools necessary to a smooth and logical analysis were
available, and a majority of the Court stood ready to put aside
the most durable and problematical of the bans on advertising.
Linmark was a test run for a first amendment theory that was
about to come of age, a necessary flexing of new strength prior to
Bates.

II.
A.

ANALYSIS OF

Bates

The Holding

The holding in Bates was confined to its facts: The state may
not suppress truthful advertising of the availability and terms of
routine legal services.7 2 A narrow holding was required by the
Court's determination that the overbreadth doctrine did not
apply to commercial speech: Legal advertising regulations can be
attacked only as applied to the plaintiff's advertisement.7 3 But a
narrow holding also served the Court's purposes. It carried a clear
rejection of any across-the-board legal advertising ban, and it
7 See note 55 supra.
72 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
" Under the overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff can challenge the constitutionality of
an entire regulation on the ground that it may sweep some protected speech into its
prohibitory scheme. Without the overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff is limited to showing
that the regulation is unconstitutional as applied to him. Justice Blackmun argued that,
because advertisers "can determine more readily than others whether their speech is
truthful and protected," advertising regulations would not be likely to "chill" such
"verifiable" speech, and the overbreadth doctrine was therefore unnecessary. Id. at 2707.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

encouraged a creative response from the bar by allowing flexibility in promulgating new rules."
Justice Blackmun offered a series of suggestions as to the
permissible scope of new regulations: "[Riegulation to assure
truthfulness,"75 which might sweep too broadly in other areas,
such as libel,76 will be upheld for commercial speech. False, deceptive, or misleading advertising may be banned outright. Only
routine services may be advertised." Advertising claims as to the
quality of services apparently may be prohibited,78 but judgment
was reserved on "that issue for another day." 79 In-person solicitation will continue to be disallowed," illegal transactions may not
82
be advertised,"1 and warnings or disclaimers may be required.
Regulations of legal advertising in general will be free from attack
' Chief Justice Burger characterized the Court's opinion as "draconian." Id. at 2711
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell described it as the "imposition of hard and fast
constitutional rules." Id. at 2718 (Powell, J., dissenting). In view of the considerable
leeway the Court provided, these criticisms seem less than just.
" Id. at 2708-09.
,oSee Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Blackmun stressed that
advertising is "calculated," not "spontaneous" speech, and, as such, is susceptible to
specific restrictions against misleading content. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
Id. at 2703.
' Blackmun's extension of this exception became a bit troublesome. He supposed
that "different degrees of regulation may be appropriate in different areas" depending on
the legal sophistication of the audience. Id. at 2709 n.37. He did not advise how to measure
sophistication or to separate audiences, and it remains difficult to see how legal advertisements in the National Enquirer might be subject to greater restrictions than those in the
Wall Street Journal.
" Id. at 2700. Blackmun's diction is interestingly qualified: "[W]e need notaddress
the peculiarproblems associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of legal
services. Such claims probably are not susceptible to precise measurement or verification
and, under some circumstances might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or
even false." Id. (emphasis added and omitted). Conceivably, with language as guarded
as this, restrictions against some claims as to quality might be unconstitutional as applied.
N This exception was one of several ways the Bates reforms did not go as far as those
proposed in an important suggested revision of Canon 2 of the A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY. Note, Advertising, Soliciting, and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972), cited in Bates, 97 S. Ct. at 2703 n.25.
The author of the note also would not have ruled out advertising of quality of services. As
a means of judging deceptive content, the author argued for using the Federal Trade
Commission opinions, with the usual FTC standard of protecting the credulous man
raised, for legal advertising, to protecting the reasonable man. 81 YALE L.J. at 1197. The
suggested reforms, thus, greatly exceed those of Bates.
1197 S. Ct. at 2709.
92

Id.
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either on antitrust grounds 3 or by means of the overbreadth doctrine.
Justice Blackmun noted that "there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising, ' 84 but
offered no specifics other than the cryptic caveat that the "special
problems" of the broadcast media "will warrant special consideration." 5 The lack of time, place, and manner guidelines can inspire a "parade of horribles": 88 billboards opposite city jails or
emergency rooms, bus placards,87 skywriting, sandwich boards, or
neon facsimiles of the scales of justice announcing weekly specials. But it seems more likely that the bar's capacity for selfregulation has been not only clarified but also strengthened
through Bates."8 Blackmun's guidelines are far less detailed, for
example, than were those of Miller v. California" for obscenity
regulation, and, as obscenity litigation has shown, 0 this is perhaps just as well. The bar, after Bates, is left with a mandate to
reform and a free hand for doing so. Bates should certainly not
1 Id. at 2696-98. The Sherman Act claim that bans on legal advertising illegally
restrained trade was held barred by the "state action" exemption, enunciated in Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), for acts of state governments from antitrust actions.
1 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
5 Id.
0 Justice Powell foresaw legal advertising in magazines, buses, and subways; through
posters, handbills, and mail circulations. Id. at 2718 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting). He
urged that time, place, and manner regulations can and should have "a significantly
broader reach with respect to professional services than as to standardized products." Id.
at 2717 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Lehman might be exceedingly
difficult to reconcile with such a method of publication. See note 21 supra.
A few days prior to the Bates decision, the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising
composed and circulated two alternative proposals for revising Canon 2 of the ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. After hearings held on August 4, 1977, the proposals were
submitted to the ABA Board of Governors, having been amended in light of Bates only
in that radio, but not television, was added as a permissible advertising medium. The
ABA House of Delegates followed the Board of Governors recommendation that Proposal
A be incorporated into the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrTY but that both
proposals be circulated to state bar associations and high courts for their consideration.
Proposal A has a negative thrust, described as "regulatory," in that it limits lawyers to
certain listed forms of advertising. Proposal B was termed "directive"; it allows for any
advertising that would not be misleading, and establishes guidelines for determining what
may be misleading. 63 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1977). On December 29, 1977, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted Proposal A, with certain modifications (including permitting television advertising). The full text of Colorado's new DR 2-101 is reprinted in Appendix II.
" 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 94-101 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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produce the earthshaking consequences feared by the dissenters
and by certain commentators,9 1 and probably will encourage advertising primarily on the Bates and O'Steen model.
But an intriguing aspect of the opinion is the forcefulness
with which Blackmun urged these rather moderate reforms. He
frankly disparaged the ABA's revision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, in which the bar somewhat relaxed its long aversion to attorney advertising. 2 He called on the bar to play a
special role "in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows both
freely and cleanly. 9 3 And the major portion of the opinion was
occupied with unexampled criticism of the conventional wisdom
comprising the legal profession's objections to advertising.
B.

Methodology

The opinion can be separated into seven parts: The facts, the
9" a conantitrust issue, a lengthy summary of Virginia Pharmacy,
sideration of the state's reasons for prohibiting legal advertising,
a dismissal of the overbreadth doctrine, a consideration of
whether Bates' and O'Steen's advertisement was misleading, and
guidelines for new rules. Discounting the recital of facts and the
antitrust issue, two-thirds of the opinion was taken up with a
rigorous examination of the bar's reasons for banning attorney
advertising.
5
As Justice Blackmun noted, Bates proceeds "a fortiori""
" Justice Powell wrote that "today's decision will effect profound changes in the
practice of law." 97 S. Ct. at 2712 (Powell, J., dissenting). A news magazine warned that
"Ithe legal profession faces an era of change, the likes of which it has rarely, if ever
encountered." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 11, 1977, at 21.
" The Court remarked of the 1976 ABA revision: "[An advertising diet limited to
such spartan fare would provide scant nourishment." 97 S. Ct. at 2701. The revised
disciplinary rule permits attorneys to list, in a "law list," legal directory, or in the yellow
pages of the telephone book, information including the following: The fee for an initial
consultation, and the availability upon request of a fee schedule or fee estimates; availability of credit; the specialties of the attorney and his firm; the names of references and
clients; and various professional credentials. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
D.R. 2-102(A)(6) (1976).
One possible reason for the explicit criticism of the ABA may have been to put to
rest complaints that current and future ABA reforms represent "less drastic alternatives"
than striking advertising bans as unconstitutional. That is, Justice Blackmun was forced
to label the ABA revisions inadequate. See 97 S. Ct. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2716-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"1 97 S.Ct. at 2709.
91 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
,197 S.Ct. at 2700.
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from Virginia Pharmacy. That case had emphasized the individual and societal interests in the free flow of information to the
public and had employed a strict scrutiny test to evaluate regulations which impinged on those interests. The form of the Court's
decision was that of a balancing test; in effect, however, the Court
heavily loaded the scales in favor of the public's right to information, causing the ballast to shift to the side of speech." This
methodology, and the first amendment doctrine underlying it,
resulted in a strict scrutiny test for regulations that burdened the
availability of commercial information to the public.
As applied in Bates, the strict scrutiny analysis required that
(1) the "justifications"9 7 for suppressing the flow of information
be "acceptable,"" and (2) the state interest served be "strong." ' ,
The word "acceptable" carries an almost deliberate ambiguity.
But the opinion established that "acceptability," whatever it
means, is a difficult standard to meet. In fact, the Court suggested that where there has been "blanket suppression"'' 0 of
speech that is of value to consumers, perhaps no justification
would be acceptable.'"'
In Goldfarb v. Virginia the Court had already recognized that
"[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially
" It was Justice Harlan's view that all first amendment speech cases should be
resolved according to a balancing test. Harlan stated the balancing test simply as "a
balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests." Barenblatt v.
United. States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). In fact, Harlan preferred to ballast his scales in
favor of the government in first amendment speech cases. See, e.g., Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt.
Justice Black consistently maintained that a balancing test was entirely inappropriate for first amendment adjudication. In a direct reply to Justice Harlan's "balancing,"
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, countered that he did
not agree that "laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a
congressional or judicial balancing process." 360 U.S. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting).
" 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
" Id. at 2707.
"Id. at 2699.
' Id. at 2708.
101 There are two tests in Bates: The strict scrutiny of the general ban on advertising,
and a test for whether the regulation was unconstitutional as applied. The latter test
simply evaluates whether the advertisement's information is misleading. If it is not misleading (as with the Bates-O'Steen ad), it is protected. Justice Blackmun dismissed three
challenges to the Bates-O'Steen ad: That the words "legal clinic" were misleading; that
the words "very reasonable" unjustifiably implied bargain prices; and that the advertisement did not inform the consumer that he may obtain a name change without the services
of an attorney. Id.
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great.
...
"I0 It remained for Justice Blackmun to assess the
acceptability of the Arizona bar's justifications for serving that
interest through a ban on attorney advertising. The Court's willingness to inveigh against the state's justifications for the restriction is worthy of attention.
The first of the six justifications asserted by the state was the
need to maintain professionalism, the same point argued in
Virginia Pharmacy.0 3 It was claimed that attorneys' pride, dignity, and "obligation selflessly to serve" would be adversely affected by advertising," ' and that advertising would demonstrate
to clients that lawyers were in fact motivated by profit and not
purely by "a commitment to the clients' welfare."' 15 But Justice
Blackmun suggested that the argument was not a little disingenuous:
[W]e find the postulated connection between advertising and the
erosion of true professionalism to be severly strained. At its core, the
argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves
and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such selfdeception.100

With this observation, Justice Blackmun struck the tone that
characterizes his entire treatment of the bar's argument: suspicious, even accusatory, occasionally ironic to the point of persi07
flage.
102421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Evidently, the state interests were greater in Bates than

they had been in Virginia Pharmacy. Bates is consequently the stronger establishment of
consumers' rights against the state. Some commentators had predicted that this phrase
from Goldfarb would prevent the Court from striking legal advertising bans. See, e.g., De
Soto, Advertising and the Legal Profession, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 67, 87 (1976).
"0

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
97 S. Ct. at 2701.

105 Id.
106Id.

The Court had this to say about the bar's argument that dishonest lawyers will
abuse an advertising privilege: "It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at
another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort." Id.
at 2707. The Court accuse the bar of hypocrisy: "[Clynicism with regard to the profession
may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning
the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide
contacts with potential clients." Id. at 2702. The bar's implicit connecting of advertising
with barratry received this rebuttal: "Although advertising might increase the use of the
judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." Id. at 2705.
107
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That attorney advertising is inherently misleading was the
bar's strongest justification for continuing the ban on attorney
advertising. The argument stated that legal services are too individualized, too dependent on a lawyer's particular skills, and too
unknowable in advance to be advertised without being deceptive.'0 8 Justice Blackmun countered that routine legal services
lack those disadvantages, and that only routine legal services will
be advertised. Also, even if an advertisement cannot present a
complete picture of services available, some information is better
than none.
The next justification was that advertising would increase
litigation. Justice Blackmun responded with statistics which indicated that legal services are under-utilized, and he urged that
advertising would be a means to facilitate access to the legal
profession for that seventy percent of the population not adequately served by it.'"0 Next, the Court considered, and dismissed
as unfounded, the argument that advertising would result in
higher fees. 1 0 Another claim was that advertising would harm the
quality of legal work by encouraging cutrate "package" service in
place of individual attention."' Justice Blackmun rejected the
point perhaps a bit cavalierly, noting that "[a]n attorney who
is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising,""' and that standardized services are not necessarily inferior services. Finally he addressed an argument made much of by
the principal dissenter: Oversight of advertising will impose severe and unmanageable administrative burdens on the state."'
Justice Blackmun responded with a confidence in the "integrity
and honor" of the profession not to abuse its new privilege." 4
The running theme of the Court's analysis was that times
have changed and the profession must follow. Complementing
the conclusion that the bar's justifications were almost uniformly
factitious were a countertone of faith in the public to make its
own decisions wisely and persuasive reasoning that legal advertis1o*Id. at 2703.
Id. at 2705.
Id. at 2705-06.
"'Id.at 2706.
"'

"'

Id.
,"' Id. at
112

2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2715-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1' Id. at 2707.
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ing will in fact be salutary. The conclusions were also supported
by a wealth of extrinsic data, on the order of a Brandeis brief,
which catalogued the inadequacies of legal services and the benefits of advertising, and included a brief history of attorney advertising bans. The result is a finely-wrought opinion, persuasively
skeptical of the purposes behind restricting speech, backed by
sociological and historical data, and redounding finally into an
article of faith in consumers' rights.
C.

First Amendment Philosophy

The debate over attorney advertising inescapably translates
into a philosophical dispute over the proper relationship between
the people and those who govern the people. One view is characterized by faith in the people to make the correct decision if they
have access to the correct information. This view is epitomized
by Justice Blackmun's eloquent response to the bar's argument
that attorney advertising is inherently misleading:
[Tihe argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated
enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public
'is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete
information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation
of the public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that
is based on the benefits of public ignorance. . . . [Tihe preferred
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less." 5

The contrary view is epitomized by Justice Powell's dissent
in Bates, wherein he questioned whether the public should receive information of this nature. The dissenters' position distills
into two main arguments: (1) Consumers' rights to information
are "marginal" at best, and (2) of greater importance than the
consumer's right is the state's right in not having its administrative machinery overburdened by the regulation of attorney advertising."' By contrast, the majority, while not gainsaying the importance of state regulatory interests, elevated the consumer's
right to be informed to a special position, the abuse of which
would engage the vigorous scrutiny of "acceptability."
The theories behind the majority and the dissent can be
characterized as utilitarian. Both purport to strive for the greatest good to the greatest number, and both call for an adjustment

"'

I, at 2704.
Id.
Id. at 2717-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of first amendment philosophy to reach that goal. Both positions
would reject the absolutist view of the first amendment advanced
by Justice Black," 7 as well as Justice Douglas' arguments for an
inherent right of free expression."' A utilitarian view lies in back
of any balancing process but comes particularly to the fore in
what has been called the first amendment's "majoritarian" context," 9 where it is not the interests of a minority (as in equal
protection cases) or of a speaker that are being attended, but
those of the public itself. But the majority and the dissent would
undertake the protection of the public in fundamentally different
ways. The one view expressed a profound faith in the wisdom of
the people, and the other, a profound faith in the wisdom of the
government to act beneficently for the people.
The minority expounded a narrow utilitarianism by which
the greatest good for the greatest number would be accomplished
by leaving undiminished the state's power to regulate. In the legal
advertising context, this view is reflected in Justice Powell's argument that the public is best served when certain of its interests
are entrusted to the organized legal profession. Justice Powell
wrote: "As a result [of the average person's lack of legal knowledge], the type of advertising before us inescapably will mislead
many who respond to it. In the end, it will promote distrust of
lawyers and disrespect for our own system of justice."' 2 Chief
Justice Burger put it more bluntly: "[Tihe public needs protection from the unscrupulous or the incompetent practitioner anxious to prey on the uninformed."'' The Bates reforms, which may
corrode the traditional authority and dignity of social institutions
such as the organized bar, are to be abjured.
"7See

Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS

43 (Cahn ed. 1963).
"I See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
has discussed the distinction between Justice Douglas' and Justice Black's "individualist"
philosophies of the first amendment, and the utilitarian approach. Rehnquist, The First
Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REv. 1 (1976).
M'See, e.g., Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976
U. OF ILL. L.F. 1080.
'2 97 S. Ct. at 2714 (Powell, J., disssenting).
"I Id. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice proposed a less drastic
alternative: The bar can have "programs" which would announce the "range" of fees of
"truly routine" services. But such a range of fees may well (despite Chief Justice Burger's
claims to the contrary, id. n.2) operate as a minimum fee schedule rather than as a
catalyst to competition.
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The Bates majority adopted a broad utilitarian philosophy,
arguing that the public would be benefited most when benefited
directly, pursuing the ideal of an enlightened, self-sufficient citizenry. The people, thus, are most effectively served by increasing
the information for, and encouragement of, independent decisionmaking. The first amendment is an imperative prescribing the
widest possible dissemination of information and ideas.
The thesis that the first amendment is different in kind from
the rest of the Bill of Rights draws on an honorable tradition going
back to Oliver Wendell Holmes2 2 and Thomas Jefferson. Under
this view, the primary function of the first amendment is not to
protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority, but to
upgrade the working of a majoritarian democracy by mandating
the free exchange of ideas. The most effective recent advocate of
this theory was Alexander Meiklejohn. 121 Meiklejohn argued that
the Constitution was conceived in response to the people's wish
to govern themselves. The first amendment was the cynosure of
that ambition. About its axis were certain "governing powers' 21 4
effectuating not private rights but governmental responsibilities.
The state should be absolutely prevented from regulating within
the orbit of these powers, which included freedom to vote and
the right to be free of any governmental intrusion whatsoever into
education, philosophy, science, literature, the arts, or the free
flow of political information.12 5 Essential to this view of the first
I" Holmes' metaphor for this idea-the marketplace of ideas-is quite familiar, if
somewhat banal. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). More elaborate statements of similar notions have been made by Milton, Voltaire,
and John Stuart Mill. Most poetic perhaps was Mao Tse-Tung's flowerbed of ideas: "Let
a hundred flowers blossom. Let a hundred schools of thought contend." Speech by Mao
Tse-Tung, Peking (Feb. 27, 1957).
'2 See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.Rav. 245; A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrIcAL FREEDOM (1960).
1' Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 254.
The effect of the Meiklejohn approach would be to abandon the clear-and-present-danger
test (also advocated by T. E. Emerson. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 911 (1963)), and all other first amendment balancing when
public issues were the subject of the speech.
"I Meiklejohn, supra note 124, at 262. Meiklejohn had some difficulty conferring the
cachet of absolute protection on great literature. A system that would naturally favor any
political tract over Shakespeare must be in need of some refining. As Professor Redish
asked, "[I1s the performance of the political function the real reason we find it desirable
to protect great literature . . .?"Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 437
(1971).
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amendment as "an absolute" was the derogation of "private
speech" not connected to activities of "governing importance."
Meiklejohn did not conceive of advertising as an activity by
which we govern ourselves in a democracy.'26 Blackmun disagreed, and in so doing illuminated a blind spot in the Meiklejohn
vision. Blackmun perceived the flow of commercial information
as a serious matter of public affairs, to be valued according to the
Meiklejohn theory that society benefits from the spreading of
information and opinion. While the absolute protection Meiklejohn proposed was not considered, his vision of a freely informed
polity, and his ideal of self-government carried the day in Bates.
The Meiklejohn thesis, epitomized in his famous statement that
"[p]olitical freedom is not the absence of government. It is selfgovernment,""' is,of course, a theory of political freedom. But it
becomes a canon of consumerism when applied to economic freedom, as it was in Bates.
Professor Redish, in an article which criticized Meiklejohn
for not applying his thesis to the commercial speech area, effectively anticipated Bates six years before it was written.' 8 Redish
argued that commercial speech, unlike the other unprotected
types (fighting words, libel, obscenity, incitement), does no direct
damage to state interests.'2 9 Furthermore, advertising has important social uses in that it is informational; it increases consumer
sophistication; it promotes efficient use of time and effort by the
consumer; and, as it provides grounds for choosing one product
over another, it aids rational choice.'30 Redish argued generally for
"the belief in the intelligent free will of the individual, who is
capable of listening, thinking, reasoning, and, on the basis of
those activities, making his personal decision as to how he should
be governed."'' And the individual "asserts his dignity most
strikingly when he uses his power of reason to decide how his life

"'Both Meiklejohn and his peer as a first amendment theorist, T. E. Emerson,
blithely accepted without question the notion that commercial speech is entitled to less
protection than political speech. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrICAL FREEDOM 37 (1960); Emerson,
supra note 124, at 949 n.3.
"2 Meiklejohn, supra note 124, at 253.
I" Redish, supra note 125, at 431.
"2 Id. at 432-34.
13 Id.
M'

Id. at 441.
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first amendment, therefore, should protect information important to daily decisions in individuals' personal affairs. Although
great literature and "perhaps" political debate add somewhat
more to the process of rational development, ,33 advertising should
no longer be berated as less-protected speech.
One might note with irony that the more noble intellectual
pursuits-art, literature, philosophy, the "public discussion of
public issues" 34-have received no special solicitude from the
Burger Court, while advertising has. One might detect in Bates
an economic rationale suggestive of freedom of contract. Indeed,
in Virginia Pharmacy'35 and Bates, Blackmun added to the balance a societal interest in the free enterprise system. The Court's
philosophy in these cases appears to echo Adam Smith: A bargain
struck between A and B will benefit A, B, and society in general,
and the "invisible hand" of the market is all the regulation that
the conduct of those who sell and buy requires.138 But, although
some members of the Burger Court doubtless may wish to dissociate their reasoning from what could be thought of as libertarian
elitism, it should be remembered that the gravamen of the protections of Virginia Pharmacy and Bates is not the advertiser's
right to trade freely, but the consumer's right to information. The
economic philosophy that presides over these cases is not laissezfaire capitalism but consumerism, and the goals of the two often
conflict.
Bates also might be viewed as encouraging the notion of an
affirmative right of access to the media. 137 The proponents of this
theory, which is based on listeners' rights to hear the "robust
debate" of public issues, as reflected in Sullivan'38 and Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'3 advert to the need for government
32
"
134

12

'1'

Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
Meiklejohn, supra note 124, at 257.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE

(1952) (No. 39,

AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

194

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD).

,3 See Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 766 (1970);
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641

(1967).
'u 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
13'
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intervention to guarantee fair coverage of all public issues and a
lively interchange of competing ideas. The concept relies on a
substructure of listeners' rights 40 that would also support the
consumerism of Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. But positive government interference with a speaker's discretion in saying what
he wants seems an ominous warping of the spirit of the first
amendment from which the latter two cases stand wholly apart.
Instead, Bates accords with the traditional model of using
the first amendment to undo government interference with the
free flow of communication. The innovation of the line of cases
studied here was that the public's interests, not the speaker's,
inspired the Court's activism. Rather than an affirmative use of
the first amendment as a "sword" in government's regulatory
scabbard, Bates' freedom of expression operated as a shield for
consumers against government regulations.
Bates expressed the classic democratic idealism of the Bill of
Rights. Justice Blackmun's credo of trust in the people, with
society's duty being to inform them rather than to keep them in
ignorance,' is resonant with a Jeffersonian timbre. The Bates
philosophy of the first amendment, distilled to its essence, can be
found in these words of Jefferson:
"I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but
the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough
to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is
not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education."' 42

Baine Kerr
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (dicta); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
"
See text accompanying note 115 supra.
42

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820)
JEFFERSON'S LETrERs 338-39). In the following passage, Jefferson could have

(WHITMAN,

been speaking (from his Enlightenment bias) of the minority and majority opinions in
Bates:

Men by their constitutions are naturally
those who fear and distrust the people, and
them into the hands of the higher classes.
themselves with the people, have confidence

divided into two parties, first,
wish to draw all powers from
Secondly, those who identify
in them, cherish and consider

them as the most honest and safe, although not the most wise depository of
the public interests. In every country these two parties exist and in every one

where they are free to think, speak, and write, they will declare themselves.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (Aug. 10, 1824) (S. PADOVER, A JEFFERSON
PROFILE 336 (1956)).
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APPENDIX I
DVERTISEMENT7

DO YOU NEED
A LAWYER?
LEGAL SERVICES
AT VERYREASONABLEFEES

LEGAL SERVICES AT
REASONABLE RATES

ItcLreIc CINC~
&Nr. ToATTrim
0 WrrhtV
NL 1

rV1

_VAS

kt K

I~I

Telephone: (303) 399-1701
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE,
uncontested with no disagreement as to
property division, maintenance, child custody
and support.

$150
. 175

,es
s..t... .....

wit.o,,s .io.,.

Wit S*o"
,ionAW- . ...............
Theobonechorges donot include $27 CourtS
filig oe
andcols. nictipoces

" Divorce

or legal separation--uncontested

[both spouses sign papers)

S175L00 plus 12000 court filng fee
" Preparation ot all court papers and instruc.
lions on how to do your own simple
uncontested divorce
1100.00
o

Adoption--uncontested severance proceeding

SIMPLE WILL,
pertr.eo..t ..............

$45

DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE,
..OW.do .Wtsp.l scr . .

............

150

BANKRUPTCY,
indwidoo, nsn-hbsisess.
osieo und. $5.000. n
wefonte
ed .........
PtsSS5Co. Ifilg fees

20

Isto
regarding *t0htpe of cases wi be
tusnhed upon equest. The o.. qoted wets. eseew
wirit th Cityand Cosoty ors.

1225.00 Plus aproximately 11000 publicalion Cost

Rankruptcy-.non-business. no contested pro.
ceedings
Individual
1250.00 plus $55 00 court flhng lee
Wife and Husband
$300.00 plus $110.00 court filng tee
o Change of Name
o

595.00 plus 120.00 court filing lee

NEED AN ATTORNEY?
THE SILVERN LEGAL CLINIC
IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE ITS FEES
DIVORCES

1200

Information regarding other types of cases
furnished on request

Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen
617 North 3rd Stre
Phoeni. Arizena IS0
Telephone (60212124186

BANKRUPTCY

Ness. ds.wta,W

, 125

en,-

.s..,

285

~200
DEFENSEOF DRUNK DRIVING
.OR DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION
,enh
te

so...

PERSONAL INJURY
CONTINGENCY FEES

200

24%,
24 %os.eot s.t

325

27%,..s.os..

.. ,

30%e.s.eos
Information regarding other types of cases furnished on request.

Bates' and O'Steen's advertisement, which appeared in the
Arizona Republic, February 22,
1976.

THE SILVERN LEGAL CLINIC
1711 Faoy to, Sell. 202
beesn, Colorado11013

FOR AN APPOINTMENT CALL 861-8426
Soh-doy oppoonorts o-iloblo

Two advertisements which were placed 72
hours after Bates was announced, and
appeared in the Rocky Mountain News, July
1, 1977, at 32, 26.
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APPENDIX II

The following amendments to DR 2-101 of Canon 2 of the
Colorado Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court December 29, 1977, and were made
effective January 2, 1978.* They incorporate the ABA's Proposal
A for amending Canon 2 (see note 88 supra) with modifications
which include the following' Television advertising is permitted
in Colorado (paragraph B); in-person solicitation is expressly prohibited (paragraph J); fee listings. must include mention of factors which might affect such fees (paragraph B(14)(f)); apparently DR 2-101 is exclusive in that lawyers may advertise only in
the manner described therein (paragraph H). In addition, the
Colorado Supreme Court, among other changes, added a detailed
and rather restrictive definition of "legal clinic" to the
"Definitions" section of Canon 2 (not reprinted here).
DR 2-101 Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner,
associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim.
(B) In order to promote the process of informed selection of
a lawyer by potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish in print media or broadcast on radio or
television, subject to DR 2-103, the following information in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer
resides or maintains offices or in which a significant
part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the
information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication
or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A) and is presented in a dignified manner:
(1) name, including name of law firm and names of
lawyers therein;
(2) addresses and telephone numbers;
(3) a statement of one or more fields of law in which
the lawyer or law firm practices, or a statement
that the practice is limited to one or more fields
of law;
*

Lawyer Advertising: Amendments to Canon 2, 7 COLO. LAWYER 189 (1978).
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a statement that the lawyer or law firm engages
in the general practice of law, which may be accompanied by a statement indicating one or more
fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm does
not practice;
(5) a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice to the
extent permitted by rules of the Colorado Supreme Court;
(6) date of birth;
(7) date and place of admission to the bar of any state
or federal court, U.S. territory, District of Columbia, or foreign country, provided that if the terms
of such admission contain restrictions thereon,
the nature of such restrictions shall also be disclosed;
(8) schools attended, with dates of graduation and
degrees;
(9) technical and professional licenses;
(10) foreign language ability;
(11) prepaid or group legal services programs in which
the lawyer participates;
(12) a statement as to whether credit cards or other
credit arrangements are accepted;
(13) office and other hours of availability;
(14) legal fee information limited to the following:
(a) fees charged for an initial consultation;
(b) the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific service or the
availability of a written schedule of fees for
group legal service organizations;
(c) hourly rates, provided that the statement
discloses that the total fee charged will depend upon the number of hours which must
be devoted to a particular matter and that
the client is entitled, without obligation, to
an estimate of the fee likely to be charged;
(d) fixed fees for routine legal services which are
specified therein, such as simple wills, a
change in name, an uncontested personal
(4)
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bankruptcy, an uncontested adoption, and
an uncontested dissolution of marriage;
(e) range of fees for services, provided that the
statement discloses that the specific fee
within such range will vary depending upon
the client's particular matter and that the
client is entitled, without obligation, to a
written estimate of the fee within the range
likely to be charged;
(f) a statement that contingent fee rates or
schedules are available upon request;
provided that any such printed legal fee information, including that which is printed on television,
discloses (in print size equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth the fee information) all
variables and other relevant factors which could
affect such fee;
(C) Any person desiring to expand the information authorized for disclosure in DR 2-101(B), may apply to the
Colorado Supreme Court for an amendment to DR 2101(B) to permit such expansion. Any such application
shall also be served upon any entity or committee so
designated by the Colorado Supreme Court, which shall
be heard, together with the applicant, on the issue.
(D) All advertisements in their entirety shall be retained by
the lawyer for a period of three years following the publication or broadcast of such advertisement and upon
five days' request shall be produced and delivered to the
Colorado Supreme Court, any Justice thereof, or that
Court's Grievance Committee or other designated committee. If the advertisement is communicated over
radio or television, it shall be prerecorded, approved for
broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording, audio tape,
videotape or comparable method of retention shall be
maintained by the lawyer. If the advertisement is published in a newspaper of general circulation, the lawyer
shall maintain a record of the text of the advertisement
and dates of publication, in lieu of maintaining copies
of.each and every issue of the particular publication.
(E) If a lawyer renders legal services for which a fee had
been advertised, the lawyer must render that service for
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no more than the advertised fee.
(F) If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized
under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that is published
more frequently than one time per month, the lawyer
shall be bound by any representation made therein for
a period of not less than 30 days after such publication.
If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized
under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that is published
once a month or less frequently, such lawyer shall be
bound by any representation made therein until the
publication of the succeeding issue. If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under DR 2101(B) in a publication which has no fixed date for publication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound
by any representation made therein for a reasonable
period of time after publication but in no event less
than one year.
(G) Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any
fee information authorized under DR 2-101(B), the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein
for a period of not less than 30 days after such broadcast.
(H) Except to the extent permitted in DR 2-101, a lawyer
shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a
lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements,
radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit
others to do so in his behalf. However, a lawyer recommended by, paid by or whose legal services are furnished by, a qualified legal assistance organization may
authorize or permit or assist such organization to use
means of dignified commercial publicity, which does
not identify any lawyer by name, to describe the availability or nature of its legal services or legal service benefits. This does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his professional
status is germane to the political campaign or to
a political issue.
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(2)

In public notices when the name and profession
of a lawyer are required or authorized by law or
are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other than
the attraction of potential clients.
(3)
In routine reports and announcements of a bona
fide business, civic, professional, or political organization in which he serves as a director or officer.
(4)
In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5)
In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other
legal publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof.
(6)
In communications by a qualified legal assistance
organization, along with the information permitted under DR 2-101(B) and DR 2-101(A)(5), directed to a member or beneficiary of such organization.
(I) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value
to representatives of the press, radio, television, or other
communication media in anticipation of or in return for
professional publicity in a news item.
(J) Unless specifically authorized under DR 2-101(B) or DR
2-104, in-person or other direct solicitation of business
is prohibited.

WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK RESPOND TO

Gertz

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, courts have had difficulty reconciling the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press' with the
legitimate interest of the individual in protecting his reputation
from defamatory falsehoods.' Since 1964 the United States Supreme Court has struggled to balance these two apparently contradictory values. After a long line of cases the Court determined
that, in at least one area of defamation law, the development of
a standard of liability should be left to the individual states.
Thus, the Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 left the
states scrambling to promulgate constitutionally permissible
standards for imposing liability upon publishers and broadcasters
of defamatory falsehoods concerning private individuals involved
in matters of public interest or general concern.
The Gertz decision presents inherent problems to the states.
In effect, it requires that the courts of each state decide for state
citizens the protection to be given their reputations. In balancing
the interest of an individual in his reputation against the equally
significant interest of the public in matters of interest to them,
the states will undoubtedly adopt different standards.4 Two recent state court decisions in New York and Washington are evidence of the widely disparate standards which are inevitable.
In Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co.,I the Washington Supreme Court held that a publisher of a defamatory falsehood
concerning a private individual involved in a matter of general or
public interest is liable for actual damages if he fails to exercise
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 This legitimate interest has been consistently recognized even while being limited

by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
3 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
This lack of uniformity poses serious problems for the interstate publisher. To avoid
liability publishers must be aware of the standards set by each state. Publishers are, in
effect, bound by the states which impose the highest duty of due care on publishers. For
discussions of this problem and of the possibility of media self-censorship as a result of
this lack of uniformity, see Comment, State Court Reactions to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.: Inconsistent Results and Reasoning, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1431, 1445-46 (1976); Note,
New Standards in Media Defamation Cases: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 12 CALIF. W.L.
REV. 172, 186-88 (1975).
1 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
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reasonable care.' The New York Court of Appeals, ruling on the
same issue, held, in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,
Inc.,7 that the relevant question in imposing liability in these
cases is whether the publisher acted in a "grossly irresponsible
manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." 8 This comment will analyze the two standards promulgated by the highest courts of Washington and New York and
discuss which of these standards best serves the dual values of
freedom of speech and press and protection of reputation.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Because the common law tort of defamation results in the
imposition of strict liability, it has long been a source of consternation to commentators.' Upon a finding that the statement of
publication was false, defamatory, and communicated to a third
party, damages were presumed. Thus, liability was imposed absent a finding of fault."0 Historically, any contradictions between
the twin torts of libel and slander and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press were dismissed with the blanket assertion that defamatory falsehoods were not protected
under the first amendment." Thus, the interest of the individual
in his reputation was always superior to the public interest and
"right to know." It was not until 1964 that the conflict was recognized.
Inc. v. Sullivan
A. New York Times,
3
Metromedia, Inc.'

2

through Rosenbloom v.

In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court first
Id. at 445, 546 P.2d at 85.
7 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
See, e.g., Harum, Remolding of Common Law Defamation, 49 A.B.A.J. 149 (1963);
Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1073 (1962).
Interestingly, even in Great Britain, known for its vigorous defamation law, some
commentators feel that strict liability in defamation should be limited with respect to the
news media. Report of the Committee on Defamation, 39 MOD. L. REV. 187 (1975).
IC See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRs § 113 (4th ed. 1971).
" See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87
(1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"3 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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confronted the question of whether the first amendment necessitated a limitation of state libel law in certain instances. One of
three elected commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought suit against the New York Times for alleged defamatory
falsehoods published in a paid advertisement deploring the illtreatment of civil rights workers in the South. The Court held
that, in cases involving the alleged defamation of a public official,
recovery must be based upon a showing of "actual malice" defined as "knowledge that . . . [the statement] was false or . . .
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'"
Although limited to defamation involving public officials,
New York Times was a radical departure from the "defamatory
falsehoods are not protected free speech" theory. In rapid succession, the Court, in what is universally referred to as the "Times
progeny," expanded the application of this "knowledge of falsity
or reckess disregard of truth" standard to criminal libel, 5 supervisors of county-owned recreational facilities," candidates for public office, 7 and police officers. 8 In addition, the rule was extended
to cover such "public figures" as a college football coach accused
of "fixing" a game" and a retired army general involved in a
campus disturbance.0 "Reckless disregard of truth" was defined,
in yet another case, as "serious doubts as to the truth of...
[the] publication."'" However, the Court was soon to move away
abruptly from its "public official" and "public figure" rationale
in deciding defamation cases.
" The Court noted that the case was to be considered "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376 U.S. at
270. The Court concluded:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
IS Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
" Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
SOcala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265 (1971).
" Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
SI St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,22 the Court decided the
question of whether the first amendment limited the right of a
private individual to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
involving a matter of public or general interest. Rosenbloom, a
Philadelphia book dealer, complained that broadcasts by Metromedia, which referred to his books as "obscene" and stated that
a pending federal suit was an attempt on his part to force the
23
police to "lay off the smut racket," were defamatory.
Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, stated that the relevant
question in determining whether to require the New York Times
standard of "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth"
was not the status of the plaintiff as either public official, public
figure, or private individual, but the nature of the subject matter
involved in the alleged defamatory statement. 2' Thus, if the event
reported was one of public or general interest, a private individual
could recover damages for libel "only upon clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. '25 The effect was, therefore, to extend the standard
to private individuals by changing the emphasis from the status
of the defamed person to the character of the event reported.
The Times progeny, culminating in Rosenbloom, seemed to
indicate a clear trend in the law of defamation as affected by the
first amendment. In virtually all cases, the liability of a publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory statements was to be based only
upon a finding of actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of truth since the "public interest" is implicit in nearly everything the media reports. Given the fact that "reckless disregard"
required "serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, '26 the
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 36.
24 The Court said:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because
in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on
the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 52.
390 U.S. at 731.
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obstacles in the way of recovery by a defamed individual seemed
insurmountable.
B.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.27

Rosenbloom, however, was a plurality opinion. Dissents by
Justices Harlan and Marshall in that case indicated marked discontent with the application of the New York Times standard to
defamation of private individuals. With Gertz the Court retreated from its position in Rosenbloom and placed upon the
states the burden of determining what standard to adopt, so long
as it was not strict liability, in allowing recovery from defamers
of private individuals.
Much has been written of Gertz and its predicted effect upon
state defamation law. 28 In that case, an attorney brought suit in
libel against the publisher of the magazine American Opinion.In
an article discussing a supposed communist conspiracy to discredit the police, Gertz was referred to as a "communist-fronter,"
2
and a "Leninist," and was accused of having a criminal record. 1
Framing the issue as whether publishers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehoods involving private individuals enjoy a constitutional privilege against liability, the Court returned to the traditional inquiry of the New York Times progeny. The Court again
focused on the type of person defamed, not the event involved.
Recognizing the conflicting values in the case, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, said: "Some tension necessarily exists
between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the
legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury.""0 The Court,
however, declined to shoulder the responsibility of drawing the
line of demarcation between the two interests and instead left the
ultimate decision to the individual states: "We hold that, so long
as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
- 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" See, e.g., Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Damages for Libel-A New Standard for
Recovery of Damages by Private Individuals Libeled in a Report of Public InterestGertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 1 B.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (1975); Note, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 89 (1975);
Comment, As Time Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Its Effect On California
Defamation Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565 (1975); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv.
1349 (1975); Note, Freedom to Defame, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 166 (1975).
418 U.S. at 326.
Id. at 342.
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publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual."'" However, this license given to'the states
carried another limitation: "[T]he State may not permit recovery of presumed damages, at least when liability is not based on
a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. '32 Therefore, provided they did not impose strict liability
or grant presumed damages in the absence of New York Times
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth," the states
were, and indeed are, at liberty to set their own standards of care
3
in imposing liability upon defamers of private individuals.
34
II. Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co.
In Taskett, the Supreme Court of the state of Washington
took advantage of the Gertz invitation to promulgate a liability
standard in the area of private defamation.

A.

The Background of the Decision

On January 11, 1973, KING television broadcast a news story
concerning the supposed disappearance of William Taskett, a
Seattle advertising executive who owned ninety-five percent of an
agency incorporated under the name Bill Taskett & Associates,
Inc. During the previous month, the agency had lost one of its
major accounts, and, threatened with lawsuits, Taskett filed for
statutory dissolution of the corporation. Upon the appointment
of a trustee and the notification of all creditors, including defendant KING Broadcasting, Taskett and his wife departed for a
vacation in Mexico. The story broadcast by defendant asserted
that "[s]everal Seattle businesses, including some television and
Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
= In a more recent case, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court
indirectly limited the definition of "public figure" by refusing to apply the label to the
wife of the scion of a wealthy industrial family. The Court further declined to extend the
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" test of New York Times to all media
coverage of judicial proceedings. This would seem to confirm the Court's unwillingness to
extend the New York Times doctrine on the basis of the nature of the event involved, in
this case the divorce of two extremely wealthy people. The relevant inquiry is whether the
person allegedly defamed is a public official, public figure, or a private individual, and in
this context the Court will apply the "public figure" classification strictly.
86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (remanding to trial court). On remand, the
trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. No appeal was
taken from that decision. Telephone interview with Evan L. Schwab, attorney for KING
Broadcasting Co. (June 28, 1977).
"
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radio stations, are looking for an advertising man. He's gone and
he may have some of their money." 5 The story then went on to
state that "no one knows where he is"; quoted the "receiver" as
saying that the firm's debts might total one hundred thousand
dollars while assets were a fraction of that amount; indicated the
amounts several advertisers were alleged to have lost when Taskett left; noted that Taskett was last heard of in Mexico; and
ended with the plea, "Bill Taskett, won't you please come

home.'13'
The story was investigated for the defendant by a reporter
who had spoken with the sublessee of Taskett's apartment, with
various creditors, and with the trustee, and had consulted court
files relating to suits pending against Taskett. Upon returning to
Seattle, Taskett brought suit in libel against KING Broadcasting
and James Harriot, the station's "anchorman."
Washington had been one of the first states to respond to
Rosenbloom. In Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 37 the state supreme court, citing Rosenbloom with approval, and noting the
"tension" between the individual's interest in his reputation and
first amendment guarantees, determined that a private individual involved in a matter of public interest must prove "knowing
or reckless falsity" with clear and convincing proof to recover in
libel.38 Relying on Miller, the trial court in Taskett granted summary judgment in favor of KING. The court noted that Gertz
appeared to allow more "flexibility" than Rosenbloom in imposing liability but said that any change would have to be initiated
in the state supreme court.3 9 Taskett appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals certified the case to the Washington Supreme Court.
Although the state supreme court had not addressed the issues raised in Gertz before the Taskett case, the state's judiciary
was aware of Gertz and its potential impact upon Miller. The
Quotes are as reported in the court's opinion. 86 Wash. 2d at 451, 546 P.2d at 88.
31 Quotes are as reported in the court's opinion. Id. at 452, 546 P.2d at 88-89.
31 79 Wash. 2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971).
u Id. at 827, 490 P.2d at 109.
Brief for Appellant at 6 (quoting from trial court's oral opinion). Brief for Respondents at 23 indicates that plaintiff did not mention the Gertz decision in his brief opposing
summary judgment. He did not ask the trial court to read or apply any rule under Gertz,
nor did he respond to the court's offer to defer final decision until it had read the Gertz
opinion in full.
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Washington Court of Appeals, in Exner v. AMA, 40 a case involving an alleged defamation of a self-proclaimed public figure with
respect to the limited issue of fluoridation of water, observed, in
dicta: "[pirivate individuals who have not become public figures
may now protect their reputations in state courts by legal remedy
without proof of malice and ... the mandate of Miller v. Argus
Publishingis likewise modified."'"
Against the background of Gertz (which allowed greater leeway in imposing liability upon defamers of private individuals),
Miller (which was still the law of the state requiring "knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" for recovery), and the
incorrect conclusion made in Exner (that Gertz required a modification of the strict standard in Miller), the court proceeded to
clarify the law of defamation in Washington.
B.

The Holding

Recognizing the problem of reconciling first amendment
guarantees and defamation law, as discusssed in earlier Washington cases, 2 the Washington court agreed with the reasoning in
Gertz. Hence, to require "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" as a prerequisite to recovery in libel by a private
individual imposed an unacceptable burden resulting in nearabsolute immunity for the media. The court further reasoned that
the argument that a lesser standard than the New York Times
test might result in "self-censorship" was "without merit."4
Thus, the underlying rationale of both Rosenbloom and Miller
was undercut. Although the day of strict liability for defamatory
falsehoods had passed, the pendulum had seemingly swung too
far in favor of the media. Balancing the competing interests, the
court arrived at the following conclusion:
[W]e hold that a private individual, who is neither a public figure
nor official, may recover actual damages for a defamatory falsehood,
concerning a subject of general or public interest, where the substance makes substantial dangers to reputation apparent, on a
showing that in publishing the statement, the defendant knew or,
in the exercise of reasonablecare, should have known that the state12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974).
Id. at 223, 529 P.2d at 869.
42 See, e.g., Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969);
"
'

Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967).

,3 86 Wash. 2d at 446, 546 P.2d at 86.
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ment was false, or would create a false impression in some material
respect."

The court then specifically overruled Miller v. Argus Publishing
Co. and reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.45
III. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,Inc.'"
Chapadeau offered the state of New York its opportunity to
respond to Gertz. The New York judiciary had adopted, as had
Washington, the New York Times-Rosenbloom standard and had
frequently applied it.'7 Also, as had Washington, a lower New
York court had indicated in dicta that, in light of Gertz, a standard different from that adopted in accordance with Rosenbloom
might better serve to balance the conflicting public and private
interests in defamation law.'
A.

The Background of the Decision

On June 10, 1971, Joseph L. Chapadeau, a public school
teacher, was arrested and charged with criminal possession of
heroin and criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument.
These charges were subsequently dropped. In reporting the event,
the defendant, a local newspaper in Utica, New York, grouped the
story of Chapadeau's arrest with a report concerning the arrests
of two other men on charges of criminal possession of marijuana.
The alleged libel involved one paragraph of the article which
" id. at 445, 546 P.2d at 85. Childress v. Hearst Corp., 86 Wash. 2d 486, 546 P.2d
108 (1976), decided the same day on similar facts, cited the Taskett rule as controlling.
0 See note 34 supra. One justice, concurring with the new rule, nevertheless, dissented on the ground that the rule should not be applied retroactively. Another justice
lodged a vigorous dissent opposing the new rule and defending Miller.
46 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
1 See Trails West, Inc. v. Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d 207, 298 N.E.2d 52, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863
(1973); Twenty-Five E. 40th Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 595, 282 N.E.2d
118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972); Kent v. City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y.2d 818, 277 N.E.2d 669, 327
N.Y.S.2d 653 (1971); Frank v. McEldowney, 29 N.Y.2d 720, 275 N.E.2d 337, 325 N.Y.S.2d
755 (1971).
" In Safarets, Inc. v. Gannet Co., 80 Misc. 2d 814, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
the court stated:
Were it for us to decide, we would espouse some lesser standard as permitted
in Gertz where private persons are defamed. However, we cannot anticipate
whether the Court of Appeals will abandon the Rosenbloom doctrine or, if it
should, what standard of care it might adopt. Therefore, we are bound to
adhere to the Rosenbloom rule as adopted by the Court of Appeals.
80 Misc. 2d at 818, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
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stated that "the trio was part of a group at a party in Brookwood
Park when they were arrested. Drugs and beer were found at the
party, police charge." 4 Chapadeau brought suit in libel claiming
that the article defamed him because it indicated that he was at
a party at which beer and illegal drugs were found. He further
alleged that his reputation as a high school teacher was thereby
injured."
At trial, the supreme court (New York's court of general
jurisdiction) refused to grant the defendant newspaper's motion
for summary judgment. Under the New York procedure which
allows immediate review of such orders,5' the defendant appealed
to the appellate division of the supreme court. That court reversed, granting the Observer-Dispatch's motion for summary
judgment. Chapadeau's appeal to the court of appeals followed.
B.

The Holding

In an opinion which was surprisingly short, given its potential impact, the court of appeals first surveyed the relevant cases
in the area, including the New York Times progeny, its own cases
applying Rosenbloom, and finally Gertz. The court then promulgated a new rule stating:
We now hold that within the limits imposed by the [United States]
Supreme Court where the content of the article is arguably within
the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably related
to matters warranting public exposition, the party defamed may
recover: however, to warrant such recovery he must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of
information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties."

Applying this new rule to the case, the court determined that the
facts were insufficient to support any finding of "grossly irresponsible" conduct. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment in
favor of the Observer-Dispatchwas affirmed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE Two DECISIONS
On similar facts, the highest courts of Washington and New
38 N.Y.2d at 197, 341 N.E.2d at 570, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (emphasis added).
Brief of Appellant at 2.
s'N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW & R. § 5701 (McKinney 1963).
52 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
"
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York have created two widely-differing standards for imposing
liability upon media defamers of private individuals involved in
matters of public concern. Since the Gertz opinion authorizes any
standard so long as fault is an element, both standards are constitutionally permissible. The question becomes, therefore, which
standard best serves the competing values of free speech and
untarnished reputation.
Clearly, pragmatic concerns must be taken into account in
formulating an answer. The standard must be easily understood
by the publishers and broadcasters who will be called upon to
comply with it and the members of the bar who must advise
them. In addition, it must be intelligible to the courts which will
adjudicate the disputes which will inevitably arise.
A.

The Taskett Negligence Standard

Although the Supreme Court did not mandate any particular
standard in Gertz, the decision makes the Court's preference
abundantly clear. Justice Powell's majority opinion, in dicta,
broadly hints that a negligence test is the preferred "lesser stan3
dard."5
The reasons for adopting a negligence standard in determining media liability in such cases are extremely persuasive. The
tort law concept of negligence is well understood. Courts and
lawyers are familiar with the "reasonably prudent man" test and
its applications. Thus, publishers and broadcasters can be advised, with considerable certainty, as to what will be expected of
them if they are to avoid liability. The disadvantage, as in all
negligence law, is that application of the standard is subject to
the vagaries of the jury system. Uncertainty always exists as to
how a jury will apply this reasonable man test to the facts of a
given case. Due to this uncertainty, danger of media selfcensorship is unavoidably present. However, this is true of virtually any standard, including the "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" test. In addition, the safeguards of the
appellate process, which will prevent findings of liability based
on the expression of unpopular but constitutionally protected
views, are equally available under any legal standard. Thus, the
danger of self-censorship is attributable to the necessary uncer"

418 U.S. at 348, 350.
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tainties of a jury system, not to the use of any particular standard.
In addition, the reasonable man test provides the necessary
protection for constitutional freedoms of speech and press while
allowing recovery for actual damages to reputation. In the absence of a constitutionally required standard which balances
these interests, it seems reasonable to impose liability on publishers for negligent defamation of private individuals while allowing
for good faith mistakes. It is unlikely that requiring publishers to
act as reasonably prudent members of their profession will restrain their exercise of fundamental rights to any significant degree.
The Taskett decision, relying partially on the reasons outlined above, also gave great weight to the inability of a private
individual to respond successfully to a defamatory falsehood. 4
Quoting extensively from Gertz, 5 the court noted that a public
official or figure has greater access to the sources of communication and thus enjoys a greater opportunity to refute defamatory
statements than does a private individual. This, too, is a valid
reason for selecting the negligence standard. The relative defenselessness of the private citizen adds weight to the state's interest
in providing a means of redress for injuries to his reputation,
thus, tipping the scale in the balancing process towards a
standard which requires less fault on the part of the publisher
for recovery by the defamed individual.
The majority of states passing on the problem since Gertz
have found this reasoning persuasive."6 Although a trend is diffi86 Wash. 2d at 445, 546 P.2d at 85.
Id. at 445-47, 546 P.2d at 84-85.
See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976);
Troman v. Wood, 62 Il. App. 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons,
Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1975).
Other states, while not specifically adopting a negligence standard, seem to suggest
that a negligence standard should in fact be applied. See Helton v. United Press Int'l. 303
So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1974) (private individuals no longer required to prove actual malice to
recover); Tendler v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 788, 118 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1974)
(dicta stating that absent overriding consitutional considerations negligence standard
applies); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 38 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (1975)
(denying summary judgment against plaintiffs who are private individuals since affidavits
would not preclude some finding of fault).
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cult to discern at present, it is significant that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts has tentatively adopted the negligence standard. 57 The impact this will have upon the states which have not
yet responded to Gertz is unclear. It should be remembered that
several states,58 including Colorado, 9 have chosen to retain the
Rosenbloom standard, maintaining that freedom of speech and
press requires the protection of the stricter "knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard of truth" test. Thus, uniformity in this area
of the law does not seem imminent.
What should ultimately determine which standard the remaining states adopt is how well, in practice, each standard protects the two interests at stake. It is too early to tell how well the
negligence standard will, in practice, protect constitutional freedoms of speech and press. Nevertheless, a large number of states
have, in rejecting the Rosenbloom test in favor of the negligence
standard, theoretically determined that Rosenbloom offers insufficient protection to the individual's interest in his reputation.
The choice is, therefore, between a standard that might offer
insufficient protection to constitutional guarantees and the
Rosenbloom standard that, according to the majority of states
ruling on the question, does not give adequate protection to the
value of one's reputation. This failure of the Rosenbloom
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" standard is,
580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a
private person, or concerning a public official or a public figure in relation
to a private matter, is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) Knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
See AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1974) (2-to-1 decision), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Le Boeuf v.
Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. 1976); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976).
" Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975) (two
justices dissenting).
For a discussion of the case, see Comment, Constitutional Law-Libel Action-PrivatePlaintiff versus Member News Media-An Application of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.-Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 36 OWo ST. L.J. 911 (1975).
In the recent case of Rowe v. Metz, 564 P.2d 425 (Colo. App. 1977), cert. granted,
No. C-1230 (Colo. May 23, 1977), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the "reckless
disregard" standard of fault was applicable to defamation actions between private individuals.
'v

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
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perhaps, the most persuasive argument in favor of the negligence
standard adopted by Taskett.
B.

The Chapadeau "Grossly Irresponsible" Standard

Unlike the negligence standard set out in Taskett, the requirement that a private individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the publisher acted in a "grossly irresponsible manner" is not a standard familiar to the law." The
court attempted to define the new standard by describing
"grossly irresponsible" as "without due consideration for the
standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties."'" However, this qualification
results in only further uncertainty in ascertaining what the standard means. While the term "grossly irresponsible" has the flavor
of recklessness, "without due consideration" and "ordinarily followed" are akin to the standards of conduct imposed on professionals in ordinary negligence. Thus, the initial inquiry must be
to determine where, on the spectrum of standards of care, gross
irresponsibility lies. This is no easy task.
The language employed in Chapadeauseems to rely heavily
upon Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 2
The libel action in Butts was brought by a college football coach
accused of "fixing" a game. The Court, characterizing the plaintiff as a "public figure," held: "[A] 'public figure' who is not a
public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonableconduct consituting an extreme departurefrom the standardsof investigationand
reportingordinarilyadhered to by responsible publishers. 6 3 Significantly, Justice Harlan's test was never applied, and Chief
Justice Warren's concurring opinion applying the New York
Times test to defamation of "public figures" became the law."4

0 No listing for "grossly irresponsible" is found in either BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th
ed. 1968), or WORDS AND PHRASES (1958). "Irresponsible" is defined only with reference to
mental incompetency or insolvency. 22A WORDS AN PHRASES 506 (1958).
11 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
62 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
,3 Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), joined with Butts for argument,
was remanded to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the Warren opinion.
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The Chief Justice's opinion was highly critical of the above standard:
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion departs from the standard of New York
Times and substitutes in cases involving "public figures" a standard
that is based on "highly unreasonable conduct" and is phrased in
terms of "extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." I cannot
believe that a standard which is based on such an unusual and
uncertain formulation could either guide a jury of laymen or afford
the protection for speech and debate that is fundamental to our
society and guaranteed by the First Amendment."

Chief Justice Warren's skepticism is equally applicable to the
Chapadeau standard.
The New York Court of Appeal's choice of this "grossly irresponsible" language is mystifying. Presumably, the court wished
to arrive at a standard stricter than negligence but not as strict
as reckless disregard of truth. The result of this compromise,
however, is an unmanageable standard likely to cause confusion
when applied."
It must be assumed that the court refused to adopt a negligence standard because it felt that such a standard would give
first amendment freedoms inadequate protection. However, in its
apparent concern over these rights, the court has fostered greater
uncertainty as to where constitutional protection ends and liability for defamation begins. The result is nothing short of judicial
abdication of responsibility. Not only is such a standard unfathomable to a jury of laymen but, more significantly, the publishers
and broadcasters who must abide by the standard will be equally
unsure as to what is expected of them.
This is the major failing of the Chapadeaustandard. Clarity
is imperative in this area of the law, as Justice Blackmun recognized in Gertz. 7 Uncertainty is likely to result in self-censorship.
Lowering the standard at the cost of introducing uncertainty benefits neither potential plaintiffs nor defendants. To avoid this
" 388 U.S. at 163.
' But see the following cases where the Chapadeau rule was cited as controlling:
Bolam v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 52 App. Div. 2d 762, 382 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1976); Tobler v.
Newsday, Inc., 51 App. Div. 2d 986, 381 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1976); and Commercial Programming Unlimited v. CBS, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 351, 378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1975).
11Justice Brennan concurred in order to have a "clearly defined majority position
that eliminates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity." 418 U.S. at 354.
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self-censorship, the publishers and broadcasters must have at
least a working understanding of what conduct is prohibited and
what conduct is protected. The Chapadeaustandard does neither
for the reason that the term "grossly irresponsible" is not a legally
defined standard of conduct. Publishers are likely to avoid reporting borderline stories for fear of incurring liability under what
appears to be a standard, the content of which is left largely to
the discretion of courts and juries in application.
The blame does not rest solely with the New York Court of
Appeals. The Chapadeaustandard clearly falls within the mandate of Gertz as laid down by the Supreme Court. Chapadeau
imposes liability only upon a finding of fault, albeit the degree of
fault required remains unclear. The Supreme Court might have
done better simply to give the states a choice between negligence
and the "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" standards, both of which are thoroughly familiar to bar and bench.
The Court opted to give the states greater leeway, however, opening the way to compromise standards such as Chapadeau.
In spite of its weakness, the Chapadeau standard is not unsalvageable. A good solid line of cases interpreting the rather
amorphous language of the rule might give it the clarity needed
in this area. It should be remembered that the New York Times
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth" test suffered
from the same lack of legal meaning until the words were given
significance through interpretation.68 Unfortunately, while the
standard remains unexplained, New York courts, lawyers, plaintiffs, and publishers must suffer with its inadequacies.
CONCLUSION

Given the Gertz decision, wherein the Supreme Court refused to promulgate a standard by which liability in defamation
law could be measured, some confusion is to be expected as each
state attempts to strike a balance between the Constitution and
the individual's right to protection from defamatory falsehoods.
The inevitable outcome is that different standards will be
adopted in different jurisdictions. It therefore seems an inopportune time for the courts to add further confusion by creating
unmanageable standards.
0

See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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Virtually any clear legal standard is preferable to one so
ambiguous as to be no standard at all. The failure to promulgate
a workable and understandable test by which to impose liability
upon defamers of private individuals involved in matters of public interest is the near-fatal defect of Chapadeau v. Utica
Observer-Dispatch,Inc.
The remaining question is which, among the workable standards in this area, is the best. The negligence standard adopted
in Taskett v. KING Broadcasting,Inc. strikes an admirable balance between the interest in constitutionally protected free
speech and press, and the interest in protection of the reputations
of private individuals. The standard adequately protects both
interests by limiting media liability to occasions when the publisher or broadcaster has failed to act reasonably and, at the same
time, allows the private individual to recover actual damages,
without the almost insurmountable burden of proof required by
Rosenbloom. It seems likely that, given these advantages, the
states which have yet to set a standard in this area should opt for
the negligence standard as did the court in Taskett.
Herbert C. Phillips

A

FEE SIMPLE IN WATER OR A TREND TOWARD
FAVORING CITIES?

City of Grand Junction v. Kannah Creek Water
Users Association, 557 P.2d 1173 (Colo. 1976)
INTRODUCTION

Several Colorado cases have commented on the necessity for
just compensation when water rights are condemned;' but the
Colorado Supreme Court, in City of Grand Junction v. Kannah
Creek Water Users Association,2 addressed itself for the first time

to the effect of a previous condemnation.' Prior to this decision,
it could be presumed that any water right acquired by condemna-

tion would entail the same rights and limitations as water rights
acquired by appropriation.' The Kannah Creek case indicates
that where a city acquires a water right through condemnation

many of the limitations on that right may be disregarded.'
The Kannah Creek case had its origins in 1911, when the city
of Grand Junction, in an eminent domain proceeding,' acquired
direct-flow7 water rights from agricultural appropriators along
E.g., Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 549, 349 P.2d 370, 379 (1960); Black v.
Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 457, 264 P.2d 502, 506 (1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426, 94 P. 339, 341 (1908). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
2 557 P.2d 1173 (Colo. 1976).
3 City of Grand Junction v. Van Pelt, Civ. No. 1818 (Dist. Ct. Mesa County, Nov.
11, 1911). This action was brought under a Colorado statute providing that:
[Cities] shall have the right and privilege of taking water in sufficient
quantity, for the purpose hereinbefore mentioned, from any stream, creek,
gulch or spring in the state; provided, that if the taking of such water in such
quantity shall materially interfere with or impair the vested right of any
person or persons or corporation, heretofore acquired, residing upon such
creek, gulch or stream, or doing any milling or manufacturing business
thereon, they shall first obtain the consent of such person or persons or
corporation, or acquire the right of domain, by condemnation, as prescribed
by the constitution and laws upon that subject, and make full compensation
or satisfaction for all the damages thereby occasioned to such person or
persons or corporation.
1877 COLO. GEN. LAws ch. 100, § 2655 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-12-101(78)
(1973)). See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to 216 (Supp. 1976).
4 "'Appropriation' means the application of a certain portion of the waters of the
state to a beneficial use." CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (1973).
, See text accompanying notes 40-42, 55-58 infra for a discussion of some of the
limitations.
See note 3 supra.
There are "two classes of appropriations ....one for ditches diverting water directly
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Kannah Creek. The judgment awarded the city a "paramount
right" to a "continuous flow" of 7.81 cubic feet per second of
water, 8 but made no express mention of storage rights.
Sixty-two years later, in 1973, the city instituted the Kannah
Creek action to change the manner of use to include the right to
store water in Purdy Mesa Reservoir which the city had acquired
in 1954. Downstream appropriators protested, alleging the proposed change would result in a diminution in the quality of water
available for their decreed appropriations.
The water judge9 denied the storage right, holding that the
city could not divert to the reservoir water not immediately required.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing between a water right acquired by condemnation and one acquired
by appropriation.' 0 The court held that the 1911 judgment
granted a "paramount right"" to the water itself;" that the
storage right thus acquired was implied"3 by the circumstances
surrounding the 1911 judgment; and that the right was not lost
by over fifty years of non-use."
Justices Erickson and Lee dissented, stating that the majority's concept of eminent domain as applied to water rights was
erroneous since there can be no fee simple in water-the water
right is a mere usufruct' 5-and that under principles of water law,
from the stream [direct flow], and one for the storage of water, to be used subsequently."
Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 191, 269 P. 574, 581 (1928).
Accord, Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co., 86 Colo. 197, 199, 280 P. 481,
481 (1929). See Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 256 (1970).
Civ. No. 1818 at 22.
The water court has exclusive jurisdiction over all water right determinations within
its jurisdiction. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203(1) (1973).
557 P.2d at 1176-77.
Id. at 1176, 1177.
" Id. at 1175.
'3 Id. at 1177.
4 Id.

,5 557 P.2d at 1179 (Erickson and Lee, JJ., dissenting). See note 40 infra. The nature
of a usufruct is such that "[a] title by use is not acquired . . . [When the use has been
completed the right of the user terminates." Pulaski Irr. Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70
Colo. 565, 568, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922). It has also been said that:
[W]e have to consider the peculiar nature of the property designated "a
water right," and the title thereto, as distinguished from land. This "right"
is said to be intangible and incorporeal. The ultimate title or ownership of
the water of the natural streams of this state is, by the Constitution, vested

A FEE SIMPLE IN WATER?

a change in manner of use from direct flow to storage required
additional compensation. 6
Certainly, the reasoning of the majority is unique in Colorado." Because the city had acquired the rights to the 7.81 cubic
feet per second of water in an action in rem, it could change the
manner of use from direct flow to storage without liability.'" The
case also breaks new ground in holding that a storage right can
be implied, 9 and that the right so acquired was not lost by failure
to apply the water to a beneficial use for over fifty years.20 Nevertheless, Kannah Creek may be indicative of an emerging policy
to ensure that cities have adequate water supplies in times of
shortage.2 '
The following discussion will consider Kannah Creek in light
of (1) whether the 1911 decree purported to grant a storage right
to Grand Junction, (2) whether the 1911 decree could grant a
storage right, (3) if a storage right was obtained, whether it was
lost by over fifty years of non-use, and (4) the policies and trends
evidenced by this decision.
in the public, but dedicated to the use of the people, subject to appropriation.
Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 368, 123 P. 831,
832-33 (1912).
I 557 P.2d at 1178-79.
" Under well-settled water law principles, if the farmers who originally owned the
rights to the 7.81 cubic feet per second of water had attempted to change the manner of
use from direct flow to storage they would have been subject to injunction if the change
would have resulted in injury to other appropriators. See text accompanying notes 41-42
infra.
' 557 P.2d at 1175. One view of eminent domain, the in rem theory, is that:
[Tihe acquisition of private property [is] by an exercise of the power of
eminent [domain] itself, not upon the title or upon the sum of the titles if
there are diversified interests. Upon appropriation all inconsistent proprietary rights are divested and not only privies but strangers are concluded.
Thereafter, whoever may have been the owner, or whatever may have been
the quality of his estate, he is entitled to full compensation according to his
interest and to the extent of the taking, but the paramount right is in the
public not as claiming under him by a statutory grant, but by an independent title.
3 NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.1 (3d ed. 1976).
" See 557 P.2d at 1176-77.
20 Id. at 1177. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973), for a definition of
"beneficial use."
" See text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
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1911 DECREE PURPORT TO GRANT A STORAGE RIGHT?
The Kannah Creek court construed the decree of 1911 very
liberally in favor of Grand Junction to hold that the decree implied a storage right. The decree did not expressly mention the
word "storage." 2 Since direct flow and storage are two different
kinds of appropriation, 23 a party decreed only direct flow rights
normally could not change his manner of use to storage if others
24
would be injured.
The majority reasoned that the storage right was nevertheless implied by the "obvious" need for storage at the time of the
1911 judgment, and by language in the judgment referring to
"water works" to be constructed in the future. 5 Earlier Colorado
case law has consistently held that, for a water right to exist,
intent to appropriate must be coupled with notice. 2 Kannah
Creek is unique in holding that notice can be implied27 by obvious
29
28
need rather than by physical act or filing.
DID THE

Another puzzling question arises from the language of measurement used by the 1911 decree. The city's water right was
decreed in terms of statutory inches or cubic feet per second"
which are direct flow measurements.3 1 A storage right is measured
557 P.2d at 1176.
Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr.
Co., 86 Colo. 197, 199, 280 P. 481, 481
(1929); Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 191, 269 P. 574,581 (1928);
Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. v. Huppe, 60 Colo. 535, 538, 155 P. 386, 388 (1916); New
Loveland & Greeley Irr.
& Land Co. v. Consolidated Home-Supply Ditch & Res. Co., 27
Colo. 525, 528, 62 P. 366, 366-67 (1900).
2'See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
" 557 P.2d at 1177.
" Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power Co., 174 Colo. 309, 317,
486 P.2d 438, 442 (1971); Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 446, 484 P.2d
1211, 1215 (1971); Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist., 161 Colo. 416, 421, 425 P.2d 259, 261 (1967); City & County of Denver v. Northern
Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 388, 276 P.2d 992, 999 (1954); Wheeler v.
Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 588, 17 P. 487, 489 (1888); Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo.
148, 153, 2 P. 901, 903 (1884).
' The dissent pointed out that need is not equated with right. 557 P.2d at 1179.
21See note 26 supra.
" In other appropriation states, filing is necessary to secure the right. See 1 W.
2

2

HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 315-18 (1971). In Colo-

rado filing is only evidentiary to the determination of the dates of intent and notice.
Cresson Consol. Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 283, 338 P.2d 278,
283 (1959); Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 458, 264 P.2d 502, 506-07 (1953).
10 557 P.2d at 1179.
31 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-80-102(8) (1973).
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by cubic feet or acre-feet. 2 To hold that a storage right could be
decreed in terms of a direct flow measurement, the majority relied on the phrases "continuous flow" and "paramount right"
used in the 1911 judgment.33 The court stated:
The 1911 judgment must be read as a whole. The lack of direct
reference to storage rights and measurements is not fatal. On the
contrary, the designation of a "paramount right" in cubic feet per
second is a declaration of the City's right rather than as a limitation
upon it and is a definite expression of an unlimited right."

The Colorado Supreme Court has previously equated the
term "continuous flow" with direct flow. 5 While some authorities
have used the term "paramount right" to mean a right greater
than that obtained by prior appropriation or by purchase of the
rights of another, 36 Colorado cases using the phrase have given it
37
a meaning equivalent only to the appropriative right itself.

II.

COULD THE

1911

DECREE GRANT A STORAGE RIGHT?

The Kannah Creek court's most important and radical departure from prior law is found in its holding that the 1911 judgment granted a "right to the water itself, 38 a right which no other
American jurisdiction has recognized. 3 The majority opinion purported to recognize the familiar rule that a water right is usufructuary only,4" and that, while the point of diversion or manner of
32

Id.

1 557 P.2d at 1175, 1176.
1 Id. at 1176.
" Baker v. City of Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 495, 289 P. 603, 605 (1930). Cf. Wolff v.
Pomponia, 52 Colo. 109, 114, 120 P. 142, 144 (1911) (where the court used the term
"constant flow" rather than "continuous flow"). But cf. City of Westminster v. Church,
167 Colo. 1, 13, 15, 445 P.2d 52, 58, 59 (1968) (where the court used the term "continuous
flow" as a substitute for direct flow and as distinguished from intermittent direct flow,
but then later used the term in the context of "a continuous flow for storage").
" City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 252, 537 P.2d 1250,
1289, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 35 (1975); 3 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.1 (3d ed.

1976).

17City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 200, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (1939);
Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 587-88, 17 P. 487, 489 (1888); Monte Vista
Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 368, 123 P. 831, 832 (1912).
557 P.2d at 1175.

s,The early English view was that the landowner had an absolute ownership right to
the ground water under his land. But that view was soon rejected in this country. E.g.,
Basset v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
" "The right to the use of water, whether by direct flow, or through storage reservoirs,
is a usufructuary right .... Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co., 86 Colo.
197, 199, 280 P. 481, 481-82 (1929). Accord, Pulaski Irr. Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70
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use can be changed, 4 such change is permissible only if it results
in no material injury to existing rights, junior or senior.42 Specifically, the court recognized the holding of City of Westminster v.
Church,13 where a city had purchased direct-flow rights and attempted to change them to a storage purpose." In Church the
Colorado Supreme Court had decided: "Defendant City of Westminster could not enlarge upon its predecessors' use of the water
rights by changing periodic direct flow for irrigation to a continuous flow for storage. Such a change would necessarily increase the
Colo. 565, 568-69, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922); Crippen v. White, 28 Colo. 298, 302, 64 P. 184,
186 (1901); Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 589, 17 P. 487, 490 (1888);
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882); Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 368-69, 123 P. 831, 832-33 (1912); 1 W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 441 (1971); Ross, Acquisition of
Existing Water Rights, 13 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 447, 478 (1967). See COLO. CONST.
art. XVI, § 5, providing that: "The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (1973) provides, in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Colorado that all
waters originating in or flowing into this state, whether found on the surface
or underground, have always been and are hereby declared to be the property
of the public, dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation and use in accordance with law.
See note 15 supra.
,1CF&I Steel Corp. v. Rooks, 178 Colo. 110, 114, 495 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1972); Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg, 171 Colo. 304, 310, 467 P.2d 267, 270 (1970); City of Colorado
Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 296, 249 P.2d 151, 154 (1952); Brighton Ditch Co. v. City
of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 372, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951); Colorado Milling & Elev. Co.
v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 26 Colo. 47, 51, 56 P. 185, 186 (1899).
42 City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 15, 445 P.2d 52, 59 (1968); Farmers
Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 578-79, 272 P.2d 629, 631
(1954); Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 587,
183 P.2d 552, 555 (1947); Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co., 86 Colo. 197,
200, 280 P. 481, 482 (1929); Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 191,
269 P. 574, 581 (1928); New Loveland & Greeley Irr. & Land Co. v. Consolidated HomeSupply Ditch & Res. Co., 27 Colo. 525, 530-31, 62 P. 366, 366-67 (1900); Note, A Survey
of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 253-56 (1970). See Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg, 171 Colo. 304, 311, 467 P.2d 267, 271 (1970) (when a city buys a direct-flow right
and changes the manner of use to storage, the "appropriator for storage purposes would
be limited to what he was entitled to divert for irrigation purposes, both as to amount
and time of diversion.").
,3167 Colo. 1, 15, 445 P.2d 52, 59 (1968).
" Church is factually similar to Kannah Creek except that in Kannah Creek the city
acquired the direct-flow rights by eminent domain rather that by purchase, and all the
appropriators along the stream were supposedly compensated for the injury resulting from
the change in use by the 1911 judgment. 557 P.2d at 1175.
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ultimate consumption from the stream to the detriment of other
appropriators."4 5
The Kannah Creek court distinguished Church on the
ground that in Kannah Creek the 1911 judgment had condemned
rights from all appropriators on the stream.46 Therefore,
assuming"' the 1911 judgment had already compensated those
appropriators for the additional damage48 caused by the change
to storage sought in 1973, the farmers presently relying on the
return flow from the city's use of the 7.81 cubic feet per second
of water would have no right to complain.
Nevertheless, the Kannah Creek court realized the Church
case had not been adequately disposed of.49 Consequently, the
court held that the city had condemned the 7.81 cubic feet per
second of water in fee. 10 In the court's language, Grand Junction
condemned "the right to the water itself. 5' Thus, the court relied
heavily upon the proposition that, unlike Church, "[t]he original action was not brought pursuant to the statutes dealing with
the approriations of water. Rather it was strictly limited to the
City's power of condemnation based on eminent domain." 52
While the court's rationale may be tenable, it ignores the
basic distinction between the ownership of land and the right to
the use of water. A fee simple ownership in water is illogical
because of the peculiar interconnection of water rights and because of the physical absurdity of attempting to lay claim to
, 167 Colo. at 15, 445 P.2d at 59.
" 557 P.2d at 1175.
,7 Nowhere does the 1911 judgment expressly purport to compensate for the added
damage occasioned by the city's change of use to storage. See 557 P.2d at 1176-77.
" The farmers were originally damaged to the extent that the city's direct-flow use
of the 7.81 cubic feet per second of water caused some reduction in the amount of water
reaching the farmers. Some of the 7.81 cubic feet per second of water returned to the
stream and flowed to the farmers after the city used them. The supreme court's decision
apparently allows the city to store the entire 7.81 cubic feet per second without returning
any of it to the stream. See 557 P.2d at 1177.
" First, under ordinary water law principles, the city may have lost the conditional
right gained by the 1911 decree by a failure to apply the 7.81 cubic feet per second storage
right to a beneficial use with reasonable diligence. See text accompanying notes 54-66
infra. Second, the dissent pointed out that the condemnor can acquire no greater right
than that owned by the condemnee (direct-flow rights). 557 P.2d at 1179. But see note 18
supra.
557 P.2d at 1175, 1176.
5' Id. at 1175.
52 Id.
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something as elusive as a water molecule. That all the appropriators along Kannah Creek were supposedly compensated by the
1911 judgment looms as a very important fact in this regard, and
the majority concedes that any appropriator not paid by the 1911
3
judgment would now have an action against the city.1
III.

ASSUMING A RIGHT TO STORAGE EXISTED IN

1911,

WAS THAT

RIGHT LOST AFTER FIFTY YEARS OF NON-USE?
most other western states, 54 Colorado allocates

Like
its surface water under a legal system of "prior appropriation."55 Under
this system, one who first couples intent to appropriate with some
act giving notice56 has a right superior to those who begin water
projects on the same stream at a later date;57 provided that the
11Id. at 1177. See City of Thornton v. Farmers' Reservoir & Irr. Co., No. 27462 (Colo.
Feb. 6, 1978), wherein the court equates "water works" and "water rights."
'
All states west of the 100th meridian apply prior appropriation law for surface
water. However, some western states apply a hybrid combining appropriation law with
riparian law. Riparianism is the theory used in the eastern states. See 1 W. HUTrcHNs,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1-3 (1971). COLO. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 6. "Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the water
for the same purpose ...."
- Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power Co., 174 Colo.309, 316,
486 P.2d 438, 442 (1971); Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 445, 484 P.2d
1211, 1214 (1971); City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo.
375, 388, 276 P.2d 992, 999 (1954); Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 153, 2P. 901, 903-04 (1884).
COLO.CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-401(1)(b) (1973).
(II) As among water rights decreed in the same water district in the same
adjudication suit, the historic date of initiation of appropriation shall determine the relative priorities, beginning with the earliest right.
(III)As among rights decreed in the same water district in different adjudication suits, all water rights decreed in an adjudication suit shall be senior
to all water rights decreed in any subsequent adjudication suit.
(IV) As among water rights decreed in the various original adjudication
suits in the various water districts of the same water division, the decreed
date of initiation of appropriation shall determine the relative priorities in
numbered sequence, beginning with the earliest right.
(V) As among water rights decreed in the various supplemental adjudication suits in the various water districts of the same water division, the actual
priority date of any decree in any district shall not extend back further than
the day following the entry of the final decree in the preceding adjudication
suit in such district.
(VI) If the preceding principles would cause in any particular case a substantial change in the priority of a particular water right to the extent theretofore lawfully enjoyed for a period of not less than eighteen years, then the
division engineer shall designate the priority for that water right in accordance with historic practice.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-401(1)(b) (1973).
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project is completed with reasonable diligence, i.e., on the condition that the water is actually applied to a beneficial use within
58
a reasonable time.
Cities enjoy a modified rule of reasonable diligence under
City and County of Denver v. Sheriff." If there is unappropriated
water available, a city can take more than it presently needs in
anticipation of normal growth over a reasonable time. 0 However,
a city cannot simply reserve these rights; the water must be applied to a beneficial use in the meantime." Given these principles, it is difficult to understand how the majority in Kannah
Creek could state: "The fact that the City did not utilize a particular reservoir until 1954 is of no moment to this Court."8 The
court apparently relied upon the fee simple approach to hold that
the right was perfected through condemnation and could not be
lost by a failure to apply to a beneficial use within a reasonable
time. Once again, this theory ignores the interconnection of water
rights, unless it can be seen as a mere extension of the City and
County of Denver v. Sheriff doctrine.
It can be argued that the city lost the storage right by abandonment. To lose a water right by abandonment there must be
non-use coupled with intent to abandon."' A Colorado statute sets
up a rebuttable presumption of abandonment after ten years of
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1973); Colorado Water Conserv. Dist. v. Twin
Lakes Res. & Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 565, 468 P.2d 853, 856 (1970); Four Counties Water
Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist., 159 Colo. 499, 509, 414 P.2d 469, 475
(1966); City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375,
398, 276 P.2d 992, 1004 (1954); Drach v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 144, 109 P. 748, 751 (1910);
Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 588, 17 P. 487, 489 (1887).
105 Colo. 193, 210, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939).
A Colorado statute allows cities of over 200,000 population to lease these reserved
water rights. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 31-35-201 (1973). See note 79 infra.
11 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 203, 210, 96 P.2d 836, 841, 844
(1939); Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133, 139-40
(1955).
62 557 P.2d at 1177.
U, "'Abandonment of a water right' means the termination of a water right in whole

or in part as a result of the intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the
use of all or part of the water available thereunder." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(2)
(1973); CF & I Steel Corp. v. Purgatoire River Water Conserv. Dist., 183 Colo. 135, 140,
515 P.2d 456, 458 (1973); City & County of Denver v. Just, 175 Colo. 260, 266, 487 P.2d
367, 370 (1971); New Mercer Ditch Co. v. New Cache La Poudre Iff. Ditch Co., 70 Colo.
351, 353-54, 201 P. 557, 558 (1921); San Luis Valley Irr. Dist. v. Town of Alamosa, 55 Colo.
386, 390-91, 135 P. 769, 771 (1913); Alamosa Creek Canal Co. v. Nelson, 42 Colo. 140, 147,
93 P. 1112, 1114 (1908). See Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 154, 2 P. 901, 904 (1884).
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non-use. 4 While there is previous case law to the contrary, 5 a
recent Colorado statute now states that conditional water rights,
i.e., those appropriations which have not yet been put to beneficial use but which meet the initial requirements of intent to appropriate and notice, may be abandoned,6"

IV.

POLICIES AND TRENDS

The Kannah Creek court declared that it was in the public
interest to condemn water for the city of Grand Junction and
therefore the city acquired "not only the ownership, but also the
additional right to distribute that water to the citizens of Grand
Junction" 7 even though the eventual storage use resulted in additional damage to the water rights of farmers-damage not compensated for by the 1911 decree. 8
This result seems anomalous; past Colorado Supreme Court
decisions have protected the farmer from the ever-growing demands for domestic water supply. 9 Indeed, despite the Colorado
Constitution's grant of "preference" to the domestic use of
water,70 the court early held that a city must pay just compensation when it condemns the rights of an appropriator.' An early
case explained this result by reasoning that municipal use was
not a domestic purpose.72 Later, the landmark case of Town of
"

COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 37-92-402(11) (Supp. 1976).

Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 105, 371 P.2d 775, 782 (1962).
0 COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(1) (1973). " 'Abandonment of a conditional water
right' means the termination of a conditional water right as a result of the failure to
develop with reasonable diligence the proposed appropriation upon which such water right
is to be based."
7 557 P.2d at 1175.
6' Grand Junction, in its appellate brief, stated: "It is true that the 1911 decree is
unique; none other like it can be found despite extensive research. The condemning, not
of existing rights, but of a first right, superior to all others, was ingenious." Reply Brief
for Appellant at 2, City of Grand Junction v. Kannah Creek Water Users Ass'n, 557 P.2d
1173 (Colo. 1976). See note 47 supra.
" E.g.,
Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339
(1908).
'0 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6: "[Wlhen the waters of any natural stream are not
sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose
"

7' Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 549, 349 P.2d 370, 379 (1960); Town of Sterling
v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 427, 94 P. 339, 341 (1908).
' Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 237, 48 P. 532, 534
(1896).
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Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co.73 held that because the
use of water is a valuable property right, the constitutional preference for domestic use is merely the privilege to condemn and pay
for the rights of nonpreferred users.74
Nevertheless, Kannah Creek is probably best explained not
as an anomaly to familiar rules of water law, but as the Colorado
Supreme Court's clearest signal of its developing policy to ensure
that cities receive adequate water in times of shortage.75 A number of post-Church cases fit the pattern. For example, in
Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg,75 the Colorado court was confronted with a situation similar to that in the Church and
Kannah Creek cases. As in Church, the city (Walsenburg) had
purchased direct-flow rights of farmers and attempted to change
the manner of use to storage. Therefore, the condemnation-fee
simple approach of Kannah Creek was not available. The court,
neverthless, circumvented Church by holding that downstream
appropriators had not proved injury "clearly and conclusively.""
42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
Id. at 426, 94 P. at 341; Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN.
L. REv. 133, 134-37 (1955); Thomas, Appropriationsof Water for a PreferredPurpose, 22
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 422, 424 (1950). See Carlson, Report to Governor John A. Love on
Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DE. L.J. 293, 309-15 (1973).
"' Several states have opted for a true preference approach in allowing cities to reserve
water rights for future growth. E.g., TEx. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.028 (Vernon) (1972)
("Any appropriation made after May 17, 1931, for any purpose other than domestic or
municipal use, is subject to the right of any city or town to make further appropriations
of the water for domestic or municipal use without paying for the water."); see Trelease,
Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 133, 136-37 (1955). In California,
appropriations for electrical energy and other power-generating purposes are granted subject to appropriations for domestic and agricultural purposes. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist.
v. Department Pub. Works, 1 Cal. 2d 479, 35 P,2d 1027 (1934). In Kansas, domestic users
may fill barrels from any stream without regard to the prior appropriations of others. KAN.
STAT. § 42-311 (1973). Until 1965, a New Mexico statute permitted unincorporated villages
with populations exceeding 3,000 persons to take water without regard to prior appropriations. The most drastic example seems to be the California "pueblo right." By virtue of a
city's position as the first major settlement on a river during the period of Spanish or
Mexican control, the city can take all the water it needs from the river basin without
regard to prior appropriations and without compensation. See City of Los Angeles v. City
of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975); 2 W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAwS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 145 (1974); C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION
& WATER 2590-93 (1912).
" 171 Colo. 304, 310, 467 P.2d 267, 270-71 (1970).
" Id. at 310, 467 P.2d at 270. This language seems contradictory to the court's concession that the "burden of proof to establish that a change of use will not injure the rights
of other users from the same source rests on the petitioner." Id.
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This is somewhat contrary to the language of the earlier Church
case that "[sluch a change [to storage] would necessarily increase the ultimate consumption from the stream to the detriment of other appropriators.""8 Other recent cases also point to
this developing policy of domestic "preference". 79
CONCLUSION

The determination that all appropriators or their predecessors who were injured by the change in use to storage had somehow been compensated by the 1911 judgment condemning their
direct flow rights is probably the salient feature of this case factually. Under existing Colorado water laws, further compensation
to the Kannah Creek farmers should have been required. In holding that a city may in some instances acquire a fee simple in
water taken by condemnation, the court brushed aside three
basic principles of water law: (1) the principle of usufructuary
rights, (2) the doctrine of beneficial use, and (3) the principle that
no change in use can be made if it injures other appropriators.
7R 167 Colo. at 15, 445 P.2d at 59.

E.g., Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961). In that case the court held that the Colorado
water compensation statute for transmountain diversions did not apply to Denver. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-118(b)(IV) (1973). The court stated: "We find nothing in the
Constitution which even intimates that waters should be retained for use in the watershed
where originating." 148 Colo. at 202, 365 P.2d at 288-89. The court also distinguished an
earlier case which had held against Denver and held that construction begun on one phase
of a project would be applied to another phase in a different area for purposes of showing
reasonable diligence. Id. at 202-03, 365 P.2d at 289 (distinguishing City & County of
Denver v.Northern Colo. Water Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954)).
In two cases decided the same day, in 1972 the Colorado Supreme Court developed
doctrines which give cities almost absolute ownership of water in certain circumstances.
In Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. 1 v. Farmers' Reservoir & Irr. Co., 179
Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972), the court held that the usual rule for change of point of
diversion does not apply to change of point of return of "waste water." Id. at 41-42, 499
P.2d at 1193. In City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 179 Colo.47, 506 P.2d
144 (1972), the court held that a city may re-use, make successive uses for different
purposes, and dispose of water by lease or sale where the water has been imported by
transmountain diversion by the city. Id. at 52, 57, 506 P.2d at 146, 149.
In a recent opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court held that home-rule cities are not
subject to certain provisions of the Water Rights Condemnation Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§
38-6-201 to 216 (Supp. 1976). Among the sections held unconstitutional was one which
provides that no municipality may condemn water rights for any anticipated or future
needs in excess of fifteen years. Id. § 38-6-202(2). The court did not decide whether these
provisions would be invalid as applied to cities without home-rule charters. City of Thornton v. Farmers' Reservoir & Irr.
Co., No. 27462 (Colo. Feb. 6, 1978).
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The Kannah Creek case, being a severe aberration from prior
law, presented more questions than it answered. For example,
may other cities in Colorado now claim a fee simple right in water
taken under previous condemnation actions, even though their
condemnees could not have claimed such a right? Because
Kannah Creek is an anomaly in Colorado water law, it may be
limited to its facts.
Kannah Creek may also signal a movement toward preferential treatment for cities. The court's other recent decisions in the
area of cities' water rights support this view. In any event, the
case clearly demonstrates a recognition that, in times of shortage,
the thirst of the populace must be given the "paramount" priority.
Ervin B. Pickell

